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Abstract 
This Policy Paper collects a set of contributions given and discussed at the Conference on “Global 
Administrative Law: an Italian Perspective”, European University Institute, Global Governance 
Programme, 24 February 2012. 
The purpose of the conference was to present the work of a group of Italian scholars who have, to 
date, written more than a hundred articles or books on Global Administrative Law (GAL), and have 
been or are engaged in around ten collective enterprises on the subject. 
After a brief introduction by Sabino Cassese, in which the main features of GAL and its significance 
are examined, nine contributions deal with a high number of legal issues raised by globalization and 
global governance. All of them adopt a GAL approach in order to tame and frame relevant topics such 
as the role of administrative law beyond the State (Stefano Battini), courts acting as global regulators 
(Elisa D’Alterio), the global governance after the financial crisis (Giulio Napolitano), the global 
financial regulation (Maurizia De Bellis), global rules of public procurement (Hilde Caroli Casavola) 
and procurement regimes of international organizations (Elisabetta Morlino), global sports law 
(Lorenzo Casini), the relationships between GAL and EU administrative law (Edoardo Chiti) the 
transgovernmental power at the European and global level (Mario Savino). 
This Policy Paper aims at contributing to one of the most significant intellectual enterprise of 21st 
century, i.e. framing, understanding and explaining the legal implications of globalization. From this 
perspective, works here presented clearly show that public and administrative law can be very useful, 
but they must be studied solely in their usual paradigms. These latter were developed in national 
contexts as a set of values, principles, and rules necessary to the proper functioning of domestic 
institutions: they cannot be transposed mechanically to the global legal space and they must be 
adapted to such a different endeavor. 
Keywords 
Globalization; global governance; global administrative law; global polity, EU law; 
Transgovernmental Networks; Financial Regulation; Public Procurement; Courts; Sports Law 
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What is Global Administrative Law and why study it? 
Sabino Cassese* 
I. Contents 
The purpose of this conference is to present the work of a group of about thirty Italian scholars (ten of 
whom are present today)1. These scholars have, to date, written more than a hundred articles or books 
on Global Administrative Law (GAL) (refer to the list of the works published by the participants and 
to the IRPA website), have been or are engaged in around ten collective enterprises on the subject, 
have organized, from 2005 to 2012, eight GAL international seminars (seven in Viterbo and one in 
Rome) and have published a “GAL Casebook” (first edition 2006; second edition 2008; third edition 
2012). 
By way of introduction, I shall address the following questions: 
- Why study Global Administrative Law? 
- What is the Global Polity? 
- What are the main features of the Global Legal Space? 
- What role does the law play in the Global Space?  
- How is the problem of legitimacy in the Global Legal Space solved? 
- What are the main characteristics of Global Administrative Law? 
- Why is the study of Global Administrative Law an important intellectual exercise? 
II. Why study Global Administrative Law? 
Why did so many Italian legal scholars start to study Global Administrative Law in the early days of 
this century? Some reasons are peculiar to Italy, while others are common to European and American 
scholars. 
1. Global Administrative Law is the major development in the field of public law in the second half 
of the 20th century: 
a. Global Administrative Law has evolved according to an incremental pattern: first, it was applied 
to peace and human rights (the UN); then, to areas such as the sea, nuclear waste, health, labor, the 
environment; subsequently, to trade; finally, to global terrorism and global crises; 
b. the process of globalization has been piecemeal, and globalization has developed through crises 
and unbalances, by accretion and accumulation; 
2. the study of Global Administrative Law is the logical sequel to the study of EU law, in order to 
integrate EU law in the larger world context and to understand what there is beyond the State; 
3. there is a strong need to break with cultural nationalism, according to which public law is 
connected to the State and, therefore, each State has its own public law and there is no link 
between the different national legal environments. It is necessary to expose each national legal 
culture or scholarship to international evaluation and to let cross-national fertilization develop. 
                                                     
* Judge of the Italian Constitutional Court. 
1 They are: Alessandra Battaglia, Stefano Battini, Mariangela Benedetti, Giulia Bertezzolo, Dario Bevilacqua, Hilde Caroli 
Casavola, Bruno Carotti, Lorenzo Casini, Sabino Cassese, Eleonora Cavalieri, Edoardo Chiti, Martina Conticelli, Elisa 
D’Alterio, Maurizia De Bellis, Giacinto della Cananea, Marco Macchia, Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella, Elisabetta Morlino, 
Giulio Napolitano, Marco Pacini, Lorenzo Saltari, Aldo Sandulli, Mario Savino, Gianluca Sgueo, Giulio Vesperini. 
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National scholarship should be less parochial and more outward-looking. It is, thus, necessary to 
substitute the global paradigm to the statist paradigm and let institutions and ideas migrate from 
one area (and level) to the other; 
4. international law does not fully capture the peculiarities of globalization (it is focused on relations 
between States), whilst GAL is better capable of analysing both transnational and 
transgovernmental relations and civil societies acting as global actors, on the premise that States 
are fragmented.  
III. What is the Global Polity?  
I shall now examine the process of globalization from a political science point of view and then review 
the main features of the global legal space. 
The main features of the Global Polity are the following: 
1. There is no global government, but rather several global regulatory regimes (from health to 
labor, to trade, to sea, to banking), without one single hierarchically superior regulatory system. The 
Global Polity is the empire of “ad-hoc-cracy”: global regulatory regimes do not follow a common 
pattern. This highly a-systematic system has been nicely encapsulated in the formulation “governance 
without government” (a formulation which already dates back twenty years2). What unifies this 
mosaic of legal orders is the “wechselseitige Eigennutz” (“reciprocal interest”)3. 
Vertically, there is continuity and no clear dividing line between global and national levels. 
“Global” does not mean that the State is excluded. National civil societies, national bureaucracies, 
national executives are all important actors in the global arena, where they accept to lose some of their 
autonomy (sovereignty) in exchange for getting influence in a much larger area than that of the 
national State. The bazaar replaces the cathedral4. 
“Global” does not mean intergovernmental: in the global space, there are transnational networks 
and links among civil societies that are as important as International Governmental Organizations 
(IGOs). While global regulatory regimes are approximately two thousand, Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGO) number more than forty thousand5. 
2. There is no representative democracy and there are no periodic elections at the global level; but 
deliberative democracy can work as a valid surrogate, granting participation in the decision making 
processes. 
Global regulatory regimes impose democratic principles on national governments. In particular, 
some democratic principles (free elections, freedom of association, free speech) are imposed by global 
actors (such as the European Union and the Council of Europe) on national governments. An example 
is the conditionality for accession to the European Union (EU). Another example of this phenomenon 
is provided by the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides for individual complaints 
to be brought before the European Court of Human Rights, which in turn has compulsory jurisdiction 
over its Member States6. 
                                                     
2 J. N. Rosenau, E.-O. Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, 
Cambridge, 1992. 
3 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History and Morals (English transl.), Indianapolis, 1983. 
4 The metaphor is taken from E. S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, Sebastopol, 1999. 
5 Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations, München, Saur, 2005. 
6 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol 
No. 11, art. 34. 
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3. The global polity is porous and open: national governments, other global regulatory regimes and 
civil societies can interfere with and influence the global institutions. 
IV. The Global Legal Space 
I shall now turn to the legal aspects of my analysis and examine the Global Legal Space, the role that 
the law plays in such space and the issue of legitimacy that has been raised in this context. 
The area beyond the State is not only “global” from an economic point of view; rather, also a 
global legal space exists, encompassing a vast number of different regulatory bodies, a mass of rules, a 
great quantity of procedures, and a complex array of links both to national bureaucracies and civil 
society. 
What is missing is a single general and unitary body of global law. Instead, there are numerous 
global regimes. However, both the administrative actors and the judicial bodies (where these exist) 
within each individual regime establish links to, and rules of engagement with, other regimes. 
Cooperation, division of labor and dialogue are common among global regimes and their constituent 
institutions. Cooperative dialogue between regimes means that the principles of each regime should 
not be interpreted and applied in a vacuum. It is in this process that some have recognized the 
emergence of a general body of law at the global level7.  
Moreover, each national legal order has developed a certain number of common rules, and these 
now provide core standards that can be shared and even codified at a supranational level (take, for 
example, the Council of Europe’s codification of rules on administrative procedure8). 
Given that the global legal order is fragmented, there are no general legal principles common to all. 
But some common understandings are developing: the duty to respect human rights and the rule of 
law; the obligation to inform and to hear interested parties before a decision is taken (as held, for 
example, in the Juno Trader case before the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea);9 a number 
of due process obligations; and substantive duties relating to the principles of fairness and 
reasonableness, amongst others. 
The widely-used expression “multilevel governance” is misleading, insofar as there is no clear-cut 
separation of competences between national governments and global institutions, structured within a 
definite hierarchy, of the type that this expression seems to suggest. Rather, the global arena is 
characterized by the spread of powers between the global and the national levels of government. For 
instance, environmental protection is at once a global and a national task, and competencies in this 
                                                     
7 “The current range of international legal obligations benefits from a process of accretion and cumulation” in Arbitral 
Tribunal, Southern Bluefin Tuna case, n. 52, 14 August 2000. “[….] the principles underlying the Convention [on Human 
Rights] cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum”, in European Court of Human Rights, Bankovic v. Belgium and 
others, 12 December 2001, para. 51. See also European Court of Human Rights, Loizidou v. Turkey, II, 18 December 
1996, para. 43. “The scope of special laws is by definition narrower than that of general laws. It will thus frequently be 
the case that a matter not regulated by special law will arise in the institutions charged to administer it. In such cases, the 
relevant general law will apply”, from UN Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, Conclusions of the 
work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and 
expansion of International Law, 2006, in The Work of the International Law Commission, ed. by UN Secretariat, New 
York, 2007, vol. 1, 399. 
8 Council of Europe, The administration and you: principles of administrative law concerning the relations between 
administrative authorities and private persons, Strasbourg, 1996. 
9 International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea-Bissau, case no. 13, December 
18, 2004 (www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=13&lang=en). On the case, see D. Agus, M. Conticelli, “The 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS): The Juno Trader Case”, in Global Administrative Law: Cases, 
Materials, Issues, II ed., ed. by S. Cassese, B. Carotti, L. Casini, M. Macchia, E. MacDonald, M. Savino, Rome/ New 
York, 2008, 124-128, also available at http://www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/GALCasebook 2008.pdf. 
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field are not merely shared by global and national bodies; areas of jurisdiction overlap and compete 
with each other. The line between the national and the international is becoming increasingly blurred 
(see, for example, the Cybersquatting cases before the World Intellectual Property Organization10 
dispute resolution panels). In the case of shared powers of this kind, the rule is not strict separation and 
rigid hierarchy, but permeability, intermingling, interpenetration. 
Global institutions derive their jurisdiction and their powers from national governments. It does not 
necessarily follow, however, that all of their powers originate in direct delegation from States. For 
example, there are international institutions that were not established by national governments, but by 
other international bodies (for example, the Codex Alimentarius Commission)11. 
Moreover, cooperation in the global arena does not occur only between international institutions 
and national governments, but also between international institutions themselves. The global order can 
be illustrated by the well-known metaphor of the marble cake, as there are no clear dividing lines 
between layers (national and global) and (global) sectoral regimes; rather, the two worlds are linked 
both vertically and horizontally through a complex array of relations and networks. 
V. The law in the Global Space 
In domestic legal orders, there is a clear-cut dichotomy between legal and non-legal prescriptions, 
because there is a higher authority that establishes the dividing line between what is and what is not 
law. This picture, however, changes as we move into the global arena. There, we are confronted by a 
world that is highly formalized, but not in strictly legal terms. For example, many World Bank “legal” 
instruments are simply referred to as “policy” documents; yet in many cases these can scarcely be 
considered less important than statutes passed by national parliaments. They regulate important 
aspects of the Bank’s activity, such as the duty to perform an environmental impact assessment, and 
all relevant procedural requirements12. Private parties in India or South Africa can appeal to these 
standards, and ask that global and national governance bodies comply with them. Must we concede 
that anything that is not binding is, ipso facto, not law? If there is an area of law in which the Latin 
motto “ubi societas, ibi ius” holds true, then surely this must be the global arena. 
At this point, a second dichotomy emerges, related to the first: that between binding (“hard”) and 
non-binding (“soft”) law. The basic question that we might pose in this regard is as follows: is a 
formally binding commitment to obey a rule the only means of producing rule-conforming behavior?  
                                                     
10 See, for example, World Intellectual Property Organization, Arbitration and Mediation Center, Administrative Panel 
Decision, decision of 22 July 2003 Casio Keisanki Kabushki Kaisha, dba Casio Computer Co., Ltd v. Fulviu Mihai 
Fodoreanu, case No. DRO2003-0002; decision of 4 August 2000 Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona v. 
Barcelona.com Inc., case No. D2000-0505. Decisions are available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/ decisions/index-
cctld.html.  
11 See M.D. Masson-Matthee, The Codex Alimentarius Commission and Its Standards, The Hague, 2007. Further 
information is available in J.A. Bobo, The Role of International Agreements in Achieving Food Security: How Many 
Lawyers Does It Take to Feed a Village?, 40 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 937 (2007). 
12 Elsewhere, I have defined the WB’s operative policies as “ad hoc international administrative norms”: see S. Cassese, 
“Global Standards for National Administrative Procedures”, 68 L. & Cont. Prob., 109 (2005). Moreover, NGOs and local 
communities have been increasingly addressing the WB’s policies within the context of global compliance mechanisms, 
see, for instance, M. Circi, “The World Bank Inspection Panel: the Indian Mumbai Urban Transport Project Case”, in 
Global Administrative Law: Cases, Materials, Issues, supra, note 7, 129-133. A broader analysis of the WB social 
policies can be found in A. Vetterlein, “Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction, and the Role of Social Policies: The 
Evolution of the World Bank’s Social Development Approach”, 13 Global Gov. 513 (2007). See also K. Tomasevski, 
“The Influence of the World Bank and IMF on Economic and Social Rights”, 64 Nordic J. of Int. L. 385 (1995), M. 
Nesbitt, “The World Bank and de facto Governments: A Call for Transparency in the Bank’s Operational Policy”, 32 
Queens L.J. 641 (2006-2007), K.W. Simon, “World Bank Wants a New Approach to Consultations with Civil Society”, I 
Int. J. of Civ. Soc. L. 41 (2003).  
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Even in domestic legal orders, not all rules are binding or compulsory. National legislation also 
establishes incentives and issues guidelines; it seeks not only to compel, but also to promote, to 
correct, to educate, and so on. 
An example from the global arena is provided by the standards generated by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission. These are not, in and of themselves, compulsory; they are, however, in 
effect given binding force by the World Trade Organization13. One authority produces rules, another 
endows them with binding force. The rule is not binding from its inception, rather only becoming so 
because another authority imposes conformity upon those under its jurisdiction. Therefore, in this case 
the rule is binding in the field of global trade, but not in other areas, giving rise to a “dédoublement”. 
A third point, also related, concerns the concept of authority. Power, not authority, is central in the 
global arena. Power can be exercised through authoritative means (such as the “command and control” 
models familiar to domestic administrative systems), but also through agreements, contracts, 
incentives, standards and guidelines. 
Finally, while in the national legal orders a law which did not emanate from the State (Hans 
Kelsen) was (once) not conceivable, globalization breaks the link between sovereignty, territoriality 
and legislation, and opens the way to private legislation (for example, ICANN). In a system with a 
multiplicity of sources of law, law and the State are not the same thing, and the rule of law does not 
mean the rule of (State) law. 
VI. Legitimacy in the Global Legal Space 
There exists no cosmopolitan democracy, no planetary constitution, no global Parliament. Is this cause 
for concern? 
Here again it is necessary to return to certain basic questions. Why do we want national 
governments to be legitimate? Simply put, the answer might consist of something as follows. National 
governments exercise their power through authority: they oblige and impose. Therefore, they must be 
run on the basis of the consent of the governed. Through recurrent elections, politicians are chosen and 
kept under control by the people. 
A number of differences emerge, however, when we move from the national to the global context. 
First, global bodies do not normally exercise power through authority: they seek not to simply impose 
their will, but rather to influence the behavior of national bureaucracies and private parties through a 
variety of different mechanisms. 
                                                     
13 See, for a general overview of the Codex Alimentarius Commission within the World Trade Organization, J. Vapnek, 
“Legislative Implementation of the Food Chain Approach”, 40 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 987 (2007); J. Kurtz, “A Look 
behind the Mirror: Standardisation, Institutions and the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements”, 30 U.N.S.W.L.J. 504 (2007), 
also available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2007/31.pdf; T.P. Stewart, D.S. Johanson, “The SPS 
Agreement of the World Trade Organization and International Organizations. The Roles of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the International Plant Protection Convention, and the International Office of Epizootics”, 26 Syracuse J. 
Int’l L & Com. 27 (1998-1999). An analysis of the complex relationship between the global standards of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission and domestic States is provided by D. Livshiz, “Updating American Administrative Law: 
WTO, International Standards, Domestic Implementation and Public Participation”, 24 Wis. Int’l L.J. 961 (2006-2007), 
also available at http://hosted.law.wisc.edu/wilj/issues/24/4/livshiz.pdf. A more general overview is provided by K. 
Claire, “Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International Actor and Its Influence on Other Actors and 
Regimes”, 24 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 79 (2006). A further analysis of the Codex Alimentarius standards and their connection 
to the FAO and WTO is given by M. D. Masson-Matthee, supra, note 9. It is worth noting that the standards can also 
diverge. See, for instance, E. D’Alterio, “Relations between Global Law and EU Law”, in Global Administrative Law: 
Cases, Materials, Issues, supra, note 7, 199-208; H.S. Shapiro, “The Rules That Swallowed Exceptions: The WTO SPS 
Agreement and Its Relationship to GATT Articles XX and XXI – The Threat of the EU-GMO Dispute”, 24 Ariz. J. Int’l 
& Comp. L. 199 (2007) . 
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Secondly, global bodies are usually established in order to keep national governments under 
control, or to provide services or pursue goals that governments alone are unable to. Therefore, they 
place limits on the activities of national executives. In this regard, we might suggest, they are on the 
same “side” as the people, formally speaking at least. 
Thirdly, national governments and infra-national agencies keep each other and global institutions 
under control (horizontal accountability).  
Fourthly, periodic elections are not the only means of legitimizing public power. Global institutions 
seek to forge their legitimacy through ensuring openness, dialogue and the participation of private 
parties (“Legitimation durch Verfahren”)14 in the decision-making process. Examples of this abound 
within global regimes: consider, for instance, the International Preliminary Examination procedure for 
the protection of inventions, established by the Patent Cooperation Treaty; or the complaints procedure 
before the World Bank Inspection Panel. 
Judicial protection is not guaranteed by every global regulatory regime. However, many do 
establish mechanisms that can act as a surrogate for formal judicial protection, for example granting 
“ex ante” participation rights to affected private parties or national governments, establishing quasi-
judicial procedures and ensuring some degree of independence to decision-making bodies.  
Finally, there are now around one hundred and ten extra-national courts around the world (most of 
them with jurisdiction in criminal matters)15. Technical and scientific expertise often play an important 
role in the controversies brought before these courts (see, for example, the Apples and Fire Blight case 
before the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body16 and the Southern Bluefin Tuna case 
before the Arbitral Tribunal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea17). Some 
internationalized forms of administrative review of domestic agencies also exist (for example, the 
NAFTA Chapter 19 Panels18); and there are many more bodies that provide some sort of judicial 
review by acting as quasi-independent courts, open to petitions from the affected citizens, and 
following adversarial or quasi-adversarial procedures. These are often referred to as, for example, 
                                                     
14 N. Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren, Frankfurt am Main, 1969. 
15 See the Project on International Courts and Tribunal International (PICT) and the synoptic chart available at 
http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/ synoptic_chart/synop_c4.pdf 
16 The relevant decisions in this case are Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, 
WT/DS245/R, 15 July 2003 and Report of Appellate Body, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Apples,WT/DS245/AB/R, AB-2003-4, 26 November 2003. On the case, see A. Albanesi, “The WTO ‘Science-Fest’: 
Japan Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples”, in Global Administrative Law: Cases, Materials, Issues, supra 
note 7, 45-50. 
17 Arbitral Tribunal established under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Australia and 
New Zealand v. Japan, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 4 August 2000. See also B. Carotti, M. Conticelli, 
“Settling Global Disputes: The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case”, in Global Administrative Law: Cases, Materials, Issues, 
supra note 7, 145-149. 
18 NAFTA Article 1904 establishes a mechanism that provides an alternative to judicial review by domestic courts of final 
determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty cases: the binational panel system. This system uses panels 
consisting of US and Canadian or Mexican panelists to review antidumping and countervailing duty decisions taken by 
national administrative authorities. The Panel may uphold or remand the national administrative action, and its decisions 
are binding. The binational panel system represents an internationalized form of administrative judicial review of 
domestic agencies: it reviews decisions of domestic agencies; its decisions are based on domestic law, not international 
trade rules; and the private parties involved (e.g. firms) have a right to initiate the panel review. For an overview on this 
topic, see G.R. Winham, A. Heather, “Antidumping and Countervailing Duties in Regional Trade Agreements: Canada-
U.S. FTA, NAFTA and beyond”, 3 Minn. J. Global Trade 1 (1994); G.R. Winham, G.C. Vega, “The Role of NAFTA 
Dispute Settlement in the Management of Canadian, Mexican and U.S. Trade and Investment Relations”, 28 Ohio N.U. 
L. Rev. 651 (2001-2002); E.J. Pan, “Assessing the NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel System: An Experiment in 
International Adjudication”, 40 Harv. Int'l. L. J. 379 (1999). See also M. Macchia, “Reasonableness and Proportionality: 
The NAFTA Binational Panel and the Extension of Administrative Justice to International Relations”, in Global 
Administrative Law: Cases, Materials, Issues, supra note 7, 86-91. 
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“compliance committees”19 or “inspection panels”20. In many regards, these latter bodies resemble the 
French Conseil d’État in the period between 1800 and 1872, when the Council was not legally 
recognized as a judicial body despite the fact that it exercised de facto judicial review. 
VII. The main features of Global Administrative Law 
I return to the question: is there a global administrative law? This question must be answered in the 
affirmative. This law has the following features: 
1. Notwithstanding some areas of overlap, global administrative law should be distinguished from 
traditional international law. “Ius gentium”, “Ius inter gentes” and the law of the nations refer to 
the law established between the governments of States to regulate relations between States as legal 
                                                     
19 The term “compliance committee” is used in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). See Convention on 
Biological Diversity, COP-MOP 1, Establishment of procedures and mechanisms on compliance under the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, Decision BS-I/7, Kuala Lumpur, 23 - 27 February 2004, also available at 
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/decisions/ decision.shtml?decisionID=8289; Economic Commission for Europe, Meeting of 
the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, Report of the First Meeting of the Parties, Addendum, Decision I/7 Review of Compliance 
adopted at the first meeting of the Parties held in Lucca, Italy, on 21-23 October 2002, ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8, 2 April 
2004, also available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/mop1/ece.mp.pp.2.add.8.e.pdf; 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Council, Adoption of the Revised Guidelines for Submissions on 
Enforcement Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 
Council Resolution 99-06, C/99-00/RES/07/Rev.3, 28 June 1999, also available at 
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=122&ContentID=1150&SiteNodeID= 276. 
20 The term “inspection panel” is used by the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs, consisting of the World Bank Group 
and the four Regional Development Banks: the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank Group). See International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development, I.B.R.D. Res. 93-10 (Sept. 22, 1993); International Development Association, IDA 
Res. 93-6, Sept. 22, 1993 (the two Resolutions are identical and are reprinted in World Bank, World Bank Operational 
Manual: Bank Procedures, 17.55, annex A, 1999, also available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOPMANUAL/Resources/EntireOpManualExternal.pdf?resourceurlname=EntireO
pManualExternal.pdf); Asian Development Bank, Establishment of an Inspection Function, ADB Doc. R225-95 (Nov. 
10, 1995); id., Review of the Inspection Function: Establishment of a New ADB Accountability Mechanism, May 2003, 
also available at 
http://www.adb.org/documents/policies/adb_accountability_mechanism/ADB_accountability_mechanism.pdf . And for 
an Executive Summary of the reform undergone by the ADB Accountability Mechanism see 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/ADB_Accountability_Mechanism/accnt000.asp?p=policies; IFC/MIGA’s Office 
of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, (see Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman- CAO, Operational Guidelines, April 
2004 (revised April 2007), also available at http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/howwework/filecomplaint/documents/English CAOGuidelines06.08.07Web.pdf ); European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Independent Recourse Mechanism: As Approved by the Board of Directors on 29 April 
2003 (2003), available at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/policies/irmback.pdf (see also id., Independent 
Recourse Mechanism Rules of Procedure: As Approved by the Board on 6 April 2004, available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/ research/policies/procedur.pdf); Inter-American Development Bank, Policy 
Establishing the Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism, 4 February 2010, available at 
http://www.iadb.org/en/mici/publications,1768.html ; African Development Bank, African Development Fund, Board of 
Directors, Enabling Resolution, B/BD/2004/9- F/BD/2004/7- B/BD/2004/10, 30 June 2004, as amended pursuant to 
Resolution B/BD/2010/10 – F/BD/2010/04, 16 June 2010, available at 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/ Compliance-
Review/Boards%20Resolution%2016%20June%202010.pdf; African Development Bank Group, The Independent 
Review Mechanism. Operating Rules and Procedures, 16 June 2010, available at 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Compliance-Review/ 
IRM%20Operating%20Rules%20and%20Procedures%20-%2016%20June% 202010.pdf]. For an overview, see E. 
Suzuki, S. Nanwani, “Responsibility of International Organizations: the Accountability Mechanisms of Multilateral 
Development Banks”, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 177 (2006); W. Namita, “Human Rights Accountability of the IMF and the 
World Bank: A Critique of Existing Mechanisms and Articulation of a Theory of Horizontal Accountability”, 12 U. C. 
Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 331 (2005-2006).  
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entities. Despite displaying some features to the contrary, this law is still largely non–hierarchical, 
arises on a voluntary basis and contractual in nature. Global law, on the other hand, consists 
largely of the rules produced by international organizations of different kinds. 
2. International law is mainly based on transactions, while global law has developed a more robust 
hierarchy of norms. This hierarchy has developed within each individual regulatory regime; it is 
now emerging among the different regulatory regimes as well (for example, the European Court of 
Justice, in the Kadi and Yusuf cases21, recognized the primacy of United Nations law over 
European law). 
3. International organizations currently are often capable of reproducing other such organizations (in 
fact, many of them were themselves established by other global bodies). They conclude treaties 
and make rules, and can no longer be considered to be the mere agents of States. Indeed, they can 
even create standards that are aimed at transforming national governments’ internal structure. 
4. Perhaps the most important global bodies are those that carry out a standard-setting function. 
These standards are generally addressed to national governments; but this does not mean that 
private parties are not affected by them. For example, the food that we eat is subject worldwide to 
the standards of the already mentioned Codex Alimentarius Commission22. The standards 
established by the Forced Labour Convention (1930) are addressed to national governments, but 
affect private individuals (see, for example, the case of Myanmar and the International Labour 
Organization23). 
5. Such bodies are at the top of many sectoral regimes. These regimes – as already noticed - do not, 
however, exist entirely independently of each other, but rather are linked in myriad different ways 
– either in relatively structured “regime complexes”,24 or simply through the significant areas of 
overlap in their respective fields of jurisdiction (e.g., trade and labor; trade and human rights; 
environmental protection and human rights; etc.25). 
                                                     
21 European Court of First Instance, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, 21 September 2005, case 315/01, in Rec., 2005, pp. II-3649; European Court of First Instance, 
Ahmed Ali Yusuf e Ali Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, 21 September 2005, case 306/01, in Rec., 2005, pp. II-3533. For an overview, see A. Bainham, 
“Is it Really for the European Community to Implement Antiterrorism UN Security Council Resolutions?”, Camb. L. 
J.281 (2006); E. Cannizzaro, “Machiavelli, the UN Security Council and the Rule of Law”, 3 Int’l Org. L. Rev. 189 
(2006); M.M. Winkler, “When legal systems collide: the judicial review of freezing measures in the fight against 
international terrorism”, 40 Yale Law School Student Scholarship Series 1 (2007), also available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu. 
22 See J. Kurtz, supra note 11; D. Livshiz, supra note 11. See, with particular reference to the interactions with the US 
system, D.M. Strauss, “International Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Importing Caution into the U.S. 
Food Supply”, 61 Food & Drug L.J. 167 (2006) or, also, S. Keane, “Can a Consumer’s Right to Know Survive the WTO: 
The Case of Food Labelling”, 16 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 291 (2006-2007). 
23 Commission of Inquiry, ILO, Forced labour in Myanmar (Burma), Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under 
article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance by Myanmar of the 
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Geneva, 2 July 1998, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm. See also E. Morlino, “Labour Standards: 
Forced Labour in Myanmar”, in Global Administrative Law: Cases, Materials, Issues, supra note 7, 1-9. 
24 A ‘regime complex’ can be defined as “an array of partially overlapping and non hierarchical institutions governing a 
particular issue-area [...] [R]egime complexes are marked by the existence of several legal agreements that are created 
and maintained in distinct fora with participation of different sets of actors. The rules in these elemental regimes 
functionally overlap, yet there is no agreed upon hierarchy for resolving conflicts between rules. Disaggregated decision 
making in the international legal system means that agreements reached in one forum do not automatically extend to, or 
clearly trump, agreements developed in other forums”: see K. Raustiala, V. David, “The Regime Complex for Plan 
Genetic Resources”, 2 Int.’l Org. 279 (2004). 
25 The many linkages between protection of human rights and protection of the environment have long been recognized. 
Principle 1 of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration) stated that man 
has a fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a 
What is Global Administrative Law and why study it? 
9 
6. The global and the national levels interact in a number of different ways: for example, national 
governments act as law-makers at the global level, but are also the addressees of global 
substantive and procedural standards. 
7. A global administrative law has thus developed, in terms of which global regimes are encouraged, 
and sometimes compelled, to ensure and promote the rule of law and procedural fairness, 
transparency, participation, and the duty to give reasons throughout all areas of their activity. 
8. The public-private divide is blurred (there exist many significant cases of “hybridization”: see, for 
instance, the ICANN, WADA, IUCN, WIPO, ISO, etc.) and does not follow their domestic 
paradigm of government regulating business. 
9. Dispute settlement by mandatory adjudication remains, as yet, the exception rather than the rule 
within the global legal order. Traditional diplomatic relationships and negotiations survive and 
operate side by side with compulsory and binding adjudication by supranational courts and the 
non-binding decisions of different quasi-judicial bodies. 
10. Compliance in the global space is “induced”. Global regulatory regimes become effective through 
various means. Global bodies use surrogates to implement their standards: retaliation, authorizing 
controlled self-enforcement (in particular, the certification and accreditation mechanisms applied 
to the implementation of global food standards, forestry rules, ISO standards, etc.); introduction of 
incentives for compliance. Implementation and enforcement may also be left to national 
governments acting as instruments of global institutions26. 
11. While there is a well-developed administration, governed by a well-developed set of 
administrative laws, in the global space there is no constitutional law because constitutionalization 
applies mainly to national legal systems.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
life of dignity and well-being. It also recognized the responsibility of each person to protect and improve the environment 
for present and future generations. Almost twenty years later, in Resolution 45/94, the UN General Assembly recalled the 
language of Stockholm, stating that all individuals are entitled to live in an environment adequate for their health and 
well-being. The resolution called for enhanced efforts towards ensuring a better and healthier environment. In contrast to 
the earlier documents, the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Conference on Environment and Development formulated the link 
between human rights and environmental protection largely in procedural terms (see Principle 10). This angle was further 
developed in 1998, with the conclusion of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention) . The Convention focused on the same 
issues as Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration and Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration, but in a more concrete 
manner, which strengthens the areas of overlap between human rights and environmental issues. For a comment on the 
Aarhus Convention, see M. Macchia, “Legality: The Aarhus Convention and the Compliance Committee”, in Global 
Administrative Law: Cases, Materials, Issues, supra note 7, 71-76. 
26 For example, within the WTO, a number of different mechanisms are used to ensure that the rules of the regime are 
enforced: mutual support, dumping/antidumping, subsidies/countervailing measures, non-implementation of WTO 
judicial decisions/retaliation, etc. On the retaliation principle and on countervailing measures, see K. Anderson, 
“Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement”, 2 World Trade Rev. 123 (2002); T. Giannakopoulos, 
“Safeguarding Companies’ rights in competition and antidumping/antisubsidies proceedings”, 43 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 
268 (2006); T. Jurgensen, “Crime and punishment: retaliation under the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
System”, 39 J. World Trade 327 (2005); Y.H. Ngangjoh, R.R. Herran, “WTO Dispute Settlement System and the Issue of 
Compliance: Multilateralizing the Enforcement Mechanism”, 1 Manchester J. Int’l Econ. Law 15 (2004); J. Pauwelyn, 
“Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach”, 94 Amer. J. 
Int.’l L. 335 (2000). In this regard, an important case arose before the WTO Appellate Body with reference to the 
reactions of WTO member States against the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (also known as the 
“Byrd Amendment”) approved by the US Senate. See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping 
and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (“Byrd amendment”), WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/D234/AB/R,16 January 2003, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/217_234_abr_e.pdf and Panel Report, United States – Continued Dumping 
and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/217/R, WT/DS234/R, 16 September 2002, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/wto/ds217_234/ds217r_5e.asp. For an analysis of the case, see M. Benedetti, “EU 
Countermeasures against the US Byrd Amendment”, in Global Administrative Law: Cases, Materials, Issues, supra note 
7, 185-191. 
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12. A process of constitutionalization is already underway at the global level through the 
strengthening of an international civil society, the creation of a global public sphere, the growing 
number of transnational networks and the proliferation of global courts. But there is no 
government in this global constitution. This is why global law is mostly administrative law, not 
constitutional law. 
VIII. The study of Global Administrative Law as an important intellectual exercise 
I return now to the first topic that I have addressed, the study of Global Administrative Law. 
We are currently engaged in a very important intellectual exercise – no less important, indeed, than 
that undertaken by the 19th century “founding fathers” of public law, such as Laferrière in France, 
Gerber, Laband and Mayer in Germany, Orlando and Romano in Italy. Scholars in New York, Rome, 
Heidelberg and elsewhere are working on a new area of legal theory and practice: that of global law27. 
This scholarly work has three main features. It is, firstly, a truly global effort. Jurists from all over 
the world are engaged in such research, some providing in-depth analyses of individual global 
regimes, while others seek to deduce a body of common principles and rules from the many and varied 
governance experiences. 
It is worth noting that a scholarly endeavor of this sort has not been undertaken since the 17th 
century. Indeed, ever since the attack from legal positivism led to the collapse of natural law 
approaches to the discipline, law has been conceived of as the product of nation-States exclusively, 
with international law conceptualized mainly on the basis of “contractual” relations between them. As 
a consequence, the study of each national system of law has become, for the most part, limited to 
national “schools” of lawyers, with occasional raids into foreign legal systems permitted to scholars of 
a more comparative orientation. 
Secondly, this endeavor deals with an entirely new subject-matter; one that has developed only 
relatively recently and, chiefly, in the last twenty years. It encompasses a vast array of different 
treaties, rules, standards, institutions, and procedural arrangements established beyond national 
frontiers either by the States themselves, or by other global institutions, in order to deliver services, 
establish further standards, monitor compliance, or act more generally as “clearing houses”. 
This body of law is confusing, at least when viewed through the lens of traditional conceptual 
criteria. It is law, but in most cases is not binding. It does boast established institutions, but these can 
most often proceed only tentatively at best, because their authority is not yet widely recognized. 
Thirdly, in the study of this field one cannot rely upon the usual paradigms of public law. These 
were developed in national contexts as a set of values, principles, and rules necessary to the proper 
functioning of domestic institutions. For example, regular elections at the national and local levels 
serve the purpose of democracy; and the due process of law is instrumental to the protection of 
fundamental rights. But can they be transposed mechanically to an entirely new environment, beyond 
the State? Can new wine be poured into old bottles? 
 
                                                     
27 See the Global Administrative Project launched by New York University in 2005 (http://www.iilj.org/GAL/default.asp), 
the research on Global Administrative Law led by the Institute for Research on Public Administration (IRPA) in Rome 
(http://www.irpa.eu/gal-section/), and the Project on The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions at the 
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht in Heidelberg (http://www.mpil.de). 
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Administrative Law Beyond the State* 
Stefano Battini** 
1. Is there an Administrative Law beyond the EU? 
Notwithstanding the fact that no serious scholar could deny, today, that a European administrative law 
does exist, serious scholars do deny that an administrative law is conceivable in the legal space beyond 
the EU.  
The cultural assumption behind such approach is easy to recognize. It can be traced back to 
Heinrich Triepel, a “founding father” of legal dualism: “We do not know an organized community that 
has the power to pose legal norms upon the State and the individual as its members”1. The space 
beyond the State and the EU, according to legal dualism, is entirely occupied by international law, 
which is rooted on the concept of a law between equal sovereign states exercising authority within 
their territorial borders. In such a space, no authority above the states can take decisions directly 
affecting individuals inside states, and no state can take decisions affecting individuals beyond its 
territory. As a consequence, is allegedly absent the conflict between public power and individual 
freedom, which is somehow the ID card of administrative law.  
The perspective of Global Administrative Law studies could largely be seen as an attempt to 
challenge such a view, arguing that globalization creates today, even beyond the EU, an increasing 
number of “non-domestic” relationships which imply a conflict between public power and individual 
freedom. As these relationships escape to domestic administrative law, a Global Administrative Law, 
to be applied to them, partly is emerging, and partly ought to emerge and develop, in order to preserve 
the rule of law in a globalized and interdependent world.  
More specifically, two kinds of non domestic relationships between public power and individual 
freedom are increasing, and, correspondingly, two souls of GAL are emerging.  
On the one hand, supranational authorities regulate, more directly than in the past, private conduct. 
It does not mean that supranational authorities formally have the power to adopt rules and decisions 
directly and immediately binding on firms and individuals, irrespective of national incorporation and 
national implementation. It does mean, however, that supranational authorities substantially have the 
power to adopt rules and decisions immediately affecting firms and individuals, as long as states often 
have no other alternative but to incorporate and implement rules and decisions adopted at the 
supranational level: increasingly, this is the place in which the public power affecting individual 
freedom is actually exercised. 
On the other hand, domestic authorities regulate, more intensively than in the past, foreign conduct. 
Again, it does not mean that domestic authorities formally have the power to “directly affect, bind, or 
regulate property beyond its own territory, or control persons that do not reside within it”: 
notwithstanding the increasing trend to the extraterritorial application of domestic regulation2, 
                                                     
* A shorter and different version of this paper will be published in C. BORIES (ed.), Le droit administratif global, Pedone, 
Paris, 2012. 
** Professor of Administrative Law, Tuscia University of Viterbo. 
1 E. Triepel, Volkerrecht und Landesrecht, Leipzig, 1899 (citing from the Italian translation by G.C. Buzzati, Diritto 
internazionale e diritto interno, in Biblioteca di scienze politiche ed amministrative, edited by A. Brunialti, Torino, 1913, 
p. 19) 
2 K. Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? The Evolution of Extraterritoriality in American Law, OUP, 2011. 
On the topic, S. Battini Extraterritoriality: an Unexceptional Exception, in T. Zwart, G. Anthony, Jean Bernard Auby and 
John Morison (edited by), Values in Global Administrative Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011.  
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territoriality is still the rule3. It does mean, however, that domestic rules and decisions, even when 
formally applied to conducts occurring within national borders, have substantial effects outside 
national territory as long as their application involve foreign subjects: increasingly individual freedom 
is affected by a public power exercised by foreign domestic authorities. 
This paper will very briefly focus on both kinds of relationships in turn, using a few examples, and 
then will draw some general concluding remarks. 
2. Supranational authorities regulating private subjects 
It is trivial to observe that, as globalization progresses, domestic regulators, facing global problems, 
have to exercise collectively their powers in order to overcome their intrinsic territorial limit. 
Therefore, just like in domestic legal orders Parliaments delegate rule-making and adjudicatory 
powers to administrative agencies, so states delegate similar powers to supranational bodies. These 
bodies, ranging from formal international organizations to informal networks of domestic public or 
private actors, become thus a source of a huge mass of regulatory decisions, which could be best 
conceptualized, according to the GAL perspective, as administrative regulation4.  
Such regulation, however, today affects individual freedom more directly than it is believed 
according to the dualistic paradigm: domestic authorities, rather than the recipients of decisions 
adopted at the international level, are often just an enforcement tool of global decisions against private 
subjects. 
A couple of examples could clarify the concept. 
The first example is drawn from environmental regulation of civil aviation and refers to 
administrative rulemaking. The second example is drawn from anti-terrorism regulation and refers to 
administrative adjudication.  
First example. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopts environmental 
standards in order to reduce emissions from aircraft and aircraft engines. The ICAO standards are not 
formally binding. States are free to adopt different standards, if they so decide. However, if a member 
state adopts a standard which is not “equal to or above” the ICAO standard, other member states do 
not have to allow aircrafts belonging to that state to travel through their airspace. On the other hand, if 
a member state adopts a standard which is above the ICAO standard, it results in an additional 
economic burden to domestic airlines, not applicable to air carriers belonging to states adopting a 
lower standard. In 1999, the ICAO adopted a higher standard. In 2003, the US regulator (EPA), 
according to the Administrative Procedure Act, started a “notice and comment” procedure in order to 
modify the domestic standard. Some environmental organizations proposed to adopt a standard above 
the level set by ICAO. The EPA, however, decided to match exactly the level of environmental 
protection defined by the international organization. The reasons given for such a decision, however, 
did not focus on environmental or health concerns; rather, the reasons focused on market 
harmonization: “because aircraft and aircraft engines are international commodities, there is 
commercial benefit to consistency between U.S. and international emission standards. Manufacturers 
would only have to design to one emission standard globally, and air carriers would only need to be 
                                                     
3 According to Otto Mayer, "notre Etat ne prétend que par exception à exercer son autorité dans la sphère du territoire 
étranger” (Le droit administratif allemand, Giard-Briére Editeurs, Paris, 1906, § 62, (Le droit administratif international) 
p. 354). 
4 See B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, and R. B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 15 (2005); S. Cassese, Administrative Law without the State? The Challenge of Global 
Regulation, 37 NYU J. Int’l L.&Pol 663 (2005); See also the essays published in: 68:3–4 Law and Contemporary 
Problems (2005); 37:4 NYU J. Int’l L. & Pol. (2005); 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1 (2006); 6:2 Int’l Org. L.R. (2009).  
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concerned with making sure the engines installed on their aircraft meet one standard. Such 
harmonization has economic and record keeping (and reporting) benefits”5.  
In such a context, are the participatory rights granted by the Administrative Procedure Act to 
domestic environmental organization still useful, once the domestic decision is substantially (thought 
not formally) prepackaged at the supranational level ? However, as a partial redress to such a loss of 
due process rights, ICAO grants to international coalitions of environmental organizations the 
observatory status which implies a set of participatory rights directly referring to the supranational 
decision-making process: the right to propose the adoption of new standards or the modification of the 
existing ones; the right to make comments to be taken into account by the deciding authority, and so 
on: overall, “a right to participate in the formation of SARPs [ICAO standards], made up of several 
other more precise rights”6. 
Second example. As is well known, a specific UN body (the Sanctions Committee) has been 
entrusted with the power to designate and place on a list (Consolidated List) individuals and entities 
associated with Al-Qaida. UN member States are bound to freeze the financial assets of any individual 
or entity designated by the Committee7. However, in an important and well-known judgment of 2008, 
the European Court of Justice set aside the European Council decision to freeze the assets of Mr Kadi, 
who had been designated by the UN Committee, on the grounds that his rights to a hearing and to an 
effective judicial remedy were patently disregarded8. As a partial redress to that decision, in 2009, the 
Security Council issued a Resolution which imposed a sort of duty to give reasons upon the UN 
Committee and provided for a sort of independent and impartial administrative review of listing 
decisions9. 
Therefore, in the first example, we have non domestic rules, contained in ICAO agreements, which: 
(a) on the one hand, substantially give a supranational organization rulemaking powers in order to set 
the level of environmental and health protection referring to the air pollution caused by emissions 
from aircraft and aircraft engines; and (b) protect the interests of affected people and firms by granting 
them the right to participate in a “notice and comment” procedure referring to the supranational 
decision making process. 
In the second example, we have now non-domestic rules, contained in UN Resolutions, which: (a) 
on the one hand, give a supranational organization adjudicatory powers in order to limit the property 
rights of private subjects; and (b), on the other hand, protect the property rights of the affected persons 
by granting them due process guarantees, such as the duty to give reasons and the right to an 
independent review.  
What kind of law is that? We could stipulate, for peace of some international law scholars, that this 
is still International Law. However, we should admit that such International Law is very much 
removed from its traditional and original paradigm, according to which it is a law “among the States” 
and its subjects are “States and only States”. We could also stipulate, for peace of some administrative 
law scholars, that this is not Administrative Law. However, if this is not Administrative Law, we 
should admit that it seems as if it were. 
                                                     
5 EPA, Emission Standards and Test Procedures for Aircraft and Aircraft Engines - Summary and Analysis of Comments 
(EPA420-R-05-004 – November 2005), p. 6:  
6 Tiago Fidalgo de Freitas, From participation towards compliance: The role of private actors in the making of SARPs by 
ICAO, Paper presented at the 3rd Global Administrative Law Seminar – Viterbo 15-16 giugno 2007.  
7 Resolution 1267 (1999) - S/RES/1267 (1999), 15 October 1999 and subsequent amendments and modifications 
8 See Judgement of The European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 3 September 2008, in Cases C-402/05 P and C-
415/05 P. 
9 Resolution 1904 (2009) - S/RES/1904 (2009), 17 December 2009 
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3. Domestic authorities regulating foreign subjects 
Let us now turn to the second type of “non-domestic” relationships between public power and 
individual freedom, namely those between domestic authorities and foreign subjects. This is also the 
space occupied by the second soul of Global Administrative Law. 
In conditions of economic interdependence, domestic regulation has an increased extraterritorial 
impact. It affects foreign conduct, particularly foreign firms seeking to market their products, to 
provide their services or to make their investments in the territory of any of the states sharing a 
common market. This is hardly a new phenomenon. Domestic rules and administrative decisions have 
always had a cross-border impact. However this old phenomenon has now increased in size, and the 
change in quantity becomes at a certain point a change in quality: it had never occurred that a so 
intruding and developed domestic administrative regulation was applied on a social and economic 
structure so deeply integrated and globalized. When markets, ruled by a deep administrative regulation 
that is domestic, become global, an unbalance is inevitably created: companies, which are called to 
move around an economic area without borders become exposed to the various and different domestic 
administrative regulations operating in that area and are forced to comply with each one, in order to 
commercialize their products in all the countries where they are in force. Traditionally, in domestic 
legal orders, Administrative Law has always meant, for companies, an important protection against the 
intrusiveness of administrative regulation. But the procedural guarantees set out by the domestic 
administrative law cannot obviously be enforced against foreign authorities. In this respect, companies 
have to rely on foreign administrative law, which is often not familiar, changing from land to land, 
sometimes underdeveloped. That is why a higher administrative law, more uniform as defined by 
supranational sources of law, is now emerging, providing companies operating around the world with 
a minimum quantity of administrative guarantees to rely on, whatever the country in which they do 
business. A growing set of supranational rules is thus emerging, which regulate the exercise of the 
domestic regulation affecting foreign freedom. 
Three other examples could clarify the concept. 
The first example refers to food safety regulation in Italy. In 2000, the Italian government 
suspended the placing on the Italian market of some GMO products patented by Monsanto, a 
multinational corporation headquartered in the US, on consumers’ health grounds. Monsanto contested 
the decision before the Italian Administrative Tribunal. However, at the same time, Monsanto 
managed to persuade the US government to claim, before the WTO, the violation of the SPS 
Agreement. This Agreement regulates the power of WTO Member States to adopt rules and 
administrative measures which, in order to protect health and environment, restrict international trade. 
The exercise of that power is subject both to procedural and substantial restrictions. As for the former, 
administrative decisions restricting international trade must comply with provisions which are very 
similar to the corresponding provisions of domestic laws regulating the administrative procedure: 
procedures must be undertaken and completed without undue delay; the standard processing period of 
each procedure must be published and the anticipated processing period must be communicated to the 
applicant; information requirements must be limited to what is necessary for appropriate control, 
inspection and approval procedures; judicial or administrative review of decisions must be ensured; 
and so on10. As for substantial restrictions, domestic administrative measures, adopted in application 
of domestic food safety legislation, must be actually “necessary” to ensure consumers’ health and 
must be “based on” a sufficient scientific evidence and an “appropriate risk assessment”. The WTO 
Panel issued its report in 200611 and declared unlawful the Italian measure at issue, as it lacked a 
                                                     
10 On the topic, P. M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Organization, 24 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 
1 2003; S. Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization, The George Washington 
University Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Paper n. 142. 
11 See G. Shaffer and M. Pollack, Reconciling (or Failing to Reconcile) Regulatory Differences: The Ongoing Transatlantic 
Dispute over the Regulation of Biotechnology. Workshop on The New Transatlantic Agenda and the Future of 
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“rational relationship” with the risk assessment conducted by the Italian scientific consultative body 
(Italian Superior Institute of Health), which stated that: "in the light of current scientific knowledge 
[...] there are no risks to human or animal health due to the consumption of derivatives of the GMOs 
[...]”. Therefore, the WTO Panel concluded that “there is no apparent rational relationship between 
Italy's safeguard measure, which imposes a prohibition, and risk assessments which we understand 
found no grounds for considering that the use of T25 maize, MON810 maize, MON809 maize and Bt-
11 maize (EC-163) endangers human health or the environment”12. Remarkably, the Italian 
Administrative Tribunal reached the same conclusions, following the same reasoning: it set aside the 
decision on grounds of inconsistency between its content and the results of the investigation. To put it 
differently, the exercise of the administrative power has been unreasonable13. 
The second example refers to public procurement in Canada. In August 2005, the Canadian 
Department of Public Works and Government Services, acting on behalf of the Treasury Board 
Secretariat, sent a Request for Proposals for the provision of professional audit services. As a qualified 
supplier, Deloitte & Touche submitted its bid. However, another company won the contract. Deloitte 
& Touche filed a claim to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, which is a domestic quasi-
judicial body that also acts as an international body, as it is competent for claims filed by companies 
alleging an infringement of the NAFTA and GPA provisions. These international agreements regulate 
public procurement procedures, in order to open tendering procedures to the participation of foreign 
companies and in order to introduce, in this way, more competition among bidders14. For example, the 
WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) imposes on member states the obligation to 
provide to suppliers all information necessary to permit them to submit responsive tenders15. Deloitte 
& Touche claimed the violation of this specific provision, arguing that the government introduced a 
new criterion for the evaluation of the proposals after the submission of the bids. The Canadian 
International Trade Tribunal sustained the allegation and recommended that the Canadian government 
compensate Deloitte & Touche for its “lost opportunity”, at one-quarter of the profit that Deloitte 
would have earned had it been the successful bidder in the procurement: “it is clear that the evaluation 
used an evaluation criterion not previously disclosed to bidders, or reasonably predictable from the 
RFP. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that PWGSC breached Article 506(6) of the AIT, Article 1013(1) 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Transatlantic Economic Governance, European University Institute, Florence, 18-19 June 2004. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=955277; G. Marceau and J. P. Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. A Map of the World 
Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods, Journal of World Trade, 36 (5), 2002; R. Hudec, Science and 
Post-discriminatory WTO Law, 26 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 2003; J. L. Dunoff, Lotus Eaters: Reflections on the 
Varietals Dispute, the SPS Agreement and WTO Dispute Resolution, Institute for International Law and Public Policy – 
IILPP, White Papers Series, 2006-1 
12 European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products - Reports of the Panel - 
WT/DS291/R; WT/DS292/R; WT/DS293/R, 29/09/2006, para 7.3195 (d). 
13 Tar Lazio, Sezione I, 3 dicembre 2004, n. 14477 
14 See on the topic the paper by Hilde Caroli Casavola in this volume. See also H. Caroli Casavola, Internationalizing 
Public Procurement Law: Conflicting Global Standards for Public Procurement, in Global Jurist Advances: Vol. 6 
(2006), Iss. 3, Available at: http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol6/iss3/art7; J.B. Auby, L’internationalisation du 
droit des contrats publics, in Droit administratif, 2003 (Aug.-Sept) ; C. McCrudden and S. G. Gross, WTO Government 
Procurement Rules and the Local Dynamics of Procurement Policies: A Malaysian Case Study, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151 
(2006). 
15 Particularly, art. XII, 2 states as follows: “Tender documentation provided to suppliers shall contain all information 
necessary to permit them to submit responsive tenders, including information required to be published in the notice of 
intended procurement, except for paragraph 6(g) of Article IX, and the following: […] h the criteria for awarding the 
contract, including any factors other than price that are to be considered in the evaluation of tenders and the cost 
elements to be included in evaluating tender prices, such as transport, insurance and inspection costs, and in the case of 
products or services of other Parties, customs duties and other import charges, taxes and currency of payment”. 
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of NAFTA and Article XII(2) of the AGP”16. The rule applied by the Canadian Tribunal, according to 
which administration must determine, and previously disclose, the evaluation criteria, is very well 
known in most domestic administrative law systems. It is an application of a more general standard, 
that is to say the impartiality principle. 
The last example refers to environmental protection in Mexico. In 1998, The Mexican Agency for 
environmental protection (INE) refused the renewal of the license for an hazardous waste landfill, 
owned by a Spanish corporation, TECMED. As a foreign investor, TECMED was entitled to the 
protection provided for in the Bilateral Investment Agreement between Spain and Mexico. This 
Agreement, as the majority of the approximately 2.500 Bilateral Investment Agreements (BITs) 
currently in force, committed the contracting parties not only to admit and promote foreign 
investment, but also to guarantee substantial rights to foreign investors, in order to protect them 
against the unlawful or arbitrary exercise of the regulatory power of the host State. Two types of 
clauses, typically set out in Investment Treaties have the most severe impact on domestic 
administrative regulation: “indirect expropriation” and “fair and equitable treatment”17. As for the 
latter, the Investment Treaty between Mexico and Spain provides as follows:“Each Party shall accord 
to covered investments of investors of the Other Party treatment in accordance with customary 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”. As the 
Agreement enables the foreign investor to bring suit against the host State before an international 
arbitral tribunal, TECMED filed a request for an arbitration, alleging, inter alia, the violation of the 
duty to accord to foreign investors a “fair and equitable treatment”. The arbitral tribunal stated that the 
measure applied by the Mexican government infringed the fair and equitable treatment clause and 
awarded a compensation for damages of more than 5 million dollars. The Tribunal has stated that the 
fair and equitable treatment clause implies a due process requirement, which obliges the government 
to ensure a “fair hearing” of the addressee of an adverse measure before adopting the decision. 
However, the Mexican government, in the tribunal’s opinion, did not allow TECMED to an adequate 
defense before denying the permit renewal: “During the term immediately preceding the Resolution, 
INE did not enter into any form of dialogue through which Cytrar or Tecmed would become aware of 
INE’s position with regard to the possible non-renewal of the Permit and the deficiencies attributed to 
Cytrar’s behavior —including those attributed in the process of relocation of operations— which 
would be the grounds for such a drastic measure and, thus, Cytrar or Tecmed did not have the 
opportunity, prior to the Resolution, to inform of, in turn, their position or provide an explanation with 
respect to such deficiencies, or the way to solve such deficiencies to avoid the denial of renewal and, 
ultimately, the deprivation of the Claimant’s investment”18. The Mexican Government thus infringed 
the International Treaty, providing for a fair and equitable treatment of the investor, as long as it 
infringed the principle of due process, which is at the center of most domestic administrative law 
systems. 
Therefore, in all the examples referred above, we have: (a) non domestic rules, contained in 
international agreements, regulating the administration, by domestic authorities, of domestic 
legislation, such as Italian (or European) food safety legislation, Canadian public procurement 
                                                     
16 Canadian International Trade Tribunal, Deloitte & Touche LLP v. Department of Public Works and Government Services 
- Determination and reasons issued Thursday, May 11, 2006, File No. PR- 005-044. 
17 On the topic, R. Dolzer, The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. 
Int’l L. & Pol., vol. 37 (2006), p. 953; G. Van Harten and M. Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of 
Global Administrative Law, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 121-150, 2006 Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=907655. 
18 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of May 
29, 2003, par. 173. See S. W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the 
Rule of Law, IILJ Working Paper 2006/6 (Global Administrative Law Series), available at http://www.iilj.org.; S. W. 
Schill, Revisiting a Landmark: Indirect Expropriation and Fair and Equitable Treatment in the ICSID Case Tecmed, in 
Transnational Dispute Management, vol. 3 (2) April 2006. 
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legislation, or Mexican environmental legislation; (b) judicial or quasi-judicial decisions, adopted by 
international court (on domestic court acting as international court), setting aside domestic 
administrative decisions on grounds of violation of specific non domestic rules, related to more 
general principles, such as reasonableness, impartiality and due process. 
No one could doubt that those principles, when applied by domestic courts in disputes involving 
domestic administrative authorities and referring to domestic administrative decisions, are 
“Administrative Law”. Should we reach a different conclusion when precisely the same principles are 
applied in precisely the same kind of disputes, by international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies? If the 
answer is no, we should admit that the WTO panel, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal and the 
Arbitral Tribunal have all applied a non domestic administrative law, which they contribute to create 
and develop. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, the following conclusions could be drawn. 
First of all, because of globalization, individual freedom is today increasingly threatened by a 
“puissance publique” which is exercised, other than by domestic authorities, by supranational and 
foreign ones as well. To the traditional case in which the state regulates citizens’ conduct, which is 
still the core of administrative law, is now to be added an ever increasing number of cases in which 
supranational authorities regulate private conduct, or domestic authorities regulate foreign conduct, 
both of which were, in the past, an exception to the opposite rule.  
Secondly, these increasingly emerging regulatory relationships are themselves regulated by a law, 
which is neither purely domestic, nor purely international. It is neither a law to be applied only inside 
states, nor a law to be applied between equal and independent political communities. It involves states 
and individuals at the same time. In this respect, it could be best conceptualized as a “global law”, as it 
applies in a legal space which crosses domestic and international law, without being a unitary and 
monistic legal order at the same time. 
Finally, such a global law is mainly made of legal materials (such as due process, duty to give 
reasons, independent review, impartiality, reasonableness, notice and comment, etc.) which mirror 
what in the most-developed domestic legal systems is known as administrative law. In other words, 
this global law “looks like” administrative law. 
Therefore, an administrative law beyond the state, and beyond the EU, does exist and it is worth 
studying it.  
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Courts as Global Regulators? 
The Judicial Regulation in the GAL Perspective 
Elisa D’Alterio* 
1. Introduction 
The present paper analyses the practice of courts to apply particular techniques (so called “doctrines”)1 
in order to regulate the relations between legal systems in the global administrative space, due to the 
lack or insufficiency of codified parameters regulating those relations. The exam of such a judicial 
activity gives rise to two preliminary questions: why is it interesting to study this issue? Why is this 
issue relevant in the Global administrative law (Gal) perspective?  
Firstly, the creation of judicial doctrines – both at ultra-state and national levels – is currently a 
topic of great interest (and also fashionable!)2 for at least three aspects: i. courts have developed an 
increasing number of functions, and this increase of judicial activities seems strictly depending on the 
strengthening of “judicial globalization”;3 ii. in particular, the creation of doctrines can be considered 
a form of judicial reaction to the “global disorder”: it is, in fact, the way to fill the lack of normative 
criteria – at national and global levels - for solving certain types of contrast. Doctrines allow the 
identification of the court having jurisdiction and/or the applicable law to the case, and – de facto – the 
solution of the dispute; iii. the application of doctrines can ensure a better jurisdictional protection to 
citizens and a higher degree of legal certainty in the global space.  
Secondly, the issue is relevant in the Gal perspective for especially four reasons. First of all, as 
underlined by a significant literature,4 an increasing proliferation of judicial bodies characterizes the 
global arena and the analysis of these organisms is fundamental to understand the general features of 
Gal. Just to mention two examples. The decisions of the WTO judiciary bodies (Panel and Appellate 
Body) strongly affect the regulation of the global market and of the economic relations between 
Member States and multinationals, by determining important administrative measures and, sometimes, 
procedural limits.5 The Inspection Panel of the World Bank can impose administrative restrictions on 
the implementation of public infrastructures (with environmental impact), by recognizing guarantees 
to citizens negatively affected by the public action.6  
Secondly, the application of doctrines should not be considered in relation to the mere problem of 
judicial adjudication, but in relation to the existence of multifarious legal systems that come into 
                                                     
* Tenured Assistant Professor of Administrative Law, Univesity of Catania. 
1 The expression “doctrines” is used by several authors with different meanings (for instance, in US the word is used with 
regard to particular theories created by judges, such as the Princess Lida doctrine, the judicial comity doctrine, etc.). See 
S. Cassese, I tribunali di Babele. I giudici alla ricerca di un nuovo ordine globale, Roma, Donzelli, 2009, 10-11, which 
elaborates a brief taxonomy of these theories. Herein, the word is used with the meanings of “judicial technique”/“rule of 
recognition” (see infra).  
2 There exists a very copious literature about the role of courts. For instance, on the web site of the “Social Science 
Research Network – SSRN” about 5.051 papers – whose title includes words “court/courts” - have been published.  
3 See A.M. Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 1103 et seq. (2000). 
4 On this aspect, see R. Mackenzie, C.P.R. Romano, Y. Shany, & P. Sands, The Manual on International Courts and 
Tribunals (2010); C.P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: the Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. 
J. Int’l L. & Pol. 711 (1999); T. Treves, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing Together the Puzzle, 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 679 et seq. (1999).  
5 See the well-known cases: WTO Appellate Body, Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, 70-72; Steel, WT/DS248/AB/R and 
Shrimp/Turtles, WT/DS58/AB/R.  
6 See the application of due process of law guarantees by the World Inspection Panel in the Report and recommendation, 
India: Mumbai urban transport project, September 3, 2004.  
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contact in the context of a “global administrative space”. In this sense, the application of doctrines – 
although it takes place in judicial proceedings – aims at pursuing a more general function than that of 
dispute settlement. The several studies on the adjudication by global courts or quasi-judicial bodies, 
usually, focus on the composition of the bodies, the proceedings, the due process of law guarantees, 
etc.;7 in all these cases, international procedural law profiles are analysed. The application of 
doctrines, instead, does not correspond to a mere procedural profile for at least four reasons: i. 
doctrines are created by judges and are not codified either in national procedural codes or in 
international treaties; ii. the application of these techniques is generally conditioned by political 
evaluations and, sometimes, by the need to guarantee global public interests; iii. in certain cases, the 
application of the judicial techniques does not lead to the settlement of the dispute, for instance when 
the court recognizes the application of the competing system and, consequently, adopts a self restraint 
behaviour (see in the case of the application of the equivalence criterion);8 iv. doctrines differ from the 
typical procedural rules pertaining to the choice of forum and multiple proceedings, such as lis alibi 
pendens and res judicata rules: a «crucial difference» is that the application of doctrines «cannot 
normally justify total abdication of jurisdiction by the comity-affording court because such an act 
would exceed that court's scope of authority».9 On the contrary, international procedural law studies 
analyse doctrines only under a procedural perspective, since they consider these techniques as mere 
parameters to choose the competent jurisdiction or to solve cases of lis alibi pendens, without looking 
at implications on Gal.10  
Thirdly, courts resort to use of doctrines in cases pertaining to administrative or constitutional law 
and not covered by national and international conflict of laws rules. Furthermore, the application of 
these mechanisms affects the discipline of relevant administrative and constitutional law issues, such 
as expropriation, public finance, due process of law, environment, etc. In this sense, doctrines are 
applied as “standards” for governing relations between legal systems in certain public sectors, by 
determining the applicable system, and by affecting the contents. 
Lastly, the judicial regulation contributes to the legal harmonization of the global space – due to the 
ordering and harmonizing effect deriving from the adoption of the judicial practices - and, 
consequently, to the development of Gal. 
In the light of the above-mentioned aspects, the present paper aims to answer the following 
questions: which is the function implemented by courts when they apply doctrines? In which measure 
does the application of doctrines affect the development of Gal? The main objective is to demonstrate 
that the application of doctrines embodies a “regulatory function” of courts, which strongly affects the 
development of Gal. Such an objective suggests how this paper is organized. Section 2 investigates the 
definition of “judicial regulation” and, in particular, analyses its development in the global 
administrative space. In section 3, the need to demonstrate how doctrines may represent a form of 
judicial regulation calls for an analysis of data relating to their application. This section takes into 
account two significant cases singled out according to the use of some relevant doctrines by ultra-state 
courts to solve contrasts between systems belonging to different legal levels. Section 4 analyses the 
object and the main features of doctrines applied in the cases mentioned in section 3, by identifying 
differences from conflict of laws rules, and by highlighting their regulatory function. In the light of 
                                                     
7 See, for instance, the relevant studies carried out by Y. Shany: Regulating Jurisdictional Relations between National and 
International Courts, Oxford University Press, 2007 and The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and 
Tribunals, Oxford, 2004. 
8 See para. 3 and 4. 
9 Y. Shany, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations between National and International Courts, supra note 7, 167. The Author 
associates several doctrines with the phenomenon of “judicial comity”. On the “judicial comity”, J. R. Paul, in his Comity 
in International Law, 32 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 et seq. (1991) and E. D’Alterio, “From judicial comity to legal comity: a 
judicial solution to global disorder?”, in 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law – ICON, no. 2, 394 ff. (2011). 
10 The first studies on conflict of laws date back to Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (Boston, 1834).  
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such a result, section 5 identifies some effects deriving from the regulatory function of courts, mainly 
with regard to the development of Gal.  
2. The judicial regulation in the global administrative space 
«The judicial institutions have a significant influence on the destiny of Anglo-American and occupy 
an important place among the political institutions in the strict sense».11 In this way, Alexis de 
Tocqueville defined the judiciary system in the United States at the first half of the nineteenth century. 
He recognized the relevant role of courts in that context, by describing them as “political bodies” with 
the power to mediate between the legislative power and the civil society. To this end, courts can affect 
the application of rules and, in certain cases, create new principles and provisions.  
Concisely, national courts can be “regulators”.12 As described by a relevant work of Gino Gorla,13 
already in the medieval period “great courts” (i.e. French Parliaments, Cameral Tribunal of the Holy 
Roman Empire in Germany, Florentine Rota, etc.), which had been entrusted with the power to 
administrate the justice in the name of the King, could issue normative acts. The administration of 
justice required the adoption, in the name of the King, of judgements with a “regulatory nature”, 
which represented a form of supplementary legislation (so called arrest de règlement). They were 
regulatory acts, subordinated to the law of the King, and dealt with specific administrative issues. 
Also today national courts act as regulators,14 by adopting judgments with “regulatory effects”, and 
by affecting the regulation of several administrative sectors in national systems (for instance, in France 
and in United Kingdom, the administrative procedure is mainly regulated by principles formulated by 
courts, due to the lack of a “general law about administrative procedure”).15 Some authors note that in 
national arena «it is becoming commonplace for courts to confront questions that were long deemed 
beyond the realm of possible judicial competence».16 Other authors, going beyond the distinction 
between common law and civil law systems, add that «judges continually make law in civil law 
jurisdictions».17 In certain cases, this practice is indirectly associated with the more general trend of 
the “judicial activism”.18  
In the global administrative space, ultra-state and national courts have – if it is possible – an even 
more important role. They solve disputes, interpret law, balance conflicts between powers, make 
                                                     
11 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835-1840. 
12 The terms “regulation/regulator” can have multifarious meanings: usually, the expressions are used to indicate both the 
discipline (and competent institutions) of public controls on the economic services implemented by private subjects, and 
the related regulatory acts of the Executive (S. Cassese, ‘Regulation’ e ‘Deregulation’, 2 Rivista trimestrale di diritto 
pubblico, 1983, 718 ff.). Nevertheless, the terms are also used to indicate a number of cases in which more or less 
qualified subjects (even private) set rules/standards affecting public sectors but not corresponding to “legislation”, due to 
the informal way followed for their adoption (F. Cafaggi (ed.), Enforcement of Transnational Regulation. Ensuring 
Compliance in a Global World, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, forthcoming). Herein, this broader meaning 
of regulation will be considered.  
13 G. Gorla, I “Grandi Tribunali” italiani fra i secoli XVI e XIX: un capitolo incompiuto della Storia politico-giuridica 
d’Italia, Quaderni del Foro Italiano, 1969. 
14 On this point, see A. Stone-Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe, Oxford University Press, 
2000.  
15 S. Cassese, La disciplina legislativa del procedimento amministrativo. Una analisi comparata, in Foro it., 1993, V c., 11.  
16 S. Issacharoff, Democracy and collective decision making, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 6, no. 2, 
2008, 266.  
17 J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition – An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America?, 
Standford, 1985, 83. 
18 L. Goldstone, The Activist. John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison and the Myth of Judicial Review, New York, Walker & 
Company, 2008. 
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recommendations, exercise public authority through judicial law-making,19 and may create principles 
and rules. In addition to these functions, they can also “regulate” global issues. In which sense can 
courts be considered regulators at the global level? What do they exactly regulate? 
To answer the aforesaid questions, it is necessary to start from a main assumption: the «global 
regulation typically does not operate on two distinct, vertically separated levels, international and 
domestic. Rather, it functions through a web of interactions and influences, horizontal, vertical, and 
diagonal, among a diverse multiplicity of different regimes and actors, resembling nothing so much as 
a Jackson Pollock painting».20 In this context, «the state’s near monopoly over domestic and 
international norm-promulgation has been replaced with a more heterogeneous field of law makers – 
professionals associations, international bureaucracies, multinational corporations and local 
communities […]».21 Therefore, private operators, associations, private organizations, 
intergovernmental organizations, public-private organisms, NGOs, global networks make rules at the 
global level in relation to different aspects: the accreditation of products, the relations among national 
professional associations, the public services delivery, the economic relations among States, the 
protection of relevant public interests, etc. The different legal nature of regulators does not affect their 
regulatory function but rather the enforcement of their standards, which can be more or less effective 
depending on the features of each regulator.22  
In this context, the existence of a “judicial regulation” should not be surprising. Several authors 
have studied cases in which ultra-state and national courts make global rules, by setting standards and 
creating principles and parameters within a «general process of “juridification”».23 In this sense, courts 
have a “reformative or proactive function”, which is «in addition to (the) ‘conservative function’ of 
judges to uphold legality by applying existing rules of law».24 Just to mention a number of significant 
examples.  
Some authors recognize the key role played by courts in the regulation of global public interests, 
such as the environment, and suggest to consider this activity in terms of risk assessment (cost-benefit 
analysis), by highlighting «how judges consciously or intuitively calculate economic costs and 
benefits».25 
Other authors define some courts as «international rule of law bodies», since they consider these 
bodies as subjects which «act on the basis of rules of procedure that are abstract, being set before the 
arising of any case or situation, and are public. Most of the time, it is the bodies themselves that are 
given the power to draft their own rules of procedure […]».26 Therefore, courts can create not only 
                                                     
19 J.L. Goldstein and R.H. Steinberg, Regulatory Shift: the Rise of Judicial Liberalization at the WTO, in W. Mattli and N. 
Woods (eds.), The Politics of Global Regulation, Princeton University Press, 2009, 211.  
20 R. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge To U.S. Administrative Law, in New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, 2006, vol. 37, 703.  
21 Y. Shany, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations Between National and International Courts, supra note 7, 101-102.  
22 F. Cafaggi (ed.), Enforcement of Transnational Regulation, supra note 12.  
23 J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law-Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, in 64 ZaoRV, 2004, 550.  
24 E.U. Petersmann, “Constitutional Justice” Requires Judicial Cooperation and “Comity” in the Protection of “Rule of 
Law”, in Shaping Rule of Law Through Dialogue. International and Supranational Experiences, ed. by F. Fontanelli, G. 
Martinico e P. Carrozza, Europa Law Publishing, 2010, 3. 
25 M.S. Hrezo and W.E. Hrezo, Judicial Regulation of the Environment under Posner's Economic Model of the Law, 
Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 18, no. 4 (Dec., 1984), 1071-1091. 
26 C.P.R. Romano, A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions, in Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 
2011, 2, no. 1, 252. The Author describes a remarkable taxonomy of judicial bodies and quasi-judicial bodies in the 
global space.  
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“substantive rules” (such as in the case of the environmental regulation), but also “procedural rules” 
(in addition, see the promulgation of disciplinary codes and rules governing lawyers practicing).27  
Courts can also regulate both very detailed questions, such as the insurance policies, by creating 
particular doctrines (i.e. reasonable expectations doctrine),28 and broader and more remarkable sectors, 
such as the global market. On this last point, some authors note that «over the last fifteen years, the 
focus WTO/GATT trade regulation has moved from trade rounds to a judicial process. […] the 
regulatory shift taking place at the WTO, from the legislative to the judicial, has given a new set of 
actors the authority and autonomy sufficient to set policy».29 
A certain literature even affirms that the judicial regulation contributes to «the gradual construction 
of a global legal system. […] It is a system composed of both horizontal and vertical networks of 
national and international judges, […]. The judges who are participating in these networks are 
motivated not out of respect for international law per se […]. They are instead driven by a host of 
more prosaic concerns, such as judicial politics, the demands of a heavy caseload, and the new impact 
of international rules on national litigants».30 Global courts are engaged «in constructive dialogue that, 
through cross-fertilization of their views, may bring about progress in the law».31 
A more radical interpretation of the phenomenon recognizes the development of a “judicial 
legislation”, whereby certain delegated legislative powers of making rules for the regulation of their 
own procedure passed by the Judicature. It differs from the principle of stare decisis, since courts 
create new rules (not limited by precedents), by implementing a function of «creation and evolution of 
the law».32 
Lastly, other authors have analysed the creation of judicial parameters to regulate the relations 
between different jurisdictions in cases of multiple proceedings in the lack of normative criteria.33 
Also this case can be considered a form of judicial regulation, insofar as courts create new rules for 
regulating some issues. These studies differ from other studies about the development of judicial 
doctrines:34 the former consider these mechanisms under a mere procedural perspective; the latter, 
instead, identify an “integrating role” of courts, which is represented by «some doctrines that allow 
cooperation, by acting either as a “clutch” to link and disconnect legal systems, or as a “glue” to keep 
                                                     
27 F.C. Zacharias and B.A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, in  
Ohio State Law Journal, vol. 70, Spring 2009. 
28 D. Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 William and Mary Law 
Review, 4, 1389 ff. (2007).  
29 W. Mattli and N. Woods (eds.), The Politics of Global Regulation, supra note 19, XIV. 
30 A.M. Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton, 2004, 65 ss. In this sense, see also J.S. Martinez, Towards an 
International Judicial System, in Stanford Law Review, vol. 56, 2003, 429 ss. 
31 T. Treves, Judicial Law-making in an Era of “Proliferation” of International Courts and Tribunals: Development or 
Fragmentation of International Law?, in R. Wolfrum and V. Roeben (eds.), Developments of International Law in 
Treaty-Making, Berlin, 2005, 619.  
32 M. Taruffo, Le funzioni delle corti supreme. Cenni generali, in Annuario di diritto comparato e di studi legislativi, 
Napoli, Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 2011, 25. Several authors recognize a “judge-made law”. See M. Cappelletti, 
Giudici legislatori?, Milano, Giuffrè, 1984.  
33 Y. Shany, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations Between National and International Courts, supra note 7.  
34 See S. Cassese, Diritto globale. Giustizia e democrazia oltre lo Stato, Torino, Einaudi, 141: «(…) with the recent 
development of non-state courts, there is a new phenomenon: the courts become the regulators of relations between 
different levels of government (vertically) and the producers of rules that fill the “gaps” between different ultra-state 
regulatory regimes (horizontally)».  
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them together, or as a “rhetorical device” to allow more easily waivers».35 In this sense, doctrines can 
be defined as “rules of engagement”36 regulating the relations among legal systems. 
As already mentioned, the present paper focuses on the development of judicial doctrines in the Gal 
perspective. This profile is not considered in previous studies on judicial doctrines, which, in fact, do 
not investigate in-depth the real function of the application of doctrines and their implications on Gal. 
The following paragraph considers two relevant cases pertaining to administrative law issues 
(precisely, the exercise of ablative administrative powers), in which different ultra-state courts resort 
to similar doctrines to regulate relations between legal systems, with the consequence of affecting the 
related disciplines. 
3. Case studies 
a) Kadi case. The case deals with the application of restrictive administrative measures by ultra-state 
public institutions (EU institutions) to a individual suspected of terrorism on the basis of UN law. 
Therefore, a problem of “contact” between the EU system e UN system arises.37  
Under this perspective, the case can be examined by considering four main points. Firstly, the 
European judge recognizes a general deference of the EU order in relation to the UN system, with the 
consequence that this relationship is not subjected to the article 351 TFEU (para. 288).38 On this 
deference would depend both the general supremacy of UN law on the EU system, and the 
incompetence of the European court to review the legality of the UN measures and the related 
executive acts adopted by EU institutions. Secondly, the European judge identifies some “counter-
limits”: the implementation of UN measures, in fact, cannot determine the violation of certain 
principles and values, that are resistant to the general prevalence of global law. These limits, initially 
linked with the principles of “jus cogens” (i.e. rules of international law),39 are then associated, in the 
decisions of 2008 and 2010,40 with the general principles and fundamental rights protected by the EU 
law. Thirdly, a link between these limits and the foundation of a legal review on UN measures and on 
the European executive acts of UN resolutions is recognized in the following terms: European judges 
assess the adequacy of the UN guarantees with the due process of law guarantees provided by the EU 
law. Finally, the results of the “exam of adequacy” condition the admissibility of the appeal: negative 
results allow to apply, under a general mechanism of subsidiarity, the system of guarantees provided 
by EU law and, consequently, to admit the appeal. 
b) Bosphorus case. The case regards the application of an administrative seizure by a national 
authority on the basis of EU law, which prejudices property rights protected by the ECHR system. In 
this judgement, a “contact” between EU law and ECHR system takes place.  
In particular, the Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi is a Turkish airline that 
leases two aircrafts of the Yugoslav national airline. Due to the outbreak of armed conflicts in 
Yugoslavia, the UN system provides for sanctions against this regime. After landing in Dublin of the 
aircraft, the Irish authorities, in compliance with UN measures carried out at EU level (Resolution no. 
820/1993, executed by EC Regulation no. 990/1993), apply the seizure of the vehicle without 
                                                     
35 S. Cassese, I tribunali di Babele, supra note 1, 10.  
36 M. Kumm, Constitutional Democracy Encounters International Law: Terms of Engagement, in New York University 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, no. 47, 2006. 
37 The case is broadly well-known. Herein, the analysis focuses on the specific profile of the use of doctrines to regulate 
relations between legal systems.  
38 ECJ—Grand Chamber, 3 September, 2008, joined causes 402/05 P e 415/05 P.  
39 Court of First Instance, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Consiglio UE e Commissione Ce, 21 September 2005, cause 315/01.  
40 Court of First Instance, Kadi v. Commission, 30 September 2010, cause 85/09. 
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providing any compensation. After a series of procedural events, the case is lodged to the Strasbourg 
Court, by alleging the infringement of Article 1 of ECHR Protocol no. 1, which protects the property 
right.41 The Court rejects the appeal, asserting that there is no infringement of the provision at issue, 
given that the Irish authorities did not exercise full discretion, but they acted in compliance with EU 
executive provisions of UN resolutions (para. 148). The Court affirms that the EU guarantees are 
“equivalent” or, in other words, “comparable” to those afforded by the ECHR system (para. 154-155). 
In the light of such equivalence between EU law and ECHR system, it is inferred that Irish authorities 
– by applying the seizure on the basis on EU provisions - complied with the ECHR (para. 156-165). 
4. Object and techniques of the judicial regulation  
The above-mentioned judgements deal with the application of administrative measures on private 
subjects. In both cases, public authorities (national and ultra-state bodies) – under ultra-state 
provisions - exercise “ablative powers” at the expense of individuals, who lodge appeal in different 
ultra-state forum against such measures. The general problem is to identify the legal guarantees 
applicable to the claimant, due to the impossibility to apply national administrative law. In both cases, 
ultra-state courts have to choose between the system to which they belong (so called lex fori) and the 
competing system (respectively, EU system v. UN system; ECHR system v. EU system). How do 
courts choose the system? Are there criteria for the selection? Courts cannot resort to conflict of laws 
rules, since the cases do not concern private law issues. Furthermore, there no exist specific provisions 
regulating relations between, respectively, UN system and EU order, and EU order and ECHR system, 
with regard to administrative issues (as those arisen in the cases). For these reasons, courts have had to 
create specific criteria: counter-limits doctrine (in the Kadi case), and equivalence criterion (in the 
Bosphorus case). Which are the main features of these techniques?  
Despite their respective peculiarities, counter-limits and equivalence criteria are judicial doctrines 
with two common denominators: i. they work on the basis of the same mechanism; ii. they affect the 
application of administrative measures provided by ultra-state law. Firstly, the application of both 
doctrines is preceded by an activity of “judge judging judges” 42 corresponding to the evaluation of a 
judicial system by another equally independent and equivalent. This practice cannot be considered a 
judicial review of the act, but it could be defined a check on the “adequacy” of the safeguards 
provided by the competing system. The adequacy, in turn, is weighted in relation to either the 
standards of due process of law (in counter-limits doctrine), or the degree of protection afforded by the 
competing system (in equivalence criterion). At the same time, both doctrines work as “access texts” 
to a possible judicial review: in fact, in the Kadi case, the infringement of due process of law standards 
allows the judicial review of UN measures by the EU judges; in the Bosphorus case, the lack of 
equivalence would have allowed the judicial review of the EU acts by the Strasbourg Court.  
As regards the second aspect, the application of doctrines affect the regulation and the enforcement 
of ultra-state administrative sanctions (respectively, freezing of funds and seizure), insofar as it allows 
the identification of the legal system providing for guarantees applicable to the individuals liable for 
administrative measures. Theoretically, the application of ultra-state administrative sanctions would 
comply with ultra-state administrative guarantees. For instance, a citizen liable for an administrative 
measure (a sanction, an expropriation, etc.) under the Italian law has the rights to be promptly 
informed, to participate in the related administrative procedure, to access to administrative 
documentation, etc., envisaged by Law no. 241/1990 (“Italian Law on administrative procedure”). On 
the contrary, at the global level there no exist general provisions providing for administrative 
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guarantees applicable to “multilevel cases”43 - such as Kadi and Bosphorus cases –; each ultra-state 
regime has own and peculiar rules according to the logic of “self-contained regimes”.44 Moreover, 
there no exist pre-established hierarchies among legal regimes: in “multilevel cases”, each ultra-state 
regime applies its rules without looking at the possible guarantees envisaged by the competing system. 
In this perspective, courts fill a gap, by creating rules (doctrines) to identify the applicable system of 
guarantees in favour of individuals.  
How do courts elaborate these rules? Do they take into account particular interests? Counter-limits 
and equivalence criteria are doctrines aimed at guaranteeing the better protection of private subjects, 
although their application does not always determine this result (such as in the Bosphorus case). 
Usually, these doctrines lead to the application of the more “complete” system, according to the 
general interest of protection of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, also other interests may affect the 
use of these doctrines: political strategies, economic conditions, etc. (see para. 5).  
In general, judicial doctrines (see the reciprocity principle, the reference technique, the technique of 
conclusiveness, the forum non conveniens, the margin of appreciation doctrine, the interposition 
technique, the court to court agreements, etc.)45 are characterized by a discretional and flexible nature: 
they do not aim at establishing hierarchies, but they are only inspired by a need of harmonization. 
These techniques however are not a mere expression of a “free appreciation” of judges, but they 
correspond to stable mechanisms, applied in many cases. Furthermore, they structurally differ from 
national conflict of laws rules and choice-of-forum rules envisaged by international treaties:46 these 
codified parameters, due to their “stringent nature”, would not allow judges to make any balancing of 
the interests underlying public sectors, in order to identify the applicable regime47. For instance, in the 
Kadi case, the European Court of Justice could not have determined the applicable regime on the basis 
of the conflict-of-laws criteria (for example, domicile of the parties, the place where the infringement 
occurred, the citizenship of the individual), because of the need to consider the existence of general 
public interests (peace and international security) as well as the protection of fundamental rights. In 
this sense, doctrines answer the lack or insufficiency of global codified criteria, given that – more 
generally - «situations of jurisdictional interaction not fully covered by any specific international law 
instrument governing the interplay between the relevant international courts and their national 
counterparts».48  
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48 Y. Shany, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations between National and International Courts, supra note 7, 39. 
Courts as Global Regulators? The Judicial Regulation in the GAL Perspective 
27 
5. Can a court be a “Gal regulator”? 
A well-known artist of the last century, Kazimir Malevich, argued that «the artist can be creative only 
when the shapes in his paintings have nothing in common with nature».49 In this sense, the figure of 
the judge is not much different from that of the Suprematist painter.  
This paper has sought to highlight this profile, first of all, by analysing the large literature on 
judicial regulation along with some significant examples of this practice (section 2). In addition to the 
important experiences at the national level (examined by Tocqueville, Gorla, etc.), there exist several 
cases of judicial regulation at the global level. On this point, it is possible to define a taxonomy, 
whereby a “substantive regulation”, a “procedural regulation”, and a “constructive regulation” are 
recognizable. Substantive regulation would occur when courts elaborate rules immediately affecting 
the discipline of certain sectors, such as in the cases of environment, insurance policies, and global 
market. Procedural regulation would correspond to standards created by courts to regulate judicial 
procedures, ethic codes, etc. Finally, a constructive regulation would be represented by judicial 
doctrines.50 A certain literature associates doctrines with the procedural regulation, but - as previously 
underscored – it is a restrictive interpretation of the practice. On the contrary, doctrines can be 
considered the way through which “multilevel questions”, mainly pertaining to administrative issues, 
are regulated in an “indirect substantive manner”. In other words, courts, which have to solve a 
multilevel case – not covered by any codified rule –, choose the applicable legal system on the basis of 
parameters (doctrines) created by themselves. The use of a certain doctrine may lead to the application 
of different systems depending on the case. For instance, the counter-limits doctrine – but even the 
equivalence criterion - imposes the application of the system providing for the better (or fuller) 
protection of fundamental rights in cases of ultra-state administrative sanctions against individuals. On 
the basis of a judge-made criterion, courts identify substantive rules applicable to the case, by 
affecting their contents with the aim to extend guarantees. Why can this practice be defined a 
“constructive regulation”? 
The elaboration of doctrines contributes to the development of Gal in a twofold way, respectively, 
by affecting the regulation of specific issues, and by «ordering the pluralism».51As regards the first 
aspect, the application of doctrines may affect the regulation of administrative issues in the lack of 
codified parameters, which allow the identification of the applicable system in multilevel cases (para. 
3 and 4). For instance, in the Kadi case, the application of counter-limits doctrine produces a concrete 
effect: in the administrative procedure of the UN Sanction Committee due process of law guarantees 
must be provided.52 Also in the Bosphorus case, the application of the equivalence criterion 
determines effects on the regulation of the administrative sanctions applied at the European level: in 
these cases, administrative guarantees at least equivalent to those envisaged in the ECHR system must 
be provided. In both cases, the administrative limits does not derive from neither administrative 
national systems, nor international treaties, but are imposed by courts through the application of 
doctrines. It can be explained due to the existence of a global administrative space, within legal 
regimes enter into contact - since in several cases they regulate overlapping sectors – arising 
multilevel cases not covered by general provisions.  
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In this perspective, doctrines are part of Gal: they may be defined as “ global secondary rules” or, 
more precisely, “global rules of recognition”—to evoke the well-known expression of H. L. A. Hart.53  
As regards the second profile, the application of doctrines contributes to harmonize the global 
disorder. The global administrative space is characterized by the existence of a wide range of legal 
systems among which there are no predetermined, stable, and codified relations owing to the lack of 
uniform regulatory instruments and, more generally, of a homogeneous global institutional framework. 
The implementation of these judicial techniques, therefore, produces an effect of harmonization and 
coordination among the different legal systems, without recognizing any project for the 
implementation of a global judicial order by courts.54 This assumption is perfectly compatible with the 
features of global space, which is non-hierarchical, diffused, and definable as a “fluid or liquid 
order”.55  
In the light of the above-mentioned aspects, courts can be added to the plethora of “Gal regulators”. 
Nevertheless, such a definition may arise at least four problems. 
(1) Legitimacy. Several authors recognize a problem of legitimacy relating to the composition of 
global courts. In whose name do they judge and regulate? On this point, there exist multifarious 
theses: some ones affirm a democratic justification, others a procedural legitimation, but the real 
question deals with to the definition of the courts as regulators: it may represent a problem insofar as 
the judicial techniques are characterized by an high degree of discretion and they are not subjected to a 
judicial review. Moreover, it is difficult to identify when courts regulate and when they only 
adjudicate, because there are several cases in which the settlement of the dispute depends on the 
regulation of the relations between the applicable systems. 
(2) Mutual interests and political influence. Why do courts create doctrines? In other words, cui 
prodest? The application of the judicial techniques reflects most of all political interests (some 
scholars speak about “the strategic theory of judicial behaviour”).56 For instance, some authors affirm 
that the application of the equivalence doctrine by the Strasbourg Court aims at keeping balance in the 
relationship between EU and ECHR systems. The application of certain techniques, moreover, may 
reflect forms of distrust between judicial systems. For instance, the application of the counter-limits 
doctrine in the Kadi case reflects the distrust of the European Court of Justice with regard to the 
procedure of the UN Sanctions Committee and the judicial guarantees provided by the UN system. 
Courts test the level of “dignity” of the competing system, by subjecting it to a very strict review. In 
all cases, this “judge judging judge” activity is strictly depended on the political influence and 
diplomatic relations among systems.  
(3) Sectors. In which measure does the application of a doctrine or the identification of the 
prevailing system depend on the sector? For instance: does the prevalence of the EU system on the UN 
regime - determined by the application of the counter-limits doctrine – characterize all cases related to 
the protection of human rights? On the one side, the application of each doctrine seems associated 
with specific sectors: for instance, the counter-limits doctrine is strictly linked with the protection of 
human rights affected by public powers; on the other side, the prevalence/or the subordination of a 
                                                     
53 «[…] while the primary rules concern the actions that individuals must do or not do, all […] secondary rules regard 
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legal system does not depend on the sector: in fact, had the UN system provided for due process 
guarantees at least equivalent to those envisaged in the EU system, the Kadi claim would have been 
rejected, because the UN system would have prevailed, although the case concerned the protection of 
human rights. Therefore, in the global arena there are not pre-established hierarchies, but very flexible 
parameters. 
(4) Enforcement. When does the judicial regulation differ from the judicial enforcement of rules? 
On this point, it is possible to identify at least three aspects on the basis of which judicial regulation 
can be distinguished from the mere judicial enforcement. Judicial regulation would occur: i. when 
courts create new rules not envisaged by any legal system; ii. when they choose which system apply 
without following any hierarchy; iii. when they either impose new limits, or recognize not codified 
guarantees.  
The above-mentioned aspects are open problems whose solution requests in-depth analyses, 
partially carried out by important working groups. As in every research, in fact, a thesis may open new 
fields of investigation and possible perspectives, and as a «traveller in a winter’s night» it makes us 
wonder: «what does story down there await its end?».57 
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The ‘puzzle’ of global governance after the financial crisis 
Giulio Napolitano* 
1. A globalization without rules 
In the second half of the 20th century, the economic globalization largely exceeded the legal and 
institutional one. Many markets were fully integrated throughout the world, even in the absence of a 
common regulatory framework. This output was coherent with the free market approach under which 
the contemporary globalization took place.1 As a consequence, the institutional landscape of the 
economic global governance remained highly fragmented. On one side, international institutions 
revealed internal weakness and criticism. Moreover, no substantial connection among the different 
institutional systems was activated. Finally, important gaps even in a free-market perspective remained 
unfilled. The absence of an effective global antitrust jurisdiction is perhaps the most evident example 
of that. 
Financial markets were the champions of the globalization process. Their global regime was 
characterized by three fundamental features. The first one was the primacy of the deregulation recipes. 
Governments throughout the world were pushed to open their markets and to soften the regulatory 
devices. The second one was the dominance of free competition among legal (dis)orders, according to 
which financial institution were able to choose the most favorable regulatory environment. The third 
one was the reservation to national jurisdiction of every decision needed to face a “local” crisis of a 
financial institution.  
The United States and the United Kingdom were at the forefront of this transformation of the 
financial markets. In the Nineties they abolished any significant restriction to the movement of capitals 
and to the capacity of the traditional commercial banks to expand their business into hazardous 
activities. This way, they were able to attract foreign investors and to get their financial institutions 
free from intrusive oversight by public authorities. When banks and other financial institutions got 
under distress, the U.S. and U.K governments decided autonomously, on a case by case basis, to 
nationalize them and to avoid the default. The same happened when the U.S. government, on the 
contrary, decided not to bail out Lehman Brothers. No consultation process was opened, not even with 
strategic partners of U.S.. Citizens and world political leaders knew about that decision only from the 
newspapers, before experiencing the negative outcomes of it over their national financial markets. 
2. Financial stability as a global public good 
The 2008 financial crisis, followed by the 2010 sovereign debt crisis, might represent a chance to 
reverse such an historical trend and to build up the basis for a stronger economic global governance 
and a better relation between the State and the market.2  
After the Lehman Brothers’ default and the global panic and distress generated by it, crises of big 
financial institutions are not any longer considered purely “local”. That’s why also solutions may not 
be exclusively “national”. The financial crisis showed the need for supranational collective action. As 
far as the markets, both real and financial, have not been so integrated since the end of the 19th 
century, also the correction of their failures must be global, for two different, even if often confused, 
reasons.  
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The first reason is that merely national solutions would leave space to regulatory arbitrage by 
multinational enterprises in order to escape unwanted rules and controls. This way, government action 
would be ineffective. The second reason is that virtually all domestic policies produce important 
international spillovers, and some of these can be quite harmful. Uncoordinated national measures 
may cause a government’s failure if regarded from a third country point of view and produce even a 
negative reverse effect for the state which adopted them.  
The point is that in a greatly interdependent world economy, the number of global or at least 
regional public goods quickly increased, from financial stability to sustainable growth, and called for 
greater global and regional collective action.3 The sovereign debt crisis in 2010 strengthened this 
awareness. The risk of a default of Greece became pretty soon a problem for the whole Europe. And 
European institutions and Member States were asked to solve it by all the world leaders, starting from 
the U.S. President.  
Strategic reaction to the financial and the sovereign debt crises are different and reveal the 
‘composite’ approach towards a new global governance. Like a ‘puzzle’, each piece is different from 
the other. And there are still some badly cut and other missing. The solution of the puzzle is far away, 
but global public law can give a contribution to it. 
3. An enhanced multilateralism: the establishment of the G-20 and the global reform of 
financial markets 
One kind of reactions to the financial crisis was the attempt to re-launch multilateralism enlarging the 
membership and increasing the effectiveness of supranational fora and institutions. 
The first attempt to strengthen the institutional architecture of global governance was the 
establishment of the G-20 as the «premier forum of international economic governance».4 The Group 
of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors was established in 1999 to bring 
together systemically important industrialized and developing economies to discuss key issues in the 
global economy. To tackle the financial and economic crisis that spread across the globe in 2008, the 
G-20 members were called upon to further strengthen international cooperation. Accordingly, 
Leaders’ Summits coupled the ones held by Treasury Ministers, giving the G-20 the highest political 
authority. This way, the G-20 became the premier forum for international economic development in 
order to promote open and constructive discussion between industrial and emerging-market countries 
on key issues related to global economic stability.  
The actions of the G20, with its balanced membership of developed and developing countries, 
helped the world to deal effectively with the financial and economic crisis. The scope of financial 
regulation was broadened, and prudential regulation and supervision were strengthened. Global 
governance improved to better take into consideration the role and the needs of emerging of 
developing countries, especially through the reforms of the governance of the IMF and the World 
Bank. 
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World after the Global Financial Crisis, in Global Policy (2010) p. 29 et seq. From the perspective of middle powers, 
D.D. Bradlow, Reforming Global Economic Governance: A Strategy for Middle Powers in the G20, Paper prepared for 
the workshop on Going Global: Australia, Brazil Indonesia, Korea and South Africa in International Affairs, Jakarta, 
Indonesia, May 25-26, 2010.  
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The strengthening of the G-20 was fundamental to transfuse new blood into multilateralism, 
overcoming limits of authority and legitimacy of the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized countries.5 
The more the G-20 will be able to play a prominent role, the more solutions adopted will be tinged 
with politics rather than with regulatory expertise and technocratic know‐how. 
A second attempt to improve the economic global governance was represented by the reformation 
of the International Financial Institutions that were established in the framework of the Breton Woods 
Agreements: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The fundamental idea was to 
modernize the institutions fundamentally so that they could better reflect changes in the world 
economy after the crisis and more effectively play their roles in promoting global financial stability, 
fostering development and improving the lives of the poorest.  
In April 2010, the 186 countries that own the World Bank Group endorsed boosting its capital by 
more than $86 billion and giving developing countries more influence. Along with this first general 
capital increase for the World Bank for more than 20 years and shift in voting power to developing 
countries, the Development Committee of the Board of Governors also backed the Bank’s new post-
crisis strategy, and a comprehensive reform package in order to improve the governance of the Bank. 
The four main components of the package concerned financial resources, voting power, post-crisis 
strategy, operational reforms.  
Also the International Monetary Fund was at the core of a comprehensive package of quota and 
governance reforms in order to achieve a more legitimate, credible and effective institution. The aim is 
to ensure that quotas and Executive Board composition are more reflective of new global economic 
realities, and to secure the IMF’s status as a quota-based institution, with sufficient resources to 
support members’ needs. 
A third attempt to push for worldwide solution was the strengthening of global financial regulation 
and supervision. 
On the institutional side, the most important achievement was the establishment in April 2009 of a 
new Financial Stability Board (FSB) as the successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). In 
November 2008, the Leaders of the G20 countries called for a larger membership and a stronger 
institutional basis of the FSF.  
The purpose was to strengthen its effectiveness as a mechanism for national authorities, standard 
setting bodies and international financial institutions in order to address vulnerabilities and to develop 
and implement strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interest of financial stability. As 
announced in the G20 Leaders Summit of April 2009, the expanded FSF was then re-established as the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) with a broadened mandate to promote financial stability. The FSB is 
now called to coordinate at the international level the work of national financial authorities and 
international standard setting bodies and to develop and promote the implementation of effective 
regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies.  
On the regulatory side, all financial institutions and operations were put under review. The most 
important achievement was the agreement reached by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) on the new bank capital and liquidity framework, which increases the resilience of the global 
banking system by raising the quality, quantity and international consistency of bank capital and 
liquidity, constrains the build-up of leverage and maturity mismatches, and introduces capital buffers 
above the minimum requirements that can be drawn upon in bad times. The framework includes an 
internationally harmonized leverage ratio to serve as a backstop to the risk-based capital measures. 
The new standards are expected to reduce banks’ incentive to take excessive risks, lower the 
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likelihood and severity of future crises, and enable banks to withstand – without extraordinary 
government support – stresses of a magnitude associated with the recent financial crisis.  
Nonetheless, greater level of global economic integration, even after a shocking experience like the 
financial crisis, didn’t produce, at least apparently, a radical change on the institutional side. As a 
matter of fact, states didn’t transfer authority to existent or new supranational bodies. No global 
authority of financial markets was established. The regulatory reform didn’t re-introduce a clear 
distinction between commercial banks and financial institutions and require a long-lasting 
implementation process at national level. According to the critics, the capacity of the FSB and of the 
Basel Committee to design sound reforms was undermined by capture and conflict of interest. Some of 
the rules applied at national level to prevent them could be usefully applied to prevent those risks. 
4. The cooperation among governments in bailout, recovery and fiscal sustainability 
policies  
Benefits and outcomes of the re-launched multilateralism were limited. Individual action by national 
governments remained fundamental to address the financial crisis. The crisis, anyhow, showed how far 
an individual government's decision (to bailout or not a big financial institution, just to take an 
example) may affect the economic and financial outcome of other countries. Since September 2008, 
then, governments realized the existence of relevant spill-over effects of every response to the crisis 
they were going to adopt. 
All governments recognized the importance of cooperation to achieve the production of new 
fundamental global public goods, like financial stability and sustainable growth. At the same time, 
experiencing the relation of the required decisions to the core of national sovereignty, they didn’t want 
to tie their hands and to commit to some form of legally binding supranational authority.  
That’s why governments implicitly claimed that “concerted practices” could represent the most 
viable way to achieve cooperation in highly sensible political matters. Informal contacts and meetings 
among political leaders and the G-20 summits became the preferred rooms to exchange points of view, 
coordinate action without assuming legal obligations, monitoring voluntary compliance. Of course, 
what governments claim to be cooperative behaviors at the global level could actually be mere 
“parallel behaviors”, simply adopted to satisfy domestic interests and pressures at the national level. 
This kind of ambiguity could perfectly fit a double and opposite need of governments: on one side, 
ensuring financial markets and public opinions throughout the world that global collective action is 
taking place through concerted practices; on the other side, assessing that the well-being of national 
citizens is at the core of sovereign decisions of governments (even if «parallel» across countries)6. 
The concerted practice/parallel behavior scheme can ben applied to explain the governmental 
strategies about the bailout of banks and financial institutions. In the first half of 2008, bailout 
measures were adopted on a case by case basis by governments, like the United Kingdom and the 
U.S., as purely domestic choices. At the beginning of September 2008, it was the decision by the U.S. 
not to bailout Lehman Brothers that revealed the worldwide negative spillover effect of a national 
government option. In such a dramatic way, it became clear the existence of a neglected global public 
good (financial stability), that should have been protected from both market and government failures. 
Since that, efforts at coordination between states started. Informal contacts and meetings among the 
U.S. and the European countries put the basis to share an economic policy analysis and to figure out 
the necessary measures to avoid the collapse of the global financial system. As the crisis was coming 
to a head, October 9 saw a simultaneous move of the central banks of U.S, Europe and China aimed at 
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reducing interest rates by half a point. On October 11, the meeting of G-7 Finance Ministers, for the 
first time, outlined a set of joint rules and measures. Only after that, the enlarged G-20 Washington 
summit held in November 2008 for the first time agreed on the relevance of the «urgent and 
exceptional measures» taken by governments to stabilize financial markets and to support the global 
economy, providing liquidity, strengthening the capital of financial institutions, protecting savings and 
deposits, unfreezing credit markets. 
Nonetheless, nor a formal agreement was stipulated, neither a decision from any supranational 
authority or network was delivered. On the contrary, governments adopted parallel behaviors in order 
to address insolvency and liquidity problems of financial institutions in each country. This way, 
governments succeeded in combining a cooperative approach at global level with the defense of 
national prerogatives.7 Even if coordinated, bailouts after the failure of Lehman Brothers continued to 
be predominantly national, for two fundamental reasons. On the one hand, the pressure from 
individuals, families and businesses for protective measures are focused on electorally-accountable 
national representative bodies. On the other hand, states are the only entities that possessed the 
financial resources necessary to fund rescue packages. Moreover, they were the only ones who had the 
necessary authorizing powers, as well as the acknowledged legitimacy to exercise them. The success 
of this strategy was assessed in the G-20 London summit, where the final declaration stated that 
governments «have provided significant and comprehensive support» to the banking systems «to 
provide liquidity, recapitalize financial institutions, and address decisively the problem of impaired 
assets».  
In efforts at coordination, the approval of specific pieces of legislation on bailout played an 
important role, as a signal revealing the game that each state was going to play. Before that, each 
country decided case by case whether to bailout or not and how. Going on this way would have greatly 
increased uncertainty not only in the market but also in relationships among states. In this context, 
each government would have acted just looking at his own interest, ignoring the spillover effects of its 
decisions. On the contrary, the approval in many countries of a new body of legislation created a more 
cooperative environment, revealing the existence of a dominant strategy to bailout and creating a more 
uniform playground.  
The governments’ response to the crisis was not limited to the financial sector. With potential 
supply exceeding actual demand, due to falling of private consumption, each country adopted stimulus 
packages to restore balance in the markets. Once again, in a deeply interconnected economy, national 
measures, to be effective, must be coordinated at global level, in order to cover supply both through 
internal consumption and export. The problem is that fiscal stimulus policies, compared to financial 
regulation, represent a field where achieving true supranationalism is even more difficult, as far as 
they produce distributional effects and largely rely on taxpayers. That’s why, also in this field, 
cooperation among governments through “concerted practices” was the only viable mechanism 
through which some form of economic global governance could take place. 
Cooperation among governments, once again, played a fundamental role in shaping a collective 
response to the crisis, while preserving the sovereign domain of national economic fiscal policies. 
Informal talks among governments and open discussions within the G-20 summits helped to discuss 
and compare different solutions, then adopted through the simultaneous approval of specific pieces of 
legislation at national level. Once approved, the G-20 asked to avoid unilateral holding-out and to 
keep recovery plans at work. Perfect synchronization of stimulus action was intended as a key factor 
in order to ensure full success of the concerted practice strategy. 
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Relying on national measures approved by elected Parliaments, anyhow, may be dangerous, as far 
as the results of the political process could be altered by the influence of pressures groups. For 
example, cooperative games to sustain recovery may be vanished by crisis-era state measures that are 
likely to adversely affect a large number of trading partners and a sizeable amount of international 
trade. Notwithstanding the repeated collective commitments to further develop an open global 
economy and to «fight protectionism»8, governments almost trebled the amount of discrimination in 
place by imposing 356 discriminatory measures, with harmful measures outnumbering beneficial 
measures by a ratio of 4:1.9  
The objective of building up a strong and balanced growth became even more difficult to achieve 
in a context of fiscal crisis. On the topic, the G-20 Toronto summit clearly stated that «sound fiscal 
finances are essential to sustain recovery, provide flexibility to respond to new shocks, ensure the 
capacity to meet the challenges of aging populations, and avoid leaving future generations with a 
legacy of deficits and debt». At the same time, the Toronto summit warned that «the path of 
adjustment must be carefully calibrated to sustain the recovery in private demand». As a matter of fact, 
there is a risk that «synchronized fiscal adjustment across several major economies could adversely 
impact the recovery».  
5. The global relevance of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe 
As a matter of fact, the financial crisis of 2008 was followed by the crisis of sovereign debt. To a 
certain extent, the former had even paved the way to the latter, as the unbalance of public finances, 
combined with low growth rates, overloaded public debt rates. Thus, the risk of a default, that 
formerly lied with undertakings, suddenly concerned also the States. The issues of liquidity and 
solvency were particularly severe in the Euro zone. One year and a half after the downturn of the 
economic crisis, then, Europe was the first asked to face with the problem of “saving the saviors”. 
The emersion of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone became immediately extremely relevant 
for all the global community. Till that time, the European Union played a limited role in global 
economic governance arena10. Suddenly, Europe conquered the center of the stage. And its proper 
management of the sovereign debt crisis became matter of concern for all the world. Member States 
could not be let alone to face it. The president of the United States and the G-20 strongly pushed 
European leaders to find a political solution and the legal devices necessary to apply it.  
The problem was that the European legal order did not envisage any tool for easing the public debt 
of a member State11. This is why the outbreak of the Greek crisis required the creation of new 
institutional mechanisms, in order to prevent the (eventual) sovereign default from having negative 
domino effects on the Euro and on the public finances of other member States, no matter if they were 
virtuous. After subsidizing Greece through the coordination of several bilateral agreements, the 
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European institutions and the member States decided to address these issues at European level and 
negotiated the creation of a specific safety nets. 
At first the Members States agreed on the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (Efsm) 
Regulation12, adopted under Art. 122, par. 2, Tfeu. Pursuant to Art. 122, where a Member State is in 
difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurrences beyond its control, the Council may grant financial assistance. However, the triggering 
event shall not depend on a failure to comply with EU law, but it should rather derive from a serious 
deterioration of international economic and financial conditions. On this basis, the Council created a 
small fund at the disposal of the European Commission. 
Later on, financial assistance was considered worth more resources. In fact, the member States 
committed to allot up to 440 billion Euro to a special purpose vehicle. Moreover, they decided to issue 
special bonds guaranteed by the member States themselves, whose participation in the fund would be 
proportionate to their contribution to the capital of the European Central Bank. The special purpose 
vehicles was set up on 7 June 2010, under the name of European financial stability facility (hereafter 
“Efsf” or “Fund”). It was a limited company under the laws of Luxembourg and its sole shareholder 
was the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Pursuant to its by-laws, the Efsf then opened its capital to the 
sixteen members of the Euro Area (it was the so-called Efsf Framework Agreement). The (pretty 
complex) tools described above were used to grant financial assistance to Ireland and Portugal and the 
special purpose vehicle also intervened for granting the second rescue package to Greece.  
Note that the Efsf raised moral hazard concerns, as its intervention eased the burden of non-
virtuous behaviors on both financial operators and member States13. This is why it was agreed that the 
Fund would last for only three years. However, the Efsf was clearly too weak to ensure financial 
stability, especially when the “safety net” was faced to the speculative attacks against sovereign debts. 
On the one hand, the fund was weak because of its temporary nature; on the other hand, its resources 
were still scarce. In this respect, it is worth recalling that the Efsf was also financed through bonds 
guaranteed by the member States. Hence, the downgrade of their ratings inevitably affected the value 
of their guarantees, which, in turn, entailed a further reduction of the resources at the disposal of the 
Efsf. 
6. The establishment of Esm as an insurance contract among governments 
The legal framework changes radically with the establishment of the European Stabilization 
Mechanism (hereafter “Esm” or “Mechanism”). To that purpose, the Heads of State and Government 
modified Art. 136, by adding that “the Member States whose currency is the Euro may establish a 
stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the Euro area as a 
whole”. In order to prevent any misuse of collective support, it is also stated that “the granting of any 
required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality”. In 
order to speed up the reform, the amendment was adopted under the simplified procedure, pursuant to 
Art. 48, par. 6, Teu.  
The content of the Esm Agreement aimed at reconciling several interests. On the one hand, the new 
framework provided for stronger bases for financial support. In fact, instead of being based on the sole 
“emergency issue”, the Mechanism leans on a stable institutional frame. Besides, the new treaty has 
flattened some of the main objections raised against financial support in the aftermath of the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis. In fact, it was contended that the Council Regulation on the European 
Mechanism for Financial Stabilization conflicted with Art. 125 Tfeu, which states that “the Union 
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shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other 
public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State”. 
Thus, it was argued that European intervention implied a liability, incompatible with the wording of 
the Tfeu. Second, the financial solidarity principle laid down by Art. 122, par. 2, Tfeu, requires that 
the triggering financial emergency depend on causes beyond the control of the member State 
concerned. However, it was questionable whether the sovereign debt crisis, although deepened by 
international financial crisis, was really beyond control by member States14. In view of these 
objections, the special provision is certainly welcome, as it explicitly sets aside the general “no-bailout 
principle” and it provides for a legal basis more robust than art. 122 Tfeu15. However, this implied to 
set aside the solidarity principles and the idea of the natural expansion of the scope of European 
implicit powers. 
Moreover, the Esm is tightly linked to the Fiscal Compact Treaty. In fact, in order to prevent moral 
hazard, the Esm will grant financial support only provided that: (i) the requiring member State has 
sought to avoid the crisis by adopting the virtuous behaviors imposed by the Treaty; (ii) the requiring 
member State has complied with the conditions laid down by the Commission. In sum, the Mechanism 
will address the issues of solvency and liquidity only after the failure of all the other means. In this 
regard, the possibility to be granted the Esm funds could be a powerful incentive for ratifying the 
Fiscal Compact Treaty, which could also be the foreword for issuing European bonds. 
The establishment of the European Stability Mechanism represents a turning point in European 
integration process. Its permanent nature transforms the Union into a community of risks, not only of 
benefits. As a collective insurance device against future damages that could affect a country or a 
people, it assumes an intimate constitutional nature. The legal status and some fundamental rules of 
the Esm, unfortunately, seem unable to meet the challenges raised by such an ambitious program. 
Transparency and accountability needs are not satisfied. And the day by day effectiveness of the 
Mechanism could be seriously undermined by ambiguities and perhaps mistakes in the institutional 
design. 
Firstly, the Treaty defines the Esm an “international financial institution”. Such a definition doesn’t 
fit its authentic nature. On one side, it’s not truly international. Even if established by a specific 
Treaty, its birth is covered by an amendment to the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. 
Its dimension is European and its tasks are complementary to the European economic governance. On 
the other side, the Mechanism is not merely a financial institution, like a commercial bank. Its 
subscribers are Member States of the Union. The governance is in the hands of ministries of finances. 
Its purpose is to give aid to Member States, not to earn money or raise revenues. The definition as an 
international financial institution is not only misleading. It also produces undue legal effects, creating 
an obstacle to the proper application of general rules on transparency and accountability referred to 
E.U. public institutions. 
Secondly, procedures to grant financial assistance are ill conceived. On one side, they are too much 
complicated and long lasting. On the other side, they depend on the request advanced by a needing 
Member State. But if it doesn’t issue the request – for internal political reasons – the financial stability 
of all the Eurozone could be threatened. That’s why it could be extremely useful to introduce a third 
party kick off. The power to start the procedure should be conferred also to a qualified number of 
other Member States, or to the European Systemic Risk Board. 
Thirdly, too much discretion is given to the Board of Governors. The Board has been vested with 
the power to grant support to a member State. In order to foster the efficiency of the financial 
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assistance, it can also allow Member States to allot the subsidy to the re-capitalisation of a financial 
institution. Finally, it can decide to purchase bonds of a Member State both on the primary and the 
secondary market. While adopting such measures, the Board of Governors seems to enjoy a broad 
discretion, as suggested by the fact that it “may decide” to adopt the measures mentioned above. 
Indeed, the Treaty does not set any general goal or primary interest for exercising such powers. 
Although the appraisal by the Commission shall be taken into account, it is not binding on the Board. 
The problem is that the Board is not even compelled to give reasons. It seems, however, that a 
motivation would be utterly necessary, especially whenever the Board sets aside the advice of a 
European institution. It is highly recommendable also the introduction of the dissenting opinion: 
representatives of Member States exercising de facto a veto power should be obliged to give reasons, 
from the perspective of the European interest and not only of the national one.  
Fourthly, the rules on dispute resolution violate the principle of “nemo iudex in causa propria”. In 
fact, the Treaty entrusts the Board of Governors itself with the settlement of disputes arising on the 
interpretation and application of the Ems Treaty between the Ems and an Ems member State. Thus, 
dispute resolution is mainly “political”, as it belongs to the same body that leads the Ems and 
represents national Governments, with the non negligible effect of rendering the Board of Governors a 
sort of iudex in causa propria. In this regard, the set up of an independent Board of Appeal – like 
those of some European agencies – would be more appropriate. 
Fifthly, the Treaty does not envisage any of the accountability tools that are usually made available 
towards European agencies. There are no consultation procedures, neither with general stakeholders, 
nor with “qualified” parties, such as institutional investors and creditors. There are no transparency 
duties, nor is it possible to have access to the files. Moreover, the Board of Governors does not report 
to the European Parliament and there are no procedures to assess Esm's efficiency. Only the financial 
administration of Esm is subject to a specific set of rules. 
7. Solving the puzzle of global governance: the contribution of global public law 
The establishment of a stronger economic global governance is a complex and long-lasting process. 
Different solutions may converge to that purpose. Some of them represent a re-launch of 
multilateralism. Others are based on new forms of cooperation among governments. Each of them 
retains its own sovereign powers, but practices are concerted and outputs collectively rated. Finally, 
the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis gave birth to an original form of collective insurance among 
governments. The actual image of global governance is that of an incomplete puzzle. The pieces are 
different one from the others. Some are properly intertwined, others not. And there are still some 
missing.  
The fundamental problem is that the proper working of each pillar of the new economic global 
governance is affected by legitimacy and efficiency deficits. The capacity of networks and fora to 
promote an effective regulatory reform is limited by conflict of interest and capture. Cooperation 
among governments is undermined by opportunistic behavior of political leaders, who sometimes 
appear to be too much sensible to short-term evaluations. Ambitious mechanisms of collective 
insurance between Member States of the European Union may fail, because operational and 
accountability devices are ill-designed.  
Global and European Administrative Law devices, such as information, transparency, participation, 
judicial review, can play a very important role in increasing the legitimacy and the accountability of 
crucial players of the regulatory reform process and of the financial assistance mechanism16. At the 
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same time, the constitutional relevance of the transformations arising from the financial and the 
sovereign debt crisis requires new conceptions of supranational constitutionalism, and an enhanced 
attention to democracy and check and balance issues. A sounder cutting of the existing pieces and a 
clever discovery of the missing ones could contribute to solve the puzzle of global governance. 
 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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Global Financial Regulation 
The Challenges Ahead and GAL 
Maurizia De Bellis* 
1. Regulation of financial markets and GAL 
After the German bank Bankhaus Herstatt collapsed, in 1974, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) was established, as a new tool to foster transnational cooperation among the G10 
central banks1. At that time, no global standard setting activity was taking place: the BCBS started 
drafting the first standards on banking at the end of the decade, soon followed by its counterpart for 
securities, the International Organization for Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), set up in 1983. 
During the 80s, the two transnational regulatory networks were rather obscure: one of the BCBS first 
President, Huib Muller, declared that «We don’t like publicity. We prefer, I might say, our hidden 
secret world of the supervisory continent»2. 
In the late 90s, the phenomenon of global financial standards gained momentum. In the aftermath 
of the Asian financial crisis, the G7 started supporting the standard setting process within the BCBS, 
the IOSCO and the private standard setter for accounting, the then named International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC; in 2001, it has been reorganized and renamed International Accounting 
Standard Board (IASB)) 3. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
were involved in the standards dissemination process. 
After the global financial crisis that started in 2008, the activity of these standard setting bodies 
was placed under wider scrutiny. Moreover, the most significant new actors of financial governance, 
the G20 and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) attracted the attention of many observers4. 
Global financial standards and rules have been studied from a number of different research 
perspectives. The Global Administrative Law (GAL) research approach is helpful in framing this 
phenomenon for a number of reasons: because of the subjects intervening; because of the object of 
regulation; because of the procedures being used to set the rules and because of the way through which 
standards are being implemented within national legal orders5. 
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First, regulators intervening in global financial governance are traceable to all the main types of 
global administrations identified by GAL scholars6: transnational networks of governmental officials 
(BCBS and IOSCO); administration by formal international organizations (IMF and the World Bank); 
hybrid intergovernmental/private administration (the FSB, bringing together not only the 
intergovernmental international organizations and the transgovernmental regulatory networks 
mentioned above, but also domestic regulators) and administration by private institutions with 
regulatory functions (the IASB, but also the International Federation of Accountants’ (IFAC), setting 
auditing standards).  
Second, the very content of global financial rules is of an administrative nature: as national 
regulatory authorities cannot cope with problems – such as financial stability – which have a global 
impact and scope, they establish regulation within transnational networks7.  
A third reason for which the GAL theoretical framework can be successful in identifying the 
features of global financial regulation is because of the way through which global rules are, first, 
drafted and, later on, implemented within national legal orders. On the one hand, both transnational 
and private regulators are increasingly setting their standards following procedures resembling closely 
to principles well known within domestic administrative law8. On the other hand, the implementation 
of global standard departs from the tradition international law model. There is no ratification of 
international treaties. Global standard are set as purely voluntary soft law, intended to be implemented 
by the regulatory authorities taking part in the network, because of its reputation and expertise. Market 
actors are expected to use private standards, such as accounting ones, voluntarily. In the last decade, 
however, a number of different mechanisms have been used to improve the implementation of global 
standards, which show a different model if interaction between global rules and national law.  
Analysing global financial regulation through GAL lenses, the paper aims at tackling four main 
research questions.  
A first question looks at who sets the rules: what is the balance of powers within the financial 
architecture that is emerging after the crisis? Is there a centre or a global institution prevailing over the 
others? 
Second, what global rules provide for must be examined. Under this regard, the core problem is the 
one of the efficiency of regulation: are reforms that are being carried on well suited to be successful?  
The success of global regulation does not depend only on the features of the standard setters and on 
the substantial provisions which are being set forth in the rules, but also on how global rules are being 
set and implemented. Moreover, the standard setting procedure and the implementation process give 
insights for more general problems, currently at the core of studies on the globalization of law. 
On the one hand, global regulators are increasingly setting standards following due process 
requirements. The use of procedural tools is often presented as a tool to cope with the lack of 
accountability of global regulators. But are these instruments sufficient for this purpose? 
(Contd.)                                                                  
<http://www.irpa.eu/index.asp?idA=161>. See also Sabino Cassese et al. (eds.), Global Administrative Law: Cases, 
Materials, Issues, second edition 2008, available at www.iilj.org/GAL/GALCasebook.asp.  
6 See Benedict Kingsbury et al., “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law”, in Law & Contemporary Problems, 
2005, Vol. 68, p. 15 ss., at 20-23. 
7 Richard Stewart, “Administrative Law in 21st century”, in New York Law Review, 2003, Vol. 78, p. 437 ss. 
8 See Sabino Cassese, “A Global Due Process of Law”, in Anthony Gordon et. al. (eds.), Values in Global Administrative 
Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011, p. 17 ss., and Giacinto della Cananea, “Beyond the State: the Europeanization and 
Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law”, in European Public Law, 2003, p. 563 ss; Armin von Bogdandy, 
“Legitimacy of International Economic Governance: Interpretative Approaches to WTO law and the Prospects of its 
Proceduralization”, in Stefan Griller (ed.), International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns – New 
Challenges for the International Legal Order, Wien-New York, Springer, 2003, p. 128 ss. 
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On the other hand, the implementation process of global standards departs from the traditional 
model of ratification and shows the increasing links between global regulation and national ones. 
What do the very diverse ways through which global financial standards are being implemented tell us 
about the globalization of domestic law? 
All of these questions have been the object of an in-depth analysis elsewhere9. The purpose of this 
paper is the one of pointing out some of the most pressing challenges ahead and of showing the 
potential of GAL in helping understanding existing patterns and in framing solutions. 
2. The global financial architecture and the quest for a centre 
Transnational regulatory networks (TRNs), such as the BCBS and the IOSCO, have long been 
considered as the as the key feature of the new financial architecture10. Others stressed the role of the 
“infrastructure” of global financial regulation, pointing out that the substance of global financial 
regulation is often shaped by private entities11. 
After the global financial crisis, two new actors established themselves as essential and received 
widespread attention: the G20 and the FSB. The roots of both institutions date back to the late 90s, in 
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis12. 
Yet, the G20 - bringing together emerging countries and G10 ones13 - until 2008 met only as a 
group of financial ministers. The first G20 political summit took place in Washington, in November 
2008. During the Pittsburgh summit, the group of twenty presented itself as «the premier forum for 
international economic cooperation»14.  
On the other hand, the originally named Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was reorganized as 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) after the G20 London Summit in April 200915. Its membership was 
broadened to all G20 countries regulatory authorities and its mandate and powers were clearly 
identified within the FSB Charter, previously lacking16. In the FSB participate – together with the 
international organizations (the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD and the Financial Action Task Force 
on Money Laundering (FATF)), transnational networks for banking, securities and insurance (BCBS, 
IOSCO and IAIS, respectively) and the IASB – national administrative authorities (such as central 
banks, supervisory authorities and treasury departments) from the G20 countries.  
The FSB seems to play three key functions in global financial governance: it coordinates the 
activity of the standard setting bodies; it identifies priorities and actions to be taken under this regard 
                                                     
9 I analyzed the point in further details elsewhere: see Maurizia De Bellis, La regolazione dei mercati finanziari, Milano, 
Giuffrè, 2012. 
10 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Real New World Order”, in Foreign Affairs, 1997, Vol. 76, n. 5, p. 184 ss. 
11 Among the first ones, Timothy Sinclair, “The Infrastructure of Global Governance: Quasi-Regulatory Mechanisms and 
the New Global Finance”, in Global Governance, 2001, vol. 7, p. 441 ss. For a recent analysis, Tim Buthe e Walter 
Mattli, The New Global Rulers. The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy, Princeton e Oxford, Princeton 
University Press, 2011. 
12 See, ex multis, B. Eichengreen, Toward a New Financial Architecture. A Practical Post-Asia Agenda, Washington D. C.: 
Institute for International Economics, 1999. 
13 Emerging countries such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa and Turkey. 
14 G20, Leaders’ Statement, Pittsburgh, 23-4 Septemebr 2009, available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf, para. 19. 
15 See Fsb, Press Release, Financial Stability Forum re-established as the Financial Stability Board, 2 April 2009, 
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_090402b.pdf. 
16 Si v. FSB, Financial Stability Board Charter, September 2009, available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925d.pdf . 
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(which it has been doing not only preparing periodic reports, but also publishing recommendations and 
guidelines); it monitors the implementation of the standards through peer reviews17. 
According to some commentators, in the last years the G20 took the leading role in global financial 
governance, setting the agenda for financial reforms, at the expenses of technocratic bodies such as the 
BCBS and the IOSCO18. This phenomenon has been presented a kind of revenge of politics over 
technique. But is it so?  
The balance of powers among the different actors intervening within global financial governance 
appears less straightforward, for a number of reasons. 
First, it must be born in mind that the standard setting process continues to take place within the 
TRNs. A case in point is the drafting of Basel III (Section III): even though the G20 and the FSB gave 
directions for reform, the details were established within the Basel Committee, and these details were 
at the heart of the compromises which were made and are crucial for the efficiency of regulation. 
Second, the interaction between the FSB and the G20 is a crucial point. The FSB documents and 
the following G20 communiquees suggest that the Board is often playing the central role, 
recommending the G20 not only which are the priority areas of intervention, but the very measures to 
be undertaken. The G20 priorities in Washington and London summits followed closely the 
recommendations set forth in the FSF report of April 200819. After the Pittsburgh summit, the G20 
impact in setting the agenda of financial reform became stronger20. Yet, the FSB still plays a crucial 
preliminary role, so that the G20 often simply endorses its activity21. Moreover, the FSB itself has 
often explicitly called for G20’s support to its standard setting activity, a support conceived as vital for 
the success of reforms, vis-à-vis the increasing pressure of lobbies22.  
These two elements – the standard setters’ central role in the drafting of the standards and the 
FSB’s leading function – show that technocratic bodies are more coordinated, do not operate in a 
vacuum, but their role is still crucial. 
The interaction between technique and politics in global financial regulation is all but settled, and 
the balance between the two is one of the main challenges ahead.  
                                                     
17 More specifically, according to the Charter, the main tasks included in the FSB mandate are: a) assessing the 
vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system and identifying related actions needed to address them, and their 
outcomes; (b) promoting coordination and information exchange among authorities responsible for financial stability; (c) 
monitoring market developments; (d) monitoring best practice in meeting regulatory standards; (e) undertaking joint 
strategic reviews of the policy development work of the international standard setting bodies to ensure their work is 
timely, coordinated, focused on priorities and addressing gaps (FSB, Charter, art. 2, para. 1).  
18 David Zaring, “International Institutional Performance in Time of Crisis”, in Chicago Journal of International Law, 2010, 
Vol. 10, p. 475 ss.. 
19 See Fsf, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience, April 2008, available 
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0804.pdf. For an analysis of the correspondance between the 
FSF recommendations and the G20 ones, see J. Kirton, Introduction: Prospects for the G20 Leaders Summit on Financial 
Markets and the World Economy, in The G20 Leaders Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, edited by 
J. Kirton, available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/g20/g20leadersbook/index.html, at 4. 
20 See N. Woods, The G20 Leaders and Global Governance, ottobre 2010, available at 
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/Woods-2010-The-G20-and-Global-Governance.doc.pdf, 
p. 3. 
21 See G20, Leaders’ Statement The Pittsburgh Summit, at 8-9: «Excessive compensation in the financial sector has both 
reflected and encouraged excessive risk taking. Reforming compensation policies and practices is an essential part of our 
effort to increase financial stability. We fully endorse the implementation standards of the FSB aimed at aligning 
compensation with long-term value creation, not excessive risk-taking». 
22 Si v. FSF, Improving Financial Regulation. Report by the Financial Stability Board to the G20 Leaders, settembre 2009, 
parr. 3, 11 e 35.  
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3. Global rules and the efficiency of regulation 
Global standards cover many areas of financial regulation. The Basel Committee sets principles and 
standards for effective banking supervision, in areas such as capital requirements and counterparty 
credit risks. The IOSCO establishes standards for securities regulation, covering aspects such as credit 
rating agencies (CRAs) conduct and hedge funds. Two private organizations, the IASB and the IFAC, 
set standards for accounting and auditing, respectively.  
The spread of global financial standard has long been considered a successful trend. Yet, the fact 
that many global financial standards existed when the crisis unfolded and that they did not prevent it 
made some claim that there could be an end of global financial standards and codes23. This does not 
appear to be the case. Three trends can be observed, which point to a different direction. 
First, it must be recalled that at the end of the 90s an attempt to codify global financial standards 
was started, when the FSF started compiling a “Compendium of Standards”, bringing together all the 
financial and economic standards, internationally recognized as «important for sound, stable and well 
functioning financial systems», established by the members of the FSF itself24. Later on, the 
Compendium has been endorsed by the FSF successor, the FSB, which updated it, recently including 
more than sixty new standards elaborated between 2009 and 201225. 
The second trend is the one of the revision of existing – but insufficient – standards. Two cases in 
point are the revision of the existing standard for capital requirements (Basel III, replacing Basel II), 
intended to strengthen banks’ resilience26, and the revision of the IOSCO’s Code of conduct 
fundamentals for credit rating agencies, aiming at taking into account CRAs’ failure in the area of 
derivatives27. 
Third, new global rules are being set in areas where they were lacking. As mentioned above, after 
the global financial crisis the FSB moved from the mere role of coordinator of other standard setters’ 
rules played by its predecessor, the FSF, to establishing itself guidelines and recommendations. 
Examples include the Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (PSCP)28, followed by more 
specific Implementation Standards in the same area29; and the sets of recommendations about over the 
counter (OTC) derivatives30 and systemically significant financial institutions (SIFI)31. 
Hence, there does not seem to be an end to global standards and codes; on the contrary, old ones 
are being updated and confirmed (the Compendium standards), others are being deeply revised (Basel 
III and IOSCO CRA Code) and new rules are being set. But are revised ruled and new ones enough to 
pursue global financial stability? 
                                                     
23 Layna Mosley, “An End to Global Standards and Codes?”, in Global Governance, 2009, Vol. 15, p. 1 ss. 
24 I analysed the structure of the FSF Compendium elsewhere: see Maurizia De Bellis, "Global Standards for Domestic 
Financial Regulations: Concourse, Competition and Mutual Reinforcement between Different Types of Global 
Administration," in Global Jurist Advances, Vol. 6, Iss. 3, available at 
http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol6/iss3/art6. 
25 See http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_cos_subject_area/index.htm (last visited 21 April 2012). 
26 See BCBS, Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, 16 December 
2010, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.htm. A revised version has been published in June 2011: see BCBS, 
Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring. Revised version, 1 June 
2011, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm.  
27 IOSCO, The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Structured Finance Markets - Final Report, May 2008, Annex A, 
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD270.pdf . 
28 FSB, Principles for Sound Compensation Practices, 2 April 2009. 
29 Si v. FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices. Implementation Standards, 25 September 2009. 
30 FSB, Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, 25 October 2010. 
31 FSB, Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions, 20 October 2010. 
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On the one hand, there are some positive developments. For example, according to commentators, 
Basel III will increase steadily banks’ capital requirements, contributing to their stability32. Yet, it is 
uncertain whether this step forward is far enough: the two controversial risk-weighting methods on 
which Basel II was based - the ‘standardized’ approach (according to which risk weights - and, 
consequently, the capital requirements that a bank has to respect - depend on the issuer’s rating), and 
the ‘internal ratings-based’ approach (IRB, according to which qualifying banks can use their own 
estimates to quantify their exposure) - were not changed33. In more general terms, the negative impact 
of the new capital rules on growth, especially in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, is 
highly problematic34. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of some of the new rules is questionable. In the areas of derivatives 
and SIFI, the Board’s recommendation do not suggest ex ante harmonization; on the contrary, they 
aim at fostering convergence when national disciplines have already been adopted. In two areas 
generally considered to be crucial for the success of financial reform – as it is well known, derivatives 
were a key factor in the unfolding of the crisis of 2008, while the consequences coming from the 
collapse of Lehmann Brothers raised the attention on the problem of the so-called “too big to fail” 
institutions –, global rules leave more space to national regulatory autonomy. 
Moreover, the very regulatory approach incorporated in the new rules is less strong than what at 
first expected. For example, the FSB preliminary documents about SIFI took into account the use of 
structural measures – aimed at separating the most risky activity from the others35 –, while the final 
document abandons this approach. 
Reforms in the area of capital requirements and CRAs have been matched by weaker rules in the 
equally, if not more, relevant areas of derivatives and SIFIs. This imbalance can stem from the timing 
of reform, as initiatives approved shortly after the spread of the crisis were less affected by the 
pressure of financial lobbies36. It remains to be seen how the unfolding of the EU sovereign debt crisis 
will influence the process of reform: if it will make gaps in current regulation more evident, thus 
urging reforms, or if concerns for growth will freeze such process. 
4. The procedure: the limits and conditions for global due process to act as a means of 
accountability 
Concerns about the lack of accountability of global financial regulators are not new. Critiques have 
focused on the secrecy of these institutions and their technocratic nature for a long time37. In the last 
                                                     
32 See Adrian Blundell-Wignall and Paul Atkinson, Thinking Beyond Basel III: Necessary Solutions for Capital and 
Liquidity, May 2010, in OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2010, disponibile anche all’indirizzo 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/58/45314422.pdf, at 13-4.  
33 See Alan Blinder, Two cheers for the New Bank Capital Standards, in Wall Street Journal, 30 Septemeber 2010; Adrian 
Blundell-Wignall and Paul Atkinson, Thinking Beyond Basel III, p. 16-7 e 21. 
34 Si v. Douglas J. Elliott, Basel III, the Banks and the Economy, 23 July 2010, The Brooking Institution paper, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0726_basel_elliott.aspx, p. 1. 
35 See FSB, Progress on the global regulatory reform agenda. Letter to G20 Ministers and Governors, 19 April 2010, at 2, 
«Where systemically important institutions are not effectively resolvable, it will strengthen the case for measures such as 
raising capital surcharges or other requirements to a point where the likelihood and impact of default is reduced to a very 
low level, or restrictions on activities/size/structure that make them resolvable», and FSB, Progress and issues on the 
global regulatory reform agenda. Letter to G20 Leaders, 24 June 2010, p. 2, «supplementary prudential requirements 
such as capital surcharges and/or structural constraints that address the greater risks that systemically important firms 
pose to the financial system» (italics added). 
36 Richard Portes, “Wasting a Crisis”, in Eurointellingence, 8 October 2009. 
37 Martin Shapiro, “Deliberative’, ‘Independent’ Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe Echo the EU?”, in 
Law & Contemporary Problems, 2005, Vol. 68, n. 3-4, p. 342 ss. and Sol Picciotto, “Networks in International Economic 
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decade, global regulators significantly improved the transparency of their standard setting activity. For 
example, according to Barr and Miller, the growing transparency and due process followed by the 
Basel Committee were effective means in strengthening the network’s accountability38. Yet, due 
process requirements vary steadily across different regulatory regimes, and so does their efficacy in 
enhancing the different regulators’ accountability.  
The approval of the second Basel Committee’s accord on capital requirements (Basel II) marked a 
move from the previous secrecy of the Committee. It involved the publication of three consultative 
draft, each followed by a period in which interested parties could send their comments. Participation in 
the process was massive, with more than two hundred comment letters for each consultative 
document39. Yet, BCBS’s due process for the approval of capital rules encountered two limits: first, 
stakeholders involved were mostly banks and financial institutions, with little or no input from 
consumers and academics40; second, participation was granted by the Committee on a case by case 
basis, with no general rule limiting its discretion for the future being set forth41. Under such 
conditions, it might have led to the global regulator’s capture by the banks42. 
When Basel III was approved, only one exposure draft for public comments was published43, while 
the final document was released after one year (a much shorter period than the five years necessary to 
finalize Basel II). Instead of three notice and comment rounds, only one was used by the Committee. 
Participation was widespread, with more than two-hundred comment letters being sent to the 
Committee44. Participants were again mostly banks and financial institutions and the scope of 
participation was decided by the BCBS on a case by case basis. 
IASB’s due process, on the contrary, is more predictable: the private organization, which started 
following some due process requirements already back in the 90s, published a Due Process Handbook 
in 2006, identifying the different standard setting phases and recognizing the principles of 
transparency, accessibility, extensive consultation, responsiveness and accountability. Hence, IASB’s 
due process includes not only participation and transparency, but also the duty to give reasons: it must 
explain why a specific standard is being adopted and the way in which it took into account the 
comments received45. Moreover, a Monitoring Body (MB) – established after the global crisis, and 
bringing together representatives of the European Commission, the American Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and the Japan Financial Services Agency, together with two representatives of the 
IOSCO – is responsible, inter alia, for verifying that the IASB follows its own due process46.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism”, in Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business, Vol. 17, n. 2/3, 1997, p. 1014 ss. 
38 Michael S. Barr and Geoffrey P. Miller, “Global Administrative Law: the View from Basel”, in European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 17, n. 1, 2006, p. 15 ss. 
39 See http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cacomments.htm .  
40 See Michael S. Barr and Geoffrey P. Miller, “Global Administrative Law: the View from Basel”, p. 24. 
41 See Stefano Battini, “Introduzione”, in Id. (ed.), La regolazione globale dei mercati finanziari, Giuffrè, 2007, p. 1 ss., at 
11.  
42 Duncan R. Wood, Governing Global Banking, at 150. 
43 See BCBS, Consultative proposals to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector announced by the Basel Committee, 
17 December 2009, available at http://www.bis.org/press/p091217.htm. 
44 See Comments received on the consultative documents "Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector" and 
"International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring", April 2010, available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165/cacomments.htm. 
45 See IFRS Foundation, Iasb’s Due Process Handbook, last version December 2010, available at 
http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/C3D78611-8792-441F-B426-6AF5189C83B8/0/DueProcessIASB2011.pdf., at 39, 41, 
43, 49, 98 and 112. 
46 See IFRS Foundation Constitution, available at http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/0B820728-7F10-4877-8068-
7B65D2A3058B/0/ConstitutionDec2010.pdf, para. 15, lett. g and Memorandum of Understanding between the 
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The use of notice and comment used at the global level must be carefully scrutinized, in order for it 
to effectively lead to both stronger accountability and efficacy, and not to result in a ‘regulatory 
capture’. Conditions for global due process to increase accountability of global regulators are several: 
a) it must be predictable, not granted on a case by case basis; 
b) it cannot identify only with participation, but it must involve also duty to give reasons; 
c) participation must be open to all the affected stakeholders; 
d) there must be an external assessment on whether the global regulator followed its due process. 
Lastly, it must be pointed out that due process must be matched with other means of accountability, 
not only procedural but also institutional ones. Under this regard, a GAL “bottom up” approach has 
been suggested: i.e. a use of national administrative law tools, for example the obligation of national 
authorities to report to national Parliament about their activity within the transnational networks47. 
5. The implementation process. The global/national interplay and the evolution of the 
globalization of law 
Global and national are not two separate levels48. National authorities take part in TRNs and in the 
FSB, participating in the setting of global rules and implement them at the national level. The analysis 
of the implementation phase, in particular, provides insights for the evolution of the global/national 
interaction.  
Standards drafted within transnational regulatory networks are later on implemented by the 
domestic authorities taking part in TRN. This was the general model of implementation of the Basel 
capital accord of 198849. This is still the case for most IOSCO standards. Basel II was partly 
implemented in the US through acts of rulemaking of the competent financial authorities (even though 
that specific process of implementation was particularly controversial, due to the emergence of a 
number of internal criticism coming both from the Congress and from small and medium size 
banks)50. 
Yet, in a number of cases the model of the implementation through acts of the national regulatory 
authorities has been abandoned. In the EU, Basel II was incorporated in the Capital Requirements 
Directive, which required the implementation of those measures from 200751. The EU CRAs 
Regulation draws widely upon IOSCO Code provisions and puts in place a registration system52. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Monitoring Board and the IFRS Trustees, available at http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/FF78D98F-A025-4BCB-B063-
4CC418237F5A/0/Monitoring_Board_Mou080110.pdf, art. III., par. 7, iv e 9, i-iv. 
47 Richard Stewart, “U.S. Administrative Law: a Model for Global Administrative Law?”, in Law & Contemporary 
Problems, 2005, Vol. 68, n. 3-4, p. 63 ss., at 76 and 85. 
48 S. Cassese, Administrative Law without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 NYU J. Int’l L.&Pol 663 
(2005), at 680. 
49 Si v. United States General Accounting Office (US GAO), International Banking: Implementation of Risk-based Capital 
Adequacy Standards, GAO/NSIAD-91-80, available at http://archive.gao.gov/d21t9/143022.pdf, pp. 2 e 13. 
50 See also Pierre-Hughes Verdier, “U.S. Implementation of Basel II: Lessons for Informal International Law-Making”, 30 
June 2011, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1879391 and Richard J. Herring, “The Rocky 
Road to Implementation of Basel II in the United States”, in Atlantic Economic Journal, 2007, vol. 35, p. 411 ss. 
51 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions, and Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions, in OJ L 177, June 30 2006, at 1 et seq. 
52 See Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating 
agencies. For a comment, see Fabian Amtenbrink and Jakob De Haan, “Regulating Credit Ratings in the European 
Union: A Critical First Assessment of Regulation 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies”, in Common Market Law 
Review, 2009, p. 1915 ss. 
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Regulation EC n. 1606/2002 (so called IAS Regulation) requires all publicly traded EU companies to 
prepare their consolidated accounts using IASB’s standards, IFRS, since 2005 (as endorsed in the 
EU)53. 
Explanations for this trend are several. On the one hand, they might show the willingness of the EU 
to control the globalization of law, far beyond the control which would take place through the informal 
implementation by national authorities. On the other hand, this trend can also been explained on the 
basis of EU institutional complexity, and on the lack – until recently – of EU financial regulatory 
authorities. The establishment, after the crisis, of a new European financial architecture could lead to a 
different result. Recent data seem to go in this direction: the newly established European Banking 
Authority (EBA) is implementing Basel III without waiting for the CRD revision process to be 
completed54. The implementation of global standards through acts of the European supervisory 
authorities – similar to the model currently used in the US – could expand in the EU context as well.  
Hence, the ongoing evolution of the ways of global financial standards implementation shows how 
the interaction between global, European and national regulation has found no settled balanced.  
                                                     
53 About the endorsement procedure, see Maurizia De Bellis, “EU and Global Private Regulatory Regimes: the Accounting 
and Auditing Sectors”, in Edoardo Chiti and Bernardo G. Mattarella (eds.), Global Administrative Law and EU 
Administrative Law. Relationships, Legal Issues and Comparison, Springer, 2011, p. 269 ss. 
54 See EBA, Recommendation on the creation and supervisory oversight of temporary capital buffers to restore market 
confidence, EBA/REC/2011/1, 8 December 2011, par. 2.  
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Global Rules on Public Procurement 
Hilde Caroli Casavola* 
During the last fifteen years public procurement has accounted for 5,5 trillions of US dollars – fifty 
times the value of the EU Gross Domestic Product. In 2008 it hovered between twelve and seventeen 
per cent of the GDP of the Member States of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).1 Such contracts are increasingly subject to rules and standards set outside a 
national context.  
More than forty supranational regulations are established by a growing number of international 
organizations and agreements. A variety of institutions and bodies has regulatory power over contracts 
concluded by public administrations.2 The World Trade Organization (WTO),3 the World Bank4 and 
the Regional Development Banks (such as the Asian Development Bank and the African Development 
Bank), the OECD, the UN as well as the various States bound by formal bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, are amongst such institutions. It has been sharply observed that « we live in an era of 
unprecedented diffusion of sophisticated public procurement regimes on a global scale ».5  
In the view of understanding these emerging regulatory phenomena, the traditional conceptual 
instruments of domestic administrative law and international law increasingly appeared outdated. 
Several new kinds of relationship between individuals and global actors – States, administrations, 
international organizations and different bodies – can be better outlined (in terms of reciprocal 
influence, interaction, mutual impact, conflicts and more) in the Global Administrative Law 
perspective.6 
Why do nations and international organizations adopt global rules on public procurement? Which 
characteristics can be found in identifying these procurement regimes? And do these regimes share 
common aspects with other sectors of Global Administrative Law?  
                                                     
* Associate Professor of Public Law, University of Molise. 
1 Ocse, Government at a Glance 2011, August 2011, pp. 148-9. The value of 17% includes 5% average value of 
procurement of State-owned or controlled firms. 
2 The literature on public procurement has mainly highlighted the phenomenon’s characteristics according to the specific 
legal framework (trade, aid development, foreign investments and anti-corruption cooperation; see, amongst others, S. 
Arrowsmith, R. Anderson eds., The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, F. Weiss, D. Kalogeras, The Principle of Non-discrimination in Procurement for Development 
Assistance, in Public Procurement Law Review, no. 1, 2005, pp. 1-14; S. Schill, Contracting with Foreigners: 
International Investment Law Implications, in Droit comparé des Contrats Publics - Comparative Law on Public 
Contracts, a cura di R. Noguellou, U. Stelkens, Brüssel, 2010, p. 63 ss.; C.R. Yukins, Integrating Integrity and 
Procurement: The United Nation Convention against Corruption and the Uncitral Model Procurement Law, in Public 
Contract Law Journal, 2007). On the relationship existing between regulatory systems established by different 
organizations and international agreements, H. Caroli Casavola, La globalizzazione dei contratti delle pubbliche 
amministrazioni, Milano, Giuffrè, 2012.  
3 In the framework of the WTO, the first Agreement on Government Procurement (so-called “Code”) was negotiated 
during the Tokyo Round (1979). The following plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement -GPA was negotiated 
during the Uruguay Round (1986-1994).  
4 As World Bank is referred the organization that manages the financing provided by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Association for Development (IDA). 
5 J.J. Schwartz, On Globalization and Government Procurement, in Public Procurement. The Continuing Revolution, 
edited by S. Arrowsmith, M. Trybus, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003, p. 23 ff., esp. p. 44. 
6 B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, R. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, in 68 Law & Contemporary 
Problems 3/4 (2005), p. 15-61; S. Cassese, The Globalization of Law, in 37 “Journal of International Law and Politics”, 4 
(2005) 973. 
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The goal of this paper is to direct attention to the questions above recalled, and to focus on some 
useful remarks concerning four points.  
First, the objectives pursued by the most developed sets of relevant rules. Secondly, the main 
features of globalization and public procurement. Third, the constants shared with other Global 
Administrative Law’ phenomena, and last, the characteristics or peculiar aspects of global public 
procurement regimes. 
1. Why global rules on public procurement?  
The emerging global regulations pursue several different goals. These goals vary depending on the 
distinctive historical and cultural background of each autonomous regulatory initiative. 
The main historical aim is to eradicate traditional home-biased procurement and to remove 
unnecessary barriers to national market access:7 domestic contract law often allows discriminatory 
treatment and restrictions of competition in the awarding procedures.8  
For instance, the negotiations launched in the context of the International Trade Organization in 
19469, on initiative and strong support of the United States, aimed to subject government procurement 
to international trade rules, removing conventional trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas. The 
purpose was to bind national legislators to apply common tendering procedures, and thus to open up 
rich domestic procurement markets, including the European internal one.10 
In particular, many international agreements and conventions use competition mechanisms in order 
to enhance access to domestic public procurement markets. The rules of best value for money, and 
efficient and effective management of public resources are often established on the basis of 
transparency and free trade principles (like in the GPA and the NAFTA).11 The need for such rules 
may partially be seen in problems of global scale, like reducing the burden on public budgets or 
leveling the playing field for international economic operators.  
Most recently, creeping protectionism has increased and discriminatory tendencies in public 
procurement have been strengthened as effect of the financial crisis.12 
                                                     
7 M.G. Herander, Discriminatory Government Procurement with a Content Requirement: its Protective Effects and 
Welfare Costs, 1986, 14 Atlantic Economic Journal, p. 20; A. Mattoo, The Government Procurement Agreement: 
Implications of Economic Theory, 1996, 19 The World Economy p. 695; F. Trionfetti, Home-biased Government 
Procurement and International Trade: Descriptive Statistics, Theory and Empirical Evidence, in S. Arrowsmith, M. 
Trybus (editors), Public Procurement. The Continuing Revolution, cit., pp. 223-233.  
8 S. Arrowsmith, Public Procurement as an Instrument of Policy, 1995, Law Quaterly Review, p. 235, and in a different 
perspective, C. McCrudden, Buying Social Justice. Equality, Government Procurement & Legal Change, Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
9 The Agreement on Government Procurement -AGP (see supra, n. 3) will entered into force only in 1981. The text of the 
plurilateral GPA, signed in 1994, has been recently renewed (April 2012) in the view of extending its coverage. For a 
comprehensive analysis of the new text, S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in WTO, The Hague, 2003; on the last 
challenges, see the bibliography in the previous note.  
10 On the GPA as “walled garden” of the USA procurement market, see C.R. Yukins, S.L. Schooner, Incrementalism. 
Eroding the Impediments to a Global Public Procurement Market, in Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2007, 
vol. 38, pp. 529-576, esp. p. 569 ff. 
11 On the common principles, rules and standard of global public procurement regimes see H. Caroli Casavola 
Internationalizing Public Procurement Law: Conflicting Global Standards for Public Procurement, in Global Jurist, 
Advances, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 4 et seq.  
12 F. Erixon, R. Sally, Trade, Globalisation and Emerging Protectionism Since the Crisis, European Center for International 
Political Economy Working Paper n. 2, 2010, p. 8, and A. Krueger, Protectionism and the crisis, in The Collapse of 
Global Trade, Murky Protectionism, and the Crisis: Recommendations for the G20, edited by R. Baldwin, S. Evenett, 
London, Centre for Economic and Policy Research, 2009, p. 37. On the specific topic related to public procurement, J. 
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In the case of the World Bank, the main objective of the Procurement Guidelines13 is to ensure that 
procurements in Bank-financed projects are conducted in a manner to guarantee that financing is 
effectively used for the purposes for which it was agreed. The fight against corruption is crucial 
among the aims of the WB procurement regime: the Guidelines provide procedural and substantial 
measures to this end.14  
Several other supranational sets of rules pursue the same objective. The increasing importance of 
anticorruption purposes in procurement regulations is evident not only in the “norm cascade”15 
occurred from the end of the 1990’s onwards – that is, the rapid and broad spreading out of numerous 
regulatory initiatives on a global scale, including the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,16 the Inter-American Convention,17 
the African Union Convention,18 the EU Criminal Convention19 and the UN Convention Against 
Corruption –,20 but also in the most recent recognition of the integrity principle in the revised text of 
the GPA.21 It is the first explicit reference to corruption practice and conflicts of interest, adopted in 
one WTO Agreement. Although the subsequent substantive obligations are still not clear, mostly 
depending on the material application,22 this change has great significance for the potential 
implications in terms of interpretation of other Treaty rules.  
A second objective of the WB Procurement Guidelines is to support the management and reform of 
public procurement systems in borrower countries. This objective is progressively attaining greater 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Linarelli, Global Procurement Law in Times of Crisis: New Buy American Policies and Options in the WTO Legal 
System, in The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform, edited by S. Arrowsmith, R. 
Anderson, cit., pp. 773 ff., G.C. Hufbauer, J.J. Schott, Buy American: Bad for Jobs, Worse for Reputation, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics Policy Brief No. PB09-2 (2009), S.L. Schooner, C.R. Yukins, Tempering “Buy 
American” in the Recovery Act - Steering Clear of a Trade War, in Government Contractor, n. 10, 2009, p. 78, and Id., 
Public Procurement: Focus on People, Value for Money and Systemic Integrity, not Protectionism, in The Collapse of 
Global Trade, Murky Protectionism, and the Crisis: Recommendations for the G20, cit., pp. 87-92. 
13 Adopted in 1964, the World Bank Guidelines for Procurement under Ibrd Loans and Ida Credits were modified in 1994, 
1999, 2004, 2006, 2010 and 2011 (available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/projects/procurement/0,,pagePK:84271~theSitePK:84266,00.html). 
14 According to para. 1.14, lett. a), b) e c) of the Procurement Guidelines, a separate and autonomous body of the WB, the 
Department of Institutional Integrity, has the power to investigate only in cases of alleged fraud and corruption. On the 
importance of preventing corruption in Bank projects and programs see World Bank, Helping Countries Combat 
Corruption. Progress at the World Bank Since 1997, Washington, 2000, 12 ss. 
15 K.W. Abbot, Rulemaking in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption, in Journal of International 
Economic Law, 2001, n. 4, p. 275, esp. p. 278. 
16 The OECD Convention was signed in 1997 and is currently applied in the 38 countries that have transposed its provisions 
into their national legal orders. States have the task of guaranteeing that the OECD rules are effective in their domestic 
legal orders. See the site www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,en_2649_201185_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
17 Inter-American Convention against Corruption, adopted on March 29, 1996 (available at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html). See R.J. Zedalis, How does the New OECD Convention on 
Bribery Stack up Against the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?, in Journal of World Trade, 1998, n. 32, p. 167. 
18 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, signed in 2002 (see the site http://www.africa-
union.org/official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruptio
n.pdf). 
19 Council of Europe, Criminal Convention Against Corruption, signed in Strasbourg, January 27, 1999 
(http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/173.htm).  
20 United Nations Convention Against Corruption-Uncac, signed in Merida, October 31, 2003 (Committee for the 
Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption, UNA/58/422; 
www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_signatures_corruption/html). See S.D. Murphy, Adoption of UN Convention Against 
Corruption, in American Journal of International Law, n. 98, 2004, p. 182  
21 Art. IV, co. 4 of the revised GPA (GPA/112, 16 December 2011).  
22 See A. Reich, The New Text of the Agreement on Government Procurement: An Analysis and Assessment, in Journal of 
International Economic Law, 12 (2010), p. 997.  
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relevance in developing and less developed countries, as strategic condition for public infrastructure 
investments and other contractual activities in the context of the recent economic crisis.  
As for other supranational procurement regimes (including the GPA), efforts to bring about 
fundamental changes to disparately developed domestic systems and to affirm a minimum common set 
of rules, have continually been the focus of international organization’s activities in the longer term. In 
the light of the multiple intersections of public procurement with other sectors (trade, environment, 
human rights etc.), the progressive expansion and improvement of the global disciplines generally 
include an enhanced range of scope. 
2. The main features of globalization and public procurement  
Considering the general frameworks of the emerging regulatory paradigm, we can outline the main 
features of globalization and public procurement in three distinct groups.  
First of all, procurement regulation at a global level is mainly based on a structure of State’ consent 
relationships. Most of the legal instruments providing global regulations have pactual nature: 
consensual acts and voluntary rules (f.i. the GPA, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial 
Communities or Authorities,23 the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and a wide number of bilateral free 
trade agreements). In force of these acts each individual State limits its own regulatory powers and 
binds public bodies and private individuals. Most of the disputes are resolved by way of conciliation, 
through solutions mutually satisfactory for the parties. In the case of GPA, the Dispute Settlement 
Body-DSB promotes consultations among them.  
On the contrary, in several cases – as for the World Bank Procurement Guidelines – procedural 
requirements are imposed by supranational and transnational bodies as rules of conduct (formally not 
binding) and are accepted as financing conditions, but they are not co-decided by the recipient 
countries. In these cases too, however, contractors express their consent and agree to the same 
objectives: as a result, public regulatory bodies, local agencies and economic operators, subject to the 
national legal order, are bound by those rules. 
Second, regulatory contents are essentially defined on the basis of economic criteria, market 
dynamics and game strategies (such as the comparative advantage, transaction costs, information 
asymmetries, best-value-for money, minimum value thresholds, incentive mechanisms).24 The 
dominant model of public procurement regulation – the GPA – is mainly based on competition and 
serves the so-called “purity principle”, that is to say the establishment of a system that reduces as far 
as possible the insertion of non-economic criteria into the procurement process, like social policy 
conditions.25 These criteria often arise the problem of compatibility of using procurement as a policy 
tool and avoiding new barriers for market access.  
                                                     
23 Signed in Madrid in 1980, European Treaty Series (ETS), no. 106, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, Treaty Office, 15th 
October 2003, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Word/106.doc. 
24 See, amongst many, R. Coase, The Firm, The Market, The Law, University of Chicago, 1988, A. Peacock, M. Ricketts, 
Government and Industry, Londra, 1991, R. Dornbusch, S. Fischer, P. Samuelson, Comparative Advantage, Trade and 
Payments in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods, in American Economic Review, v. 95, n. 2, 1980, p. 203-
224, and most recently, P.R. Krugman, M. Obstfeld, M. Melitz, International Economics: Theory And Policy9, 2012, pt. 
I, c. 3. In particular, on public procurement, G. Piga, K.V. Thai, The Economics of Public Procurement, in Riv. pol. econ., 
n. 1, 2006. 
25 S. Arrowsmith, Horizontal Policy in Public Procurement: A Taxonomy, in Journal of Public Procurement, 10 (2010), p. 
149; C. McCrudden, Buying Social Justice. Equality, Government Procurement & Legal Change, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, Id., International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the 
Legality of ‘Selective Purchasing’ Laws under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, in Journal of 
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The recent revisions to the GPA could be seen as leaving more space to tackle environmental issues 
and to favour “green public procurement”.26 However, the problem of the sharp definition of which 
environmental measures could be legitimately required as conditions or evaluation criteria is still 
open.27 
Another relevant aspect is that standardization of public procurement rules largely follows an 
Anglo-Saxon model with regard to the technical specifications, bidder notice, competitive tendering 
and award criteria. An important characteristic of this model is that it does not make a difference 
between the public or private nature of the contractors. It always applies the same principles, and thus 
seems to be based on the idea of a strong private sector involvement in public activities. Because of 
the main economic imprint of procurement rules, technical expertise is generally required for national 
and supranational regulators and decision-makers. 
Third, global bodies and regimes have developed a wide range of cross-references, 
interrelationships and reciprocal influence, including transfer of legal institutions (as competitive 
bidding procedure, transparency and fairness requirements).  
Two examples can be referred to clarify this point.  
The first example is the sixth Recognizing of the Preamble of the revised GPA: emphasis is here on 
the concept of transparency, impartiality and the commitment to avoid conflicts of interest and 
corruption. What is more significant is, however, the final reference to the UN Convention Against 
Corruption: it is recognized, for the first time, as one of the international instruments appropriate to 
clarify the WTO public procurement contents relevant to pursue those objectives. 
The second example is drawn from the legal persons’ liability regulation and refers to criminal and 
administrative adjudication.  
The 1997 OECD Convention entrusts the signing States with the twofold task of transposing the 
OECD rules into their domestic legal orders and guaranteeing that they are effective. According to the 
Convention, the Italian legislator established new rules,28 including the obligation for potential 
contractors of domestic public authorities, to adopt certain organizational, management and 
supervisory models, and to set up internal supervisory bodies, to avoid incurring such liability.29 In 
one of the first application, the well-known Enelpower case,30 a German company, emerged as the 
winner from two contract award procedure, was found in breach of the domestic legislation by the 
national judge. It held to be excluded from such legislation’s scope of application, since the absence in 
the German discipline, not only of a duty to adopt management and supervisory models, but also of 
prohibitive sanctions and criminal liability for legal persons. In his order, the judge emphasized that 
“such legislative provision has its primary origin in international and Community Conventions, such 
(Contd.)                                                                  
International Economic Law, 1999, p. 3-48. On the environmental interest, P. Kunzlik (ed.), The Environmental 
Performance of Public Procurement, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
26 Art. X, co. 6 and 9 of the revised GPA.  
27 S. Arrowsmith, The Revised Agreement on Government Procurement: changes to the procedural rules and other 
transparency provisions, in The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform, edited by S. 
Arrowsmith, R. Anderson, cit., pp. 285 ff., esp. p. 320 ff. 
28 Section 11 of Law no. 300, dated 29 September 2000. 
29 The implementing decree created a specific “administrative offence for complex structures” (Report of the ministerial 
Committee on Legislative Decree no. 231 of 8 June 2001, with particular reference to section 5). The offence comprises 
elements of administrative law and of criminal law. The liability regime applied to legal persons is that of strict liability 
(for “organisational fault”). 
30 Disqualification Order dated 28 April 2004, annotated by U. Draetta, Prime sanzioni interdittive in Italia a carico di 
persone giuridiche per corruzione di pubblici ufficiali, in Il diritto del commercio internazionale, 2004, pp. 241-44. See 
the commentary by L. Borlini, La lotta alla corruzione internazionale: le Convenzioni dell’OSCE e delle NU, il caso 
Enelpower, la “tangentopoli” irachena, in La Comunità internazionale, 2005, pp. 75-95.  
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as (…) the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (….), which require provision for the liability of legal persons. All such 
conventions, no matter how indirectly they relate to the present proceedings, have been ratified by 
Italy and Germany and therefore, despite differing forms of implementation, constitute positive law 
and a source of obligations for both Countries”.31 
In this light, the reason for the decision of the domestic adjudicative body directly focuses on the 
international rules. On these rules are based the national ones, applied by the national courts. They aim 
at ensuring that foreign competitors respect supranational rules and thus protect global public interests 
(i.e. those of contracting authorities, national competitors, states and other parties). Such interests 
include the fight against international corruption and an enhanced degree of competition in 
procurement contracts.  
The globalization or “internationalization” of domestic procurement systems takes great advantage 
from both the horizontal (lateral opening of national legal orders and supranational regimes, law 
transfer) and the vertical dimension (self-contained regimes, national-global) of interactions among the 
actors in the global space.  
3. Common aspects with other Global Administrative sectoral regimes 
With regard to aspects common to public procurement regimes and other Global Administrative 
regimes, three are relevant. 
First, global rules and standards directly affect citizens of the State-parties (involved in or 
addressed by the rule-making and decision-making processes) and non-State parties, such as private 
firms and administrative entities (i.e. the regions and local authorities). Despite the informal and 
sometimes non-binding nature of many of the sources of authority, global organizations and 
institutions exercise power and control over individuals as well as States (including States that are 
third parties to international treaties and agreements).32  
A significant example is given by the World Bank procurement system: a list of the debarred firms 
and individuals is published and regularly updated on the official website of the Bank.33 It includes 
subjects of 57 different countries, sanctioned under the Bank’s fraud and corruption policy as set forth 
in the Procurement Guidelines. Following the sanction procedures and the declaration of ineligibility, 
economic operators cannot be awarded a World Bank-financed contract for a certain period of time.  
Second, a considerable body of widespread global rules and principles shows a prominent 
administrative nature. A minimum common standard of procedural guarantees (such as competitive 
bidding and fair, open, transparent and timely completed procedure, reasoned award decision) and due 
process obligations (participation of private parties, independence of the reviewing body and others) 
play a fundamental role in developing the legal phenomena.  
To clarify the concept a useful example can be drawn from the Canadian International Trade 
Tribunal case-law.  
                                                     
31 Court of Milan, Office of Preliminary Investigation Magistrate Salvini, Disqualification Order dated 28 April 2004, cit. p. 
1. 
32 These new phenomena are driven by a process of «mutual penetration and harmonization» and develop through linkages 
and «mutual connections» among domestic, international and global laws (connecting regimes). Such a process of 
transfer of legal institutes, rules and standards takes place along vertical and horizontal lines (S. Cassese, The 
Globalization of Law, cit., 980; Id., Administrative law without the State? The challenge of global regulation, in “Journal 
of International Law and Politics”, v. 37 (2005), n. 4, pp. 663-694).  
33 See www.worldbank.org/html/opr/procure. 
Global Rules on Public Procurement 
57 
The latter is a domestic quasi-judicial body also acting as international review body with regard to 
complaints filed by non-Canadian companies (against national authorities), for procurement subject to 
GPA, NAFTA and several other international agreements.34 The case refers to Corel, a Canadian 
company, competitor of Microsoft in a combined procurement of licences and integration/training 
services. Against the award decision in favour of the latter, Corel filed the claim to the CITT, raising 
the issue of violation of GPA and NAFTA provisions on tender documentation. The claimant alleged 
that procuring authorities did not provide sufficient information relating to conversion costs. This 
information was necessary to permit potential suppliers other than the incumbent to quantify the offer 
and submit proposals. In its determination, the Tribunal found that the government had incurred in 
serious deficiencies in the procurement process and apparent discriminatory treatment of non-
incumbent bidders.35 It concludes that «[i]n the Tribunal’s view, not only is the prejudice to Corel in 
this instance real but there is also prejudice to the integrity of the Canadian procurement system».36 
Here, the high degree of procedimentalization serves the function of applying the principles of 
equal treatment, non-discrimination, competition and integrity of both the domestic and the 
international procurement markets.  
Third, the more developed a global regime’s compliance system is, the more effective it will be in 
resolving related disputes adequately. This aspect has a direct impact on contracts in terms of what 
remedies are available to the contracting parties. Moreover it ought to guarantee greater impartiality 
on the part of the deciding body, something craved by private parties as a counterbalance to the special 
nature of the powers enjoyed by the public contractors. In this respect, the example of CITT has once 
again extreme importance: the Tribunal receives, on average, less than hundred procurement 
complaints per year; only about half are accepted for inquiry; of those accepted, less than half are 
decided in favour of the complainant. Nevertheless, it «has been a vehicle for Canadian suppliers to 
obtain greater fairness, openness and transparency in the way that federal government procurement is 
conducted in Canada».37  
4. Peculiar aspects of global public procurement regimes 
Turning to the characteristics of global public procurement regimes, three aspects deserve 
consideration. 
First, a common inter-regime pattern is the tendency to leave no space to the exercise of unilateral 
powers by national authorities and (sovereign) States before, during and after the negotiation of the 
contracts. On the other side, the execution phase is almost excluded from global regulations. 
The second aspect is the need of flexibility and maximum sharing of the considerable body of 
global rules and standards.38 A flexible approach to procedural regulation is often a mean for 
enhancing consent and membership in the sector systems. The original and primary objective of global 
                                                     
34 See also the case referred in the paper by S. Battini, Administrative Law beyond the State, in this volume, § 3. 
35 Canadian International Trade Tribunal, Re Corel Corp., Determination of October 26, 1998 (PR-98-012 and PR-98-014), 
n. 79/1998, p. 21 (available at www.citt.gc.ca/procure/determin/prin2m_e.asp). Amongst other aspects, the Tribunal 
underlined that the government «offers no coherent rationale for establishing the file conversion and training costs at 50 
percent of their value in the evaluation process. It is simply not clear why this percentage was chosen and how 
specifically the risks to the government and taxpayers were balanced within the context of effective competition». 
36 Citt Determination, Re Corel Corp, p. 22. 
37 R.W. Heggart, Bid Challenge in Canada and the Impact on Public Procurement: Observations of Changes from Inside 
the Reviewing Agency, in 3rd International Public Procurement Conference Proceedings, 2008, p. 1251-9.  
38 P. Trepte, Regulating procurement: understanding the ends and means of public procurement regulation, Oxford - New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 392-3.  
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regimes is, in fact, to “attract” (i.e. induce acceptance by) the greatest possible number of countries 
and thereby guarantee that rules such as competitive tendering procedure, are widely applied. 
In this light, a considerable number of measures of the GPA of 2011 were reworded to include in 
procurement processes and decisions, the use of electronic tools (for communications and auctions) at 
the same conditions and with the same guarantees (like non-discrimination effects) already provided 
for the traditional ones (f.i. written document or texts). In the same rational, evaluation criteria and 
technical specifications provisions were revised to cover the possibility of considering environmental 
issues in their making, and minimum time periods were reduce in order to speed up procurement 
procedures in the case of a state of urgency.  
Third, the existence of judicial review systems is crucial for compliance. Global regulatory regimes 
with their own remedial mechanisms (judicial, quasi-judicial or surrogated) often acquire a substantial 
and creative approach: they are tending to extend jurisdiction in their subject-matter by interpreting 
key concepts, which are undetermined or vague in the regulations (such as “entity covered”, “value of 
the contract”).  
A meaningful example is provided by the Dispute Settlement Body in the Korea Airport decision.39 
The GPA applies, in particular, to the list of procuring entities indicated by each Party as entities 
bound by the Agreement. Competent for the disputed procurement was first designated the Korean 
Ministry for Transportation and it was included in the list of the Korean entities subject to GPA. Later 
on, the administrative competence passed on several other domestic agencies, but the list was never 
updated. 
The main legal issue focused on the nature of those authorities and their substantial relationship 
with the central government. Whilst the complainant argued that the procuring entities were “branch 
offices” or “subordinate linear organizations” tied to the central administration by a relationship of 
“instrumentality”, Korea referred to its national legislation and maintained that those bodies were 
separate legal persons enjoying functional autonomy.40 In the Panel Report, the notion of “associated 
entity” is explained by applying the “legal unity principle”, on one side, and the “principal-agent” 
scheme, on the other.41  
In this perspective, national legal orders penetrate the framework of supranational regimes and 
acquire importance within the global administrative space by exploiting the “holes” leave empty or 
free for use of the “open”, indeterminate legal concepts. The ongoing dynamic of clarifying and 
reassessing key notions takes great advantage from the interplay and the dialogue between the national 
(and regional, like the EU one) public procurement legal orders and the global regimes.  
Nevertheless, time and costs of settling a dispute before “global trade tribunals” are still the main 
reason discouraging harmed parties from bringing claims to supranational review bodies (like the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body). Therefore, implementation, organization and adjudicatory powers are 
mainly left to the States. This character explains why important global regimes, like the GPA and the 
World Bank Procurement Guidelines, have been plagued with a high degree of inconsistency in the 
various national review mechanisms and have experienced serious difficulties in obtaining effective 
enforcement.  
                                                     
39 See decision of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body adopted on 19 June 2000 (WT/DBS/M/84; Panel request of 11 May 
1999, WT/DS163/4; Panel Report presented on 1 May 2000, WT/DS163/R). 
40 Korea based its case, in particular, on the characteristics of the tasks entrusted to these bodies. These, it was generally 
considered, made the tasks’ discharge more appropriate through parties outside the traditional central government 
apparatus, given the latter’s bureaucratic organization (para. 4.254 of the Panel Report).  
41 For a comprehensive analysis of the case and the main legal issues involved, see H. Caroli Casavola, Global Rules for 
Public Procurement, in Droit comparé des Contrats Publics - Comparative Law on Public Contracts, edited by R. 
Noguellou, U. Stelkens, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2010, p. 27 seq., esp. pp. 34-40.  
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1. Introduction 
How to satisfy water, food and medicine needs for children living in countries ravaged by famine? 
How to house millions of refugees coming from countries at war? How to support democratic 
institutions in post-conflict countries? How to get aircrafts for peace-keeping operations? How does 
the United Nations (UN) fulfil its printing needs?  
In 2010 the whole UN system procured a wide range of goods, service and works for a total of over 
14.5 billion dollars1. From 2000 until 2010 the value of the purchase orders placed by the UN 
Procurement Division (UN/PD) only has raised from 687.62 million Dollars to 3,144. 52 million 
Dollars (with a peak in 2009 of 3,488.42 million Dollars) 2. This is a trend that has been steadily 
growing since the international organizations’ foundation and that has been even more prominent in 
the last decades3. It can be explained with the physiological growth of the structure and the functions 
of international organizations. For instance, in the case of the UN, it is the result of the great increase 
of peace-building and peace-keeping operations. Procurement and its regulation are, thus, acquiring 
more and more a crucial role in the fulfillment of the organizations’ mandate and goals.  
Despite this relevant empirical evidence, there are few scholarly works analyzing the rules 
governing international organizations’ procurement and its practice. Between the ‘60s and the ’70s, 
some works were published on the contracts concluded by international organizations, which focused, 
however, mainly on the contractual phase4 and the related issues, such as the law applicable to 
contracts5, and neglected a systematic inquiry into the administrative phase of vendors’ selection6. 
                                                     
* Research and Teaching Assistant in Administrative Law at University of RomaTre. 
1 Statistics can be found in United Nations, 2010 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement, 2010, also 
available at https://www.ungm.org/Publications/Documents/ASR_2010.pdf 
2 Statistics for the United Nation Procurement Division are available at http://www.un.org/depts/ptd/statistics.htm  
3 An overview on the increasing use of public-private partnerships by international organizations is provided by B. Bull,D. 
McNeill, Development Issues in Global Governance. Public-Private Partnerships and Market Multilateralism, 
Routledge: Abingdon, 2007. 
4 See M. J. Salmon, Les contrats de la Banque internationale pour la reconstruction et le développement, in «Annuaire 
français de droit international», 1956, 635 et seq.; J.-C. Groshens, Les Marchés passés par les organisations 
internationales, in «Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger», 1956, vol. 4, 741et seq.; R. 
Monaco, Osservazioni sui contratti conclusi da enti internazionali, in Aa. Vv., Studi in onore di Francesco Santoro 
Passarelli, Napoli, Jovene; 1972; N. Valticos, Les contrats conclus par les organizations internationals avec des 
personnes privées: Rapport provisoire, in «Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international», 1977(a), vol.57(1), 1 et seq.; id., 
Les contrats conclus par les organizations internationals avec des personnes privées: Rapport definitive, in «Annuaire de 
l'Institut de droit international», 1977(b), vol.57(1), 132 et seq.; J. Colin, M. H. Sinkondo, Les relations contractuelles 
des organisations internationales avec les personnes privées, in «Revue de Droit International et de Droit Compare», 
1992, vol. 69, 7 et seq.; G. Van Hecke, Contracts between International Organizations and Private Law Persons, in R. 
Bernhardt (a cura di), Encyclopedia of Public and International Law (II ed. 1992), North-Holland, Elsevier, Vol. I, 812 et 
seq.; M. Audit, Les marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services passés par les organisations internationales, in 
«Journal du Droit International», 2008, n. 4, 941 et seq. 
5 See C. W. Jenks, The Proper Law of International Organizations, Londra, Stevens & Sons Ltd./Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 
Oceana Publications, 1962; F.A. Mann, The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons, in «British 
Year Book of International Law», 1959, n.35, 34 et seq.; H. Batifol, Problèmes des contrats privés internationaux, Parigi, 
Association des études internationales, 1962; G. R. Delaume, The Proper Law of Loans Concluded by International 
Persons: A Restatement and a Forecast, in «The American Journal of International Law», 1962, vol. 56, n. 1, 63 et seq.; 
id., Issues of applicable law in the context of the World Bank operations, in N. Horn, C.M. Schmitthof (a cura di), The 
Transnational Law of International Commercial Transactions, Deventer/Boston, Kluwer,1982; Glavinis, Les litiges 
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Furthermore, much attention has been devoted to examine the rules set forth by some international and 
supranational organizations, e.g. the WTO or the EU, to harmonize rules regulating State 
procurement7, but never an adequate attention has been given to the rules of activity that the 
international organisations set forth for their own procurement activity.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
relatifs aux contrats passés entre organisations internationales et personnes privées, Parigi, L.G.D.J., 1990, 183-236; N. 
Valticos, Les contrats conclus par les organizations internationals avec des personnes privées: Rapport provisoire, cit., 
6-63; id., Les contrats conclus par les organizations internationals avec des personnes privées: Rapport definitive, cit., 
151-169; G. van Hecke, Contracts between International Organizations and Private Law Persons, in R. Bernhardt (a 
cura di), Encyclopedia of Public and International Law (II ed. 1992), North-Holland, Elsevier, Vol. I, 812 et seq.; V. M. 
E. Schneider, International Organizations and Private Persons: The Case for a Direct Application of International Law, 
in Aa. Vv., Etudes de droit international en l'honneur de Pierre Lalive, Basilea, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1993; M. H. 
Sinkondo, Le rôle de la volonté de l'organisation internationale dans la détermination du droit applicable aux contrats 
conclus avec les personnes privées, in «Revue de droit international et de droit comparé», 1997, n. 4, 367 et seq.; F. 
Seyersted, Common Law of International Organizations, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008; M. Audit, 
Les marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services passés par les organisations internationales, cit., 954-960 ; B. 
Heuninckx, Applicable Law to the Procurement of International Organisations in the European Union, in «Public 
Procurement Law Review», 2011, 20(4), 103 et seq..  
6 Indeed very few and sectional have been the studies on international organizations’ procurement: B. Heuninckx, Defence 
Procurement Law in Europe.The Role of International Organisations, paper presented at the Third Public Procurement 
Research Student Conference, University of Nottingham, 21-22 June 2007; H. Neumann, Procurement in the United 
Nations System, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2008; Y. Renouf, When legal certainty matters less than a deal: Procurement in 
International Organizations, paper presented at the University of Geneva-NYU conference on Practical Legal Problems 
of International Organizations. A Global Administrative Law Perspective on Public/Private Partnerships, Accountability, 
and Human Rights, Geneva, 20–21 March 2009, available at www.iilj.org/GAL/GALGeneva.asp; T. Sakane,Challenges 
for Humanitarian Food Assistance: The World Food Programme Procurement Administration, paper presented in the 3rd 
International Public Procurement Conference, Geneve, 28-30 August 2008; Id., Public Procuremnt in the United 
Nations System, in K.V. Thai (ed.), International Handbook of Public Procurement, Boca Raton/Florida: 
Francis&Taylor, 2009, 233 et seq.  
 More attention has instead been devoted to procurement by EU Institutions. However, often these studies have focused 
on singles aspects of the procurement procedure or on single judicial cases see J. B. Auby, Accountability and 
Contracting Out by Global Administrative Bodies. The Case of Externalization Contracts made by European Community 
Institutions paper presented at the Global Administrative Law Workshop, New York University, 18 Oct. 2006; R. 
Bickerstaff, Commission Staff Working Documents on the Requirements for Conducting Public Procurement Using 
Electronic Means, in «Public Procurement Law Review» 2006, n. 1, 17 et seq.; P. Braun, Interim Measures Against 
Community Institutions: Case T-303/04, in, «Public Procurement Law Review» 2005, n. 2, 25 et seq.; Id, Damages for 
Irregularities in the Award Process: Case T- 160/03, in, “Public Procurement Law Review» 2005, n. 4, 98 et seq.; A. 
Brown, Interim Measures Against the Community Institutions in Procurement Cases: A Note on the Esedra Case, in 
«Public Procurement Law Review» 2001, v. 2, 51 et seq.; id., Commission Award Procedure for Supply of Office 
Furniture, in «Public Procurement Law Review» 2003, n. 2, 41 et seq.; B. Heuninckx, Towards a Coherent European 
Defence Procurement Regime? European Defense Agency and European Commission Initiatives, in «Public Procurement 
Law Review» 2008, 1, 1-20; S. Kahn, Advanced Technology Projects and International Procurement: The Case of the 
European Space Agency, in «Public Procurement Law Review» 1993, n. 1, 13 et seq.; D. A. Kalogeras, Revision of the 
Financial Rules Applicable to the General Budget of the European Communities, in «Public Procurement Law Review» 
2007, n. 4, 98 et seq. Id., Remedies in the Field of Public Procurement Against the Institutions of the European 
Community: Quis Custodiat Ipsos Custode?s, in «Public Procurement Law Review» 1999, n. 5, 211 et seq.; H.-J. Priess, 
Contracting with the European Communities. Legal Aspects of E.C. Procurement and Subsidies, in «Public Procurement 
Law Review» 1996, n. 1, 7 et seq.  
7 Instead much scholarly work has been dedicated to examine the harmonization of national public procurement rules 
thanks to global standards set forth by international organizations. See, inter alia, H. Caroli Casavola, Internationalizing 
Public Procurement Law: Conflicting Global Standards for Public Procurement, in «Global Jurist», 2006, n. 6, 3 et seq. 
also available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol6/iss3/art7/ ; F. Weiss, D.Kalogeras, The Principle of Non-
discrimination in Procurement for Development Assistance, in «Public Procurement Law Review», 2005, n.1, 1 et seq. V. 
Rege, Transparency in Government Procurement. Issues on Concern and Interest to Developing Countries, in «Journal 
of World Trade», 2001, n. 35, 489 et seq.; S. Arrowsmith, A. Davies, Public Procurement: Global Revolution, The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000; S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli, D. Wallace, Regulating Public Procurement: 
National and International Perspectives, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000; J. B. Auby, L’internationalisation 
du droit des contrats publics, in «Droit Administratif», 2003, n.5, 5et seq.; id., La globalization, le droit et l’Etats, Paris: 
Procurement Regimes of International Organizations 
61 
The aim of this paper is then to explore and discuss four salient aspects of the phenomenon. The 
first is a definitional issue: what shall be included in the concept of international organizations’ 
procurement and what are the main types of procurement activity carried out by international 
organizations. The second is a legal one: what are the main features of procurement regulation. The 
third is political: what is the interplay of principles and interests behind IO’s procurement regulation 
and how this interplay determines the content of this body of administrative law. The last is a 
theoretical question: why the body of norms regulating international organizations’ procurement can 
be better read, interpreted and reformed through the lens of global administrative law8.  
2. A Taxonomy  
To a greater extent than States international organizations require external support for their 
functioning. Unlikely the States that in order to carry out their internal or external administrative 
functions and to fulfil their institutional mission can count on public properties and infrastructures –
that is resources imputable to the State itself-, international organizations depend for these purposes 
primarily on the States and on other public or private subjects from which they procure goods, service 
and works.  
Depending on the institutional mission with which are entrusted, international organizations carry 
out two types of procurement procedures: direct or indirect procurement. The international 
organizations may procure the needed goods, services and works through its competent administrative 
officials, wheatear located at its Headquarters or in the field. The agreement or contract resulting from 
such procedure can be concluded with private or public subjects, such as private companies, 
nongovernmental organizations, national governments, other international organizations. This 
procedure is generally used to allow the exercise of internal administrative functions, such as, for 
instance, the correct functioning of the offices, but also for external administrative functions linked to 
the institutional mission of the organizations, for example, the procurement of food by the WFP to be 
shipped to third world countries.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
Montchrestien, 2003; A. Reich, International Public Procurement Law: The Evolution of International Regimes on 
Public Purchasing, The Hague: Kluwer International Law, 1999.  
8 Literature on global administrative law has now become extremely rich. Just to mention same of the works theorizing the 
concept: J.-B. Auby, La globalisation, le droit, l’Etat, Paris, 2003; S. Cassese, La crisi dello Stato, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 
2002; Id., Lo spazio giuridico globale, Bari: Laterza, 2003;Id., Global Administrative Law: An Introduction 2005, 13-18, 
20-26 (Feb. 22, 2005), available at http://www.iilj.org/global_adlaw/documents /Cassesepaper.pdf. ; Id. Oltre lo Stato, 
Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2006; Id. The Globalization of Law, in «New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics», 2005, n. 37, 973 et seq.; Id., Administrative Law without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, in 
«New York University Journal of International Law and Politics», 2005, n.37, 663; L. Casini, Diritto amministrativo 
globale, in S. Cassese (ed.), Dizionario di diritto pubblico, Milano: Giuffrè, 2006, ad vocem; S. Chesterman, 
Globalization Rules:Accountability, Power, and the Prospects for Global Administrative Law, Globalization Rules: 
Accountability, Power, and the Prospects for Global Administrative Law, in «Global Governance», 2008, n. 14, 39 et 
seq.; N. Krisch, B. Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International 
Legal Order, in «European Journal of International Law», 2006, n.17, 1 et seq.; B. Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in 
Global Administrative Law, «European Journal of International Law», 2009, n. 20 (1), 23 et seq.; B. Kingsbury, N. 
Krisch, R.B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems, 2005, vol. 68, 
15 et seq.  
 With a specific reference to international organizations see B. Kingsbury, L. Casini, Global Administrative Law 
Dimensions of International Organizations Law, in « International Organizations Law Review», 2009, n. 6, 319 et seq.  
 For a complete bibliography on GAL themes see http://www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/GALCasebookBibliography.pdf 
and for an analysis of GAL cases see S. Cassese et al. (eds.), Global Administrative Law: Cases, Materials, Issues, 2nd 
edition, 2008, available at http://www.iilj.org/GAL/GALCasebook.asp.  
 A skeptical view on the GAL approach has been expressed in E. Schmidt-Aßmann, The Internationalization of 
Administrative Relations as a Challenge for Administrative Law Scholarship, in «German Law Journal», 2008, n.9, 2061 
et seq.; A. von Bogdandy, General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research Field, in German 
Law Journal», 2008, n.9, 1909 et seq.  
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Some international organizations, however, operate also using indirect ways of procurement. In 
order to fulfil their institutional mission they bestow the necessary resources to another public (or 
more rarely, private) subject, i.e. a national government, who will in turn procure the necessary goods, 
services or works. The organization can outsource9 an entire function and within this, the procurement 
activity will be managed by the subject the function has been outsourced to. Alternatively, it can 
outsource just the procurement activity10. As to the legal regime applicable, the international 
organization can leave autonomy to choose the procedure and rules that the private or public party 
deems more appropriate, only imposing the observance of some substantial legal prescriptions, e.g.: 
the observance of fundamental human rights and labour rights. It is the case of procurement through 
letter of assist, that is an agreement of political nature signed between the international organization 
and a State, usually used in peace-keeping of peace building missions. Alternatively, international 
organizations impose on the public subject the observance of guidelines which set the procurement 
procedures that the national administrative bodies in charge of the procurement function shall follow. 
Individuals taking part to the procurement selection are granted rights vis-à-vis the national 
administration in virtue of the rules set up by the organization. Furthermore monitoring mechanisms 
are set up to control compliance with the procurement rules. Examples of this kind can be found in the 
World Bank Procurement Guidelines11 or in procurement guidelines of other development banks. 
Also, as to the contractual arrangements between the national administration and the selected vendors, 
whereas the personnel performing the contract falls under the responsibility of the contractor and not 
of the organization, the international organization sometimes monitors also the contract performance. 
Failure to comply with the procurement rules and/or to correctly manage the contract is, eventually, 
penalised with the imposition of economic sanctions, such as the curtail of funds.  
If seen from the point of view of the relationship between the administration and the citizens, while 
in indirect procurement, international organizations function as an intermediary subject between 
national administrations and the private subjects, establishing rights of the latter vis-à-vis the former; 
in direct procurement is the international organization itself that shapes the legal position of the private 
subject in front of the international administration. The regulatory outcome, as it will be analyse in the 
following section, differs under many respects.  
3. The Main Features of International Organizations’ Procurement Regulation 
The quantitative growth of expenditure in procurement has been complemented by the progressive 
development of rules regulating the process of vendors selection, especially in direct procurement 
modes. Indeed, since the origins of the organizations, there has been a gradual shift from procurement 
carried out in informal ways, according to a loose set of internal administrative circulars, mainly 
through direct contracting, to procurement performed according to a much better developed body of 
                                                     
9 On outsourcing see United Nations, General Assembly, Procurement reform and outsourcing, GA/RES/52/226B, 27 
April 1998); United Nations, Joint Inspection Unit, The Challenge of outsourcing for the United Nations system 
(JIU/REP/97/5); id. , Management Audit Review of Outsourcing in the United Nations and United Nations Funds and 
Programmes, JIU/REP/2002/7, December 2002; id., Procurement Practices within the United Nations, JIU/REP/2004/9, 
2004. 
10 Definition is taken from United Nations, Joint Inspection Unit, The Challenge of outsourcing for the United Nations 
system, supra, 1 
11 World Bank, Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Service under IBRD Loans and IDA 
Credits & Grants, January 2011, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:20060840~pagePK:84
269~piPK:60001558~theSitePK:84266,00.html. On Work Bank procurement see inter alia R. Hunja, Recent Revisions to 
the World Bank’s Procurement and Consultants Selection Guidelines, in «Public Procurement Law Review», 1997, n. 6, 
216 et seq. ;T. Tucker, A Critical Analysis of the Procurement Procedures of the World Bank, in S. Arrowsmith, A. 
Davies (eds.), Public Procurement: Global Revolution, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999, 139 et seq.,  
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hard and soft rules, found in financial regulations, procurement manuals and guidelines12, following a 
pre-defined procedure and, to some extent, granting competition among vendors, publicity and 
transparency of the operations. Furthermore, this body of regulations in the last decade is undergoing a 
process of harmonization, at least among international organizations belonging to the United Nation 
system. 
International organizations’ procurement, as defined by procurement manuals and guidelines, 
usually consist of a multi-phase process: registration of vendors, solicitation of offers, evaluation and 
award. The regulation of such phases is usually said to be guided by five basic principles: the 
promotion of institutional objectives; competition through fairness, integrity and transparency; 
economy and effectiveness; best value for money; accountability. Here I focus on competition and 
accountability, as these two are the features that mainly differ international organizations’ 
procurement from national government procurement.  
3.1 Competition 
Competition is usually the leading principle guiding government procurement. The Government 
Procurement Agreement13 as well as the European procurement directives 2004/17/CE and 
2004/18/CE require national administrations to comply with a whole set of publicity, transparency and 
accountability requirements designed to grant competition and non-discrimination. Both the WTO and 
the EU have, indeed, as institutional mission the creation free market economies. Rules governing 
international organizations’ procurement give, on the contrary, less emphasis to competition. Some 
examples may be worth to be mentioned. 
                                                     
12 To mention some of these: FAO, Procurement Manual, 9 September 2003; Id., Financial Regulations, 2008, available at 
http://www.unsystemceb.org/searchkeywords_form?subjects:list=Financial%20Regulations; UNICEF, HQ Procurement 
Manual; id., Field Procurement Manual; United Nations, Porcurement Manual, March 2010, available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/ptd/manual.htm; Id., Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, ST/SGB/2003/7, 9 May 
2003; Id., UN Procurement Practitioner’s Handbook, November 2006, available at 
http://www.unops.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/Procurement%20docs/UN%20procurement%20practitioners%20handbo
ok.pdf; UNDP, Financial Regulations and Rules, april 2000; Id., Guidelines for Direct Execution, 25 June 2001, rivisto ed emendato 
22 July 2004; Id., Procurement Manual, May 2005; Id., United Nations Development Programme Procurement Manual (User Guide), 
January 2006; UNOPS, Procurement Manual, December 2007; Unops, Procurement Manual, September 2010, available at 
http://www.unops.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/Procurement%20docs/UNOPS%20procurement%20manual%20EN.pdf; 
WFP, Non-Food Procurement Manual, 1999 
 For financial institutions: African Development Bank, Financial Regulations of the African Development Bank, May 15, 
2002, available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal Documents/00157744-EN-ADB-
FINANCIAL-REGULATIONS.PDF; Id., Rules and Procedures for Procurement of Goods and Works, May 2008, 
available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-related-
Procurement/ADB%20%20RULES%20AND%20PROC%20%20GOODS%20%20AND%20WORKS%2028TH%20NO
VEMBRE%202008.PDF; Id., Rules and Procedures for the Use of Consultants, available at 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-related-
Procurement/ADB%20RULES%20AND%20PROC%20CONSULTANTS%2028TH%20NOVEMBRE%202008.PDF; 
Asian Development Bank, Procurement Guidelines, April 2010, available at 
http://www.adb.org/documents/procurement-guidelines; International Fund for Agricultural Development, Project 
Procurement Guidelines, available at http://www.adb.org/documents/procurement-guidelines; World Bank, supra.  
13 WTO, Government Procurement Agreement, 1996 available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm On the World Trade Organization, procurement and 
competition see, to mention but a few, S.J. Evenett, B.M. Hoekman, Government Procurement: Market Access, 
Transparency and Multilateral Trade Rules, in «European Journal of Political Economy», 2005, n. 21, 163 et seq.; R. 
Hunja, Recent Revisions to the World Bank’s Procurement and Consultants Selection Guidelines, in «Public Procurement 
Law Review», 1997, n. 6, 216 et seq. ;T. Tucker, A Critical Analysis of the Procurement Procedures of the World Bank, 
in S. Arrowsmith, A. Davies (eds.), Public Procurement: Global Revolution, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
1999, 139 et seq., S. Arrowsmith, Transparency in Government Procurement: the Objectives of Regulation and the 
Boundaries of the World Trade Organization, in «Journal of World Trade», 2003, n.. 37, 293 et seq.  
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a. Advertisement. In the very first phase, the general rule on vendors’ selection is that potential 
vendors are identified by placing an advertisement. However, in direct procurement, this rule has 
exceptions which are widely used. Procurement manuals allow procurement officers to decide not to 
post an Expression of Interest (EOI) because circumstances of the case do not warrant doing so. No 
specific justification is required for such decision. In practice, especially for some organizations, such 
as WFP or FAO, this exception is widely used.  
b. Solicitation. Whereas in government procurement there are usually three tendering methods 
(open tendering, restricted tendering, negotiated procedures; in the EU directives, also competitive 
dialogue), in international organisations’ direct procurement the system does not provide for open 
procedure as basic procedure, but only for selective tendering procedures: the vendors who can take 
part to the selection are only those who receive the solicitation documents sent by the procurement 
officer. Again no reason giving is required to motivate the exclusion. 
Furthermore, the Procurement Manuals generally suggest to invite all the vendors registered for a 
certain sector of activity, but at the same time allow to limit the number of potential vendors to be 
invited. This can be done inter alia in virtue of the “interest of the organization”; or if the list of 
potential recipients of Solicitation documents is “unduly long” or, more generally, “whenever the 
particular circumstances of the case render it impractical or not feasible”; and in all other 
circumstances that the competent administrative bodies deem to be exceptional. A significant room for 
discretionary evaluation is, hence, left to the procuring entity. 
It is not usually so for indirect procurement where, instead, the organization requires the national 
administration to adopt open tendering procedures as basic procedures. Limited international bidding, 
national international bidding or direct contracting are also allowed but only in the cases listed by the 
organization. Furthermore, the possibility of putting in place direct contracting procedures is 
subordinated to the authorization of the international organization.  
3.2 Accountability 
Accountability14 of procuring entities is crucial to ensure that the provisions set up in the rules and 
regulations are observed by the competent administration. Under this respect direct and indirect 
procurement differ15. Four main types of accountability can be identified: 
                                                     
14 The concept of accountability has been widely explored and variously defined. For the purposes of this paper some useful 
conceptualizations are to be found in : R. Behn, Rethinking democratic accountability, Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 2001; M. Bovens, The quest for responsibility: Accountability and citizenship in complex organisations, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Id., Analysing and assessing accountability: A conceptual 
framework, in «European Law Journal», 2007, 13, 447–468; P. Day & R. Klein, Accountabilities: Five public services, 
London: Tavistock, 1987; R. W. Grant & R.O. Keohane, Accountability and abuses of world power, in « American 
Political Science Review», 2005, 99, 29–43; C. Harlow, Accountability in the European Union. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2002; R.O. Keohane, Global governance and democratic accountability, in D. Held & M. Koewnig-
Archibugi (eds.), Taming globalization: Frontiers of governance, Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2003, 130-157; R. Mulgan, 
Accountability”: An ever-expanding concept?, in «Public Administration», 2000, vol. 78, 555–574; Id., Holding power to 
account: Accountability in modern democracies. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; J. Mashaw, Structuring a 
‘Dense Complexity’: Accountability and the Project of Administrative Law, in «Issues in Legal Scholarship», 2005, 
Article n. 4; R. MULGAN,‘Accountability’: An Ever-Expanding Concept?, in «Public Administration», 2000, n. 78, 555 
et seq.; B. Radin, The accountable juggler: The art of leadership in a federal agency. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002; 
B. S. Romzek & M.J. Dubnick, Accountability in the public sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy, in «Public 
Administration Review»,1987, vol. 47, 227–238; R. B, Stewart, Accountability, Participation, and the Problem of 
Disregard in Contemporary Global Governance, IILJ International Legal Theory Colloquium, Discussion Draft Paper, 
2008, available at http://iilj.org/courses/documents/2008Colloquium.Session4.Stewart.pdf 
15 On accountability of international institutions see inter alia L. Casini, B. Kingsbury, B. Kingsbury, supra, which suggest 
that the adoption of a GAL approach would foster international organizations’ accountability; N. Krisch, R.B. Stewart, 
supra; R. Grant, R. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, IILJ Working Paper 2004/7, 14, at 
http://iilj.org/papers/2004/2004.7%20Grant%20 Keohane.pdf; A. Reinisch, Securing Accountability of International 
Procurement Regimes of International Organizations 
65 
a. Hierarchical Administrative Accountability (direct procurement). In direct procurement 
international organizations usually provide for the opportunity to complain against procurement 
decisions (e.g. disqualification from registration or award) in front of the same administrative 
authority which took the decision or in front of higher level administrative authorities. In some 
organizations, as for instance the European Space Agency (ESA), the review procedure is highly 
formalized and proceduralized and forsees three incremental steps (Head of the Procurement 
Department, the Ombudsman for ESA, the Independent Procurement Review Board); in some others, 
as the UN, a formalized debriefing process is under experimentation; in many others, as WFP, FAO, 
UNICEF, the complaint remain informal;  
b. Institutional Accountability (direct and indirect procurement). Some OIs set up third, impartial 
bodies such as the ombudsman, for EU Institutions or for ESA, which can be activated at the request 
of private parties. Such bodies have jurisdiction over the administrative activity of the international 
organization and are vested with investigative powers. An interesting variant of this kind of 
accountability may be found in indirect procurement. Procurement guidelines of the WB, for instance, 
provide for ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms to make national administrations accountable to the 
Bank16. Ex-ante mechanisms include the Bank’s review of the State’s procurement procedures, 
documents, bid evaluations, award recommendations and contracts to ensure that the procurement 
process is carried out in accordance with the Bank guidelines. Ex-post mechanisms consist of 
complaints filed from the bidders in front of the Bank’s authorities. The Bank may then take action 
and ask the national administration to provide all the relevant documentation for the Bank’s review 
and comments. At the end of the process the Bank may recommend to the national administration the 
further steps to be taken17.  
c. Legal accountability (direct procurement). Only the EU have set a third impartial judicial body 
to decide on complaints against procurement decisions of EU institutions and this is the European 
Court of Justice.  
d. ‘International’ accountability (direct and indirect procurement). Assuming an extensive 
definition of accountability, within this concept it may be included also the possibility for private 
parties to file an informal complaint in front of State representatives in the international organization. 
These may, at their will, exercise a political pressure on the competent administrative authorities in 
order to obtain a review of the decision.  
4. Principles and Interests Behind the Rules: their Interplay 
To sum up, on one hand we have the development of a body of administrative rules governing 
international organizations’ procurement, the proceduralization of the administrative activity and, to 
some extent, the recognition of duties on the part of the administrative bodies vis-à-vis private parties. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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On the other hand the content of such duties and the scope of the corresponding rights are scarcely 
developed in direct procurement, fairly developed in indirect procurement, but in both cases less apt to 
safeguard private subjects’ interests, if compared to State procurement. 
Three reasons can be identified to explain such difference. The first two refer to the interplay of 
guiding principles within the organizations, the third with the interplay of interests behind 
procurement rules. 
The first reason relates to international organizations’ institutional objectives. These include the 
promotion of peace and security, economic development and poverty eradication, the promotion of 
human rights, democracy and good governance, and other similar goals. Indeed the tight link between 
institutional goals and procurement brings to what could be deemed as a distortion from a purely 
competitive system. Especially during the first decade of this century and beyond, procurement rules 
and practices have tended to promote procurement opportunities for vendors from developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition. This has been done, for instance, either by 
loosening competition requirements or by including domestic preference clauses in the bidding 
documents.  
The second point regards economy and effectiveness. In national government procurement, 
economy and effective management of resources have been traditionally the main concerns of national 
administrations, while competition was deemed as instrumental to this primary objective. In 
contemporary procurement systems, for instance in EU regulations or in the GPA, this relationship has 
been overturned being competition the primary policy objective. As said, in international 
organizations’ competition is not usually an institutional goal and thus procurement reproduce the 
traditional dynamic where competition is instrumental to economy and not viceversa.  
The third reason has to do with the interplay of interests behind international organizations’ 
procurement regulation18. Indeed, such procurement is based on a tripartite asset of interests. First, the 
interest of the organization itself to procure goods, services and works in an economic and effective 
manner and in a way that is compatible with its institutional objectives and more appropriate to 
promote them. In indirect procurement this means also an interest of the organization to hold the 
procuring entity accountable. Second, the interest of the private subjects to get the award and, 
instrumentally to this, the interest to transparency and accountability of the administrative action. 
Finally, the interests of the State members who finance the organization and want to see the budget 
invested returned under the form of awards to their companies. Hence, the State members who, on 
behalf of their citizens, should be the main promoters of competition, transparency and accountability 
of international procuring entities are keen to promote such values only as long as this may advantage 
their own companies. For instance, a wave of reform in favour of more competitive processes took 
place in the early Nineties when United States realized that the percentage of awards to American 
companies was progressively decreasing compared to the percentage of tenders awarded to developing 
countries’ companies.  
5. GAL Dimensions of International Organizations’ Procurement Regulation?  
By way of conclusion, I will now briefly address the last question, can procurement regulation be 
better understood, interpreted and eventually reformed through the lens of global administrative law?  
Traditionally, international administrative law (o public international law) was the law produced 
by international institutions –which were mainly international administrations-, that regulated the 
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relationships between such institutions: «[it was] essentially interstate law in terms of its nature; it 
[was] administrative as to its contents»19. 
With the development of international organizations whose secretariats were conceived as 
independent from States, rules were elaborated to regulate the relationships between the organizations, 
its organs and the individuals who served as civil servants in the organizations. This body of norms, 
referred by some scholars as internal law and by some others as administrative international law, 
differed greatly from the traditional public international law. In the words of Jenks: «1. [i]t is a 
separate system of law for each organization; 2. […] the sources of internal law are hierarchical [i.e. 
there is a treaty, then regulations, mostly administrative]; 3. […] the subjects (persona) of the internal 
law are the organization, its member States as such and their representatives on the organs of the 
organization as such, its several organs and their members, including its officials as such»20. The 
legitimacy of the international organization to adopt rules affecting private parties came from the 
internal institutional contractual relationship between the organization and its officials. Furthermore, 
the rules applicable to these individuals had a procedural character as well as a substantial nature. 
Finally, the content of such rules was more that of labor law, than that of administrative law in a 
narrow sense. 
Under all these respects, the case of international organizations’ procurement regulation shows 
peculiarities which are not be fully captured by the concept of international administrative law, but 
that may require the development of a new theoretical framework.  
First of all, international organizations’ procurement rules affect directly private parties. But these 
are affected in virtue of a non-contractual relationship. Even more, affected private parties may belong 
to States which are not even member of the international organizations. Under this respect the vendor 
who takes part to the procurement procedure finds herself in the analogous condition of the individual 
participating to the procedure selecting international organization officials. This element poses the 
minimum requisite for qualifying the relationship between the international organization and the 
private party as an administrative-type relation.  
Second, the interplay of actors and related interests shaping procurement regulation is not anymore 
only that between international administration and its officials or between national administrations, but 
it’s a tripartite interplay of interests between international administrations, private parties external to 
the administration and the State. We are, thus, moving not in a bi-dimensional space (international), 
but in a tri-dimensional space (global). 
Third, the content of the rules is strictly administrative and procedural, as they to do not govern 
labor relationships with officials. 
If we, thus, adopt the category of global administrative law to interpret the phenomenon, not only 
we are able to detect its novelty with respect to previous forms of regulation and the peculiar dynamics 
behind it, but we are also able to point out at its limits and at possible reforms as reference to 
administrative law strictu sensu, not intended as international administrative law mainly governing 
labor relationships of officials, provide us with a wide spectrum of tools that can be applied at the 
supranational level to unlock the interplay of interests and its negative effects and to foster 
transparency, reason giving, accountability still within the framework of international organizations’ 
objectives. 
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Towards global administrative systems? The case of sport 
Lorenzo Casini* 
1. Sports Law as Global Law 
In the early 1990s, a judgment by the European Court of Justice on the free movement of football 
players within the European Community marked a milestone for sports law:1 the decision (the 
“Bosman case”) limited the autonomy of international sports orders, affirmed the supremacy of EC 
law over sports rules, and cast serious doubts on the legal theories thus far applied to the sports 
context.2  
In the twenty years that followed, the points of interaction between sports law, international law 
and national legal systems have increased enormously, to the extent that they have become 
innumerable and multifaceted: regulatory, institutional, procedural, and judicial.3 Every branch of law 
must deal with sports-related issues, which arise in a most diverse range of fields: from anti-trust 
regulation to commercialization of radio and television broadcasting rights, from labour disputes to the 
protection of human rights.4 In this connection, the legislative acts approved by States for hosting 
international sporting events are only one of several examples.5 National laws “observe” the system of 
norms produced by international sporting institutions, and States comply with the provisions within 
the foundational documents of the latter. National norms often make reference to the Olympic Charter, 
which, in some cases, is even incorporated into domestic legislation.6 States shape the national 
regulation of doping-related matters on the basis of a “Code” approved by the World Anti-Doping 
Agency (WADA), a public-private foundation created for the purpose and regulated by Swiss private 
law with its headquarters in Canada.7 
Globalization further enhanced the social and economic growth of a phenomenon, which is, by its 
very nature, universal.8 As a matter of fact, “sports law is not just international; it is non-governmental 
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1 ECJ, Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club 
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3 For an overview, see F. Latty, La lex sportiva. Recherche sur le droit transnational (2007), and L. Casini, Il diritto 
globale dello sport (2010). 
4 On these issues, P. Weiler, Leveling the Playing Field. How the Law Can Make Sports Better for Fans, Cambridge, 2000, 
and S. Greenfield and G. Osborn (eds.), Law and Sport in Contemporary Society, London, 2000. 
5 Such as the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006, enacted for the 2012 Olympic Games. 
6 As happened in Turkey, with the Parliamentary Act no. 3796 of 1992, the so-called “Turkish Olympic Law” (see A.M. 
Mestre, The Law of the Olympic Games, The Hague, 2009, p. 21). 
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Kingsbury eds, 6 International Organizations Law Review 411 (2009); and K. Henne, WADA, the Promises of Law and 
the Landscapes of Antidoping Regulation, 33 Political and Legal Anthropology Review 306 (2010). 
8 R. Gulianotti and R. Robertson (eds.), Globalization and Sport, Oxford, 2007. 
Lorenzo Casini 
70 
as well, and this differentiates it from all other forms of law”.9 Sports rules are genuine “global law”, 
because they reach across the entire world, involve both international and domestic levels, and directly 
affect individuals (such as athletes): this is, for example, the case of the Olympic Charter, a private act 
with which all States comply;10 or of the abovementioned World Anti-Doping Code, a document that 
provides the framework for harmonization of anti-doping policies, rules, and regulations within sports 
organizations and among public authorities.11 
These rules include not only transnational norms established by the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) and International Federations (IFs) – i.e. “the principles that emerge from the rules 
and regulations of international sporting federations as a private contractual order” –,12 but also 
“hybrid” public-private norms approved by WADA and international law (such as the UNESCO 
Convention Against Doping in Sport). Sports law is highly heterogeneous, and, above all, it is 
“global”: it consists not only of norms given by States, but also of the regulations of central sporting 
institutions (such as the IOC, IFs and WADA) and of national sporting bodies (such as National 
Olympic Committees and National Anti-Doping Organizations). 
Sport has thus generated a set of institutions and rules that amounts to an autonomous legal corpus, 
which legal scholarship has varyingly referred to as “International Sports Law”, “Global Sports Law” 
and lex sportiva (thus drawing a patent analogy with the lex mercatoria governing international 
trade).13 
2. Global Governance of Sport and the Emergence of A Global (Administrative) Sports 
System  
Parallel to the worldwide growth of the sports phenomenon, most strikingly evidenced by the 
evolution of the Olympic games,14 there has been a progressive “globalization” of sports law and its 
organizational apparatus – a process that originates from the Olympic Movement.15 
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14 See A. Tomlinson, Olympic survivals: The Olympic Games as a global phenomenon, in L. Allison (ed.), The Global 
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Since the end of the 19th century, an organizational structure began to develop around the 
Olympics. This structure, which has become increasingly complex, has the IOC at its apex and 
International Federations (IFs) and National Federations (NFs), on one hand, and National Olympic 
Committees (NOCs), on the other hand, at its base. For both of these sub-structures, a “monopolistic” 
regime exists, as the IOC recognizes only one IF per sport, and one NOC per country. National 
Federations (also founded upon the principle of monopoly) are associated to each IF. Such a structure 
has been described as a double pyramid, one comprising the IOC and National Committees, and the 
other the International and National Federations.16 However, the structure may be defined more 
accurately as a group, as a “network” of several pyramids: indeed, in addition to the pyramid of IOC 
and Olympic Committees, there are as many pyramids as international-level federations (i.e. about one 
hundred); furthermore, each pyramid is connected to the rest by multiple organizational relationships, 
of both vertical and horizontal nature.  
Between the 1980s and 1990s, following the extraordinary development of the Olympic Movement 
– enhanced by the economic and financial success of sponsorships and by the end of the Cold War – 
the links between the international sports legal order and States became increasingly close. This led to 
a series of institutional effects: the number of sport organizations multiplied; international level 
public/private agencies, such as the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), were created; national 
entities to concretely perform the functions of international institutions proliferated; an international 
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) was established and played a key role in ensuring uniform 
application of global sports law. As a result, the institutional framework no longer appears to include 
only the IOC, IFs, Olympic Committees and National Federations, but also the world anti-doping 
authorities, (WADA and related national organizations (NADOs)), and the global system of sport 
justice, headed by the CAS.  
In seeking to describe such a complex structure, the notion of “international regime” developed by 
political scientists may be useful.17 As far as international regimes consist of “sets of implicit and 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations 
converge in a given issue-area”,18 sports legal orders can be likened to the international-level “private 
regimes”, i.e. those regimes that are voluntarily formed and should be conceptually located beyond the 
(Contd.)                                                                  
athletes competed, representing over 200 Countries, in 302 events: see D. Wallechinsky e J. Loucky, The Complete Book 
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Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 1, A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer and V. Rittberger, Theories of International 
Regimes, Cambridge, 1997, and V. Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International relations, Oxford, 1993. As to 
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mechanisms typically arising in international law.19 A common feature to all private regimes is their 
foundation upon one or more international organizations. An example in this respect is the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), an association constituted by national agencies 
for standardization for the approval of technical standards eventually adopted in the rest of the world; 
this activity is similar to the legislative tasks performed by international sport federations and by 
WADA. Other examples are the Internet, or financial markets, both governed by special international 
organizations of a private nature.  
In many private regimes, however, the role of international and national public authorities has 
recently begun to expand. In the case of sport, “pressure” from States and the EU on sports institutions 
appears to be increasing.20 Other than the Olympic Movement, governed by the IOC, and the 
technical-sporting regimes of the individual legal orders regulated by IFs, new international sports 
regimes have emerged, in which public authorities play a pivotal role: examples are the world anti-
doping regime, led by WADA and having national terminals that, in the majority of cases, are public 
administrative bodies; or the regime governing the organization of Olympic Games, which is regulated 
by the IOC but concretely performed by special national bodies appointed by domestic public 
authorities for the purpose (i.e. the Olympic Games’ Organizing Committees). 
The connections between these regimes have thus generated a global “network”.21 Not only is this 
structure based on soft norms – soft insofar as these rules are not produced according to the means 
traditionally used in international law – but it is also characterized by a considerable number of 
institutional relationships. The organization of sporting institutions consists of multiple pyramidal 
structures alongside horizontal-type relationships, which are formalized to varying degrees.22 
Therefore, although the notions of “regime” and “network” are taken from other fields of scholarly 
pursuit, they appear nevertheless to be extremely useful for understanding most of the legal 
relationships between the various international sporting institutions, and between these institutions and 
national bodies. But – for historical, political and socio-economic reasons – sport, unlike other regimes 
or networks, displays a much more advanced degree of legal and institutional development. The 
proliferation and diversification of the functions performed by sporting institutions, for example, have 
triggered the need to affirm the principle of the separation of “powers” – or a variation thereon – in 
international-level sport. 
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This requires consideration of the regulatory and institutional issues on which the notions of regime 
and network rest, but also of the nature of the activities carried out by sporting bodies. It is thus 
possible to identify two phenomena that have marked sports’ legal dimension in recent decades. First, 
the degree of proceduralization is ever-increasing: from the production of norms to the execution of 
anti-doping tests and the selection of Olympic Games’ host cities, each activity now follows a well-
defined and detailed procedure. Second, since the 1980s and due to the growing role of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS), sport has developed a sophisticated system of dispute resolution, which 
can be defined as a system of truly global sport justice. 
The development of international sport regimes, together with a multi-level network organization, 
thus enables new hypotheses to be advanced for describing the legal dimension of sport. In particular, 
the interrelationship that exists – at regulatory, organizational and procedural levels – between the 
various sport regimes prompts reference to the concept of “system”, also borrowed from other social 
sciences. 23 The notions of regime, network and system are closely interconnected;24 and it is revealing 
that the Italian scholar Santi Romano, in defining the meaning of the term “institution”, at the very 
foundation of his conception of legal orders, made frequent use of words such as “organization”, 
“structure” and the term “system” itself.25  
The set of international sports institutions (namely the IOC, WADA, CAS and the over one 
hundred IFs) and national institutions (such as the hundreds of Olympic Committees and national anti-
doping agencies and the thousands of National Federations), which is regulated in detail by documents 
such as the Olympic Charter and the World Anti-Doping Code, features structural elements that begin 
to assume a clear systemic shape. In particular, this emerging system displays three main features: the 
rise of an institutional network; the growth of administrative tasks and procedural mechanisms; the 
key role of (quasi-)judicial bodies. 
2.1. The Rise of an Institutional Network 
The global sport system is the product of the interaction between a large number of institutions that 
each creates different regimes, each of which features both a superior body located at the international 
level and domestic terminals operating at the national level. This structure is excellent matter for a 
case study on the operational mechanisms of international organizations and their relationships with 
national bodies. As may be known, this is not a new subject, but rather one that can, to a certain 
extent, be traced back to Georges Scelle’s intuition on the “dédoublement fonctionnel”.26 Furthermore, 
                                                     
23 See M.G. Losano, Sistema e struttura nel diritto, Milano, 2002 – I. Dalle Origini alla Scuola storica, II. Il Novecento e 
III. Dal Novecento alla postmodernità –, Id., Sistema e struttura nel diritto, Torino, 1968, N. Bobbio, Teoria 
dell’ordinamento giuridico, Torino, 1960, p. 74 et seq., J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System. An Introduction to the 
Theory of Legal System (1970; 1973), and L.M. Friedman, The Legal System. A Social Science Perspective (1975). See 
also T. Parsons, The Structure of social action, New York, 1939, Id., The Social System, Chicago, 1951, and Id., On 
Building Social Systems Theory: A Personal History, in Daedalus. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Science, 
1970, p. 826 et seq., and N. Luhmann, Soziale Systeme. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie, Frankfurt am Main, 1984, 
and Id., Das Recht der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main, 1993. 
24 T. Parsons, The Social System, ibid., p. 25: who referred to “system of processes of interaction between actors, it is the 
structure of the relations between the actors as involved in the interactive process which is essentially the structure of 
social system”, so that a system is a “network of such relationships”. R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and 
Interdependence, Boston, 1977, p. 19, clarify that the notion of “regime” includes “networks of rules, norms, and 
procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects”. 
25 See S. Romano, L’ordinamento giuridico (2nd edn, 1946), Firenze, 1951, p. 42 et seq This point is highlighted by N. 
Bobbio, Teoria e ideologia nella dottrina di Santi Romano (1975), in Id., Dalla struttura alla funzione. Nuovi studi di 
teoria del diritto (2007), p. 146 et seq.  
26 G. Scelle, Précis de droit des gens, I, Paris, 1932, p. 43, 54 et seq. and 217), who also stated that “les agents dotés d’une 
compétence institutionnelle ou investis par un ordre juridique utilisent leur capacité ‘fonctionnelle’ telle qu’elle est 
organisée dans l’ordre juridique qui les institués, mais pour assurer l’efficacité des normes d’un autre ordre juridique 
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these issues have also been abundantly examined with reference to EU law, since the execution of 
European-level decisions necessarily involves an examination of the relations between supranational 
bodies and national administrative authorities.27  
Moreover, in national sport law, institutional solutions influenced by public law are progressively 
spreading, both in relation to organizational structures and to the system of rules which govern 
national sporting bodies. Cases differ according to the traditions of each State, as occurs for example 
with NOCs.28 Nevertheless, in this respect, it is possible to identify features that are common to all 
national legal systems such as, for example, the conferral of a public law nature to national anti-doping 
entities, or, in the context of the Olympic games, the involvement of the public authorities of a host 
city’s country in the Board of the Organizing Committee.  
2.2. The Growth of Administrative Tasks and Procedural Mechanisms 
The increasing political, social and economic significance of sporting institutions has triggered a rise 
in the number of functions performed by these bodies and a rise in the corresponding rate of 
procedures: the case of the Olympic games’ bidding process is emblematic in this respect.  
This trend, linked to globalization, can be seen in most regimes derived from private law. Some 
scholars suggest that these regimes have developed such a high complexity of norms, institutions and 
procedures as to appear extremely similar to regimes of public law derivation.29 However, additional 
factors surround this phenomenon. First, the circumstances in which decisions taken by sports 
institutions produce effects on both public interests and individual rights, whether protected by 
national or supranational legal systems, are increasingly expanding: be it sufficient, in this connection, 
to cite the European anti-doping measures, or anti-trust regulation. Second, issues concerning the 
legitimacy and accountability of sports institutions have become all the more relevant, especially in 
light of the legal and economic effects of decisions taken by sports institutions.  
The issues listed above have drawn attention to the need to improve the procedural mechanisms 
followed by sporting institutions, to provide affected parties with participatory mechanisms and also to 
enable the review of actions taken by sport institutions. Consequently, typical principles of national 
legal systems, such as fairness, due process and the right to be heard, have often been invoked and 
applied. 
Extremely significant examples to this effect may be found in the decisions given by the CAS, 
which has often referred to such principles and likened IFs as to public administrations. In the 
Pistorius v. IAAF case, for example, the CAS evaluated the IAAF’s decision-making process to verify 
whether the decision challenged by the athlete was “procedurally unsound”.30 Previously, the CAS 
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privé des organes nécessaires à cette réalisation, ou n’en possédant que d’insuffisants” (G. Scelle, Le phénomène 
juridique du dédoublement fonctionnel, in W. Schätzel and H.-J. Schlochauer (eds.), Rechtsfragen der Internationalen 
Organisation – Festschrift für Hans Wehberg zu seinem 70. Geburtstag, Frankfurt am Main, 1956, p. 324 et seq., here p. 
331). On Scelle, H. Thierry, ‘The Thought of Georges Scelle’ (1990) 1 European Journal of Integrational Law 193, and 
A. Cassese, ‘Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law’, ibid., 
210; see also M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960, 
Cambridge, 2004, p. 327 et seq. 
27 P.P. Craig, EU Administrative Law, Oxford, 2006, and Droit Administratif Européen, sous la direction de J.-B. Auby et J. 
Dutheil de la Rochère, Bruxelles, 2007, and J. Schwarze, Europaische Verwaltungsrecht2, Baden-Baden, 2005. 
28 See J.-L. Chappelet e B. Kübler-Mabbott, The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System: The 
governance of sport, above, p. 49 et seq. and 54. 
29 A. Riles, ‘The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State’ (2008) 56 
Am. J. Comp. L. 605, for instance, observes that “global private law” is “not a radical departure from state law, but really 
more of the same” (p. 629). 
30 CAS 2008/A/1480, especially para. 56 et seq. 
Towards global administrative systems? The case of sport 
75 
highlighted “an evident analogy between sports-governing bodies and governmental bodies with 
respect to their role and functions as regulatory, administrative and sanctioning entities”.31  
Once again, a clear example of the increasing procedural dimension of sport legal orders may be 
seen in the world anti-doping regime, where we can identify both rulemaking activities (specifically, 
the creation of the World Anti-Doping Code) that take place through consultations open to public 
bodies and sporting institutions, and adjudication activities (i.e. decisions related to doping, from 
exemptions to penalties) in which procedural safeguards and fair hearings are accorded to affected 
parties. 
2.3. The Key Role of (quasi-)Judicial Bodies 
The increase in norms, institutions, functions and procedures in the sports context inevitably requires 
review mechanisms and dispute settlement bodies to be instituted, to face the ever-more frequent (and 
complex) number of controversies. Thus, the sport system developed tools for reviewing the decisions 
taken by sports institutions and arbitration or (quasi-)judicial bodies.  
For example, the anti-doping regime requires the establishment of dedicated tribunals for deciding 
appeals against the penalties imposed by National or International Federations. Furthermore, there are 
instances in which a central international body retains the power of verifying – and eventually 
modifying – decisions taken by national bodies, as in the case of the Therapeutic Use Exemption. 
Thus, a trend toward the establishment of centralized systems of review emerges, with the aim of 
ensuring uniformity in decision-making. The clearest example in this respect is the CAS.32  
Unlike other transnational realms, such as the lex mercatoria, where the norms or principles 
applied in arbitration proceedings are essentially borrowed from private law, sports-related disputes 
feature an extensive application of public law principles – more precisely, of principles peculiar to 
criminal and administrative law.33 In this framework, the issue of the role of national courts, and, in 
particular, the feasibility of judicial review of the activities of international sport institutions, remains, 
as yet, undefined.  
3. Framing Global Sports Law and Its Hybrid Public and Private Nature: 
The Administrative Law Perspective 
If sports legal orders can be usefully framed within the theory of regimes, networks and systems, the 
foregoing analysis shows that an approach based on public and administrative law may be even more 
fruitful.34 There are several analogies between the activities undertaken by international sporting 
                                                     
31 CAS 98/2000, AEK Atene & S.K. Slavia Praga v. UEFA, award of 20 August 1999, par. 58. 
32 I.S. Blackshaw, R.C.R. Siekmann e J. Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, The Hague, 2006; A. 
Rigozzi, L’arbitrage international en matière de sport, Basilea, 2005, p. 132; A. Merone, Il Tribunale arbitrale dello 
sport, Torino, 2009; e S. Stebler, Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), in P. Gola, C. Götz Staehelin e K. Graf (eds.), 
Institutional Arbitration. Tasks and Powers of Different Arbitration Institutions, Zurich-Basel-Geneva, 2009, p. 255. 
Lastly, see R.H. McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, in Handbook on International Sports Law, ibid., 32 et seq., 
and L. Casini, ‘The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sport’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 
1317. 
33 F. Latty, La lex sportiva. Recherche sur le droit transnational, above, p. 320 et seq. In CAS-JO[-TUR] 06/008, Isabella 
Dal Balcon v. Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI) & Federazione Italiana Sport Invernali (FISI), for example, 
the activity of the Italian National Olympic Committee and Italian National Skiing Federation, which excluded an athlete 
from the Olympic team, was judged “arbitrary” and “unfair”. 
34 See B. Kingsbury et al., “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law”, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems (2005) 
pp. 15–62. The website of the Global Administrative Law Project, which includes papers and symposia, is 
http://www.iilj.org/GAL. Symposia on Global Administrative Law have been published in 68:(3–4) L. & Contemp. 
Probs. (2005); 37(4) N.Y.U. J. Intl. L. & Pol. (2005); 17 Eur. J. Intl. L. 1 (2006). See also Global Administrative Law in 
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institutions and by public authorities. In many cases – similarly to what occurs today in other 
international regimes – States are directly involved (as in the case of WADA), and the national bodies 
within the sport system are mostly of public nature (as are the majority of anti-doping authorities). 
Furthermore, international sporting organizations rely on solutions borrowed from public and 
administrative law to an ever-increasing extent: this phenomenon is common not only in sports, but 
also in many other ultra-state contexts.  
An administrative law perspective can also productively interact with other legal disciplines that 
may have more experience with studying ultra-state phenomena, such as international law and the law 
of international organizations. In addition, an administrative law approach can be combined with other 
projects aimed at delineating the global legal context, such as, for example, “global 
constitutionalism”35 or the theory based on the exercise of international “public authority”.36 
Moreover, the administrative law perspective appears better equipped to deal with supranational 
phenomena than one based on the notion of “legal order”.37 Italian legal scholarship has applied this 
notion to sport since the 1920s, because, inter alia, sport is an excellent subject for a case study, since 
all the features of a “legal order” can be traced: these features – identified by Massimo Severo 
Giannini in elaborating the hypothesis originally conceived by Santi Romano – are plurality of 
actors/addressees, organization, and norms.38 As a consequence, sports law became one of the best 
fields for investigating the theory of legal orders, which thus rapidly turned into the main conceptual 
reference for the sector.39 Furthermore, the notion was also recalled by courts and, subsequently, cited 
in legislation.40 The theory of legal order was used to preserve sports from interference by national 
forces, of both political and judicial kind; a necessity that, in several cases, is no longer as urgent 
(Contd.)                                                                  
the Operations of International Organizations (L. Boisson de Chazournes, L. Casini, and B. Kingsbury ed.s), 6 
International Organizations L. Rev. (2009), and S. Cassese et al. (eds.), Global Administrative Law: Cases, Materials, 
Issues (2nd edition, 2008; 3rd edition 2012) More recently, see G. Anthony et al (eds.), Values in Global Administrative 
Law (Hart, Oxford, 2011). 
35 On “global constitutionalism”, see C.E. J. Schwöbel, Global Constitionalism in International Legal Perspective 
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2011), J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, 
International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009); and J. Klabbers, A. Peters, 
and G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009), and the Journal 
Global Constitutionalism, published since 2012 by Cambridge University Press (see the editorial on Global 
constutionalism: Himan Rights, democracy and the rule of law, by A. Wiener, A.F. Lang Jr., J. Tully, M. Poiares Maduro 
and M. Kumm). 
36 A. von Bogdandy, R. Wolfrum, J. von Bernstorff, P. Dann and M. Goldmann (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by 
International Institutions. Advancing International Institutional Law, Heidelberg, 2010 
37 S. Romano, L’ordinamento giuridico, Pisa, 1918, A.E. Cammarata, Il concetto del diritto e la “pluralità degli 
ordinamenti giuridici” (1926), in Id., Formalismo e sapere giuridico, Milano, 1963, p. 185 et seq., specialmente p. 211 et 
seq., W. Cesarini Sforza, ‘La teoria degli ordinamenti giuridici e il diritto sportivo’ (1933) Foro italiano c. 1381 et seq., 
and M.S. Giannini, Sulla pluralità degli ordinamenti giuridici (1950), now in Id., Scritti, volume terzo 1949-1954, 
Milano, 2003, p. 403 et seq., and Id., Prime osservazioni sugli Ordinamenti giuridici sportive (1946); F. Modugno, 
‘Ordinamento giuridico (dottrine generali)’ and ‘Pluralità degli ordinamenti’, both in Enc. dir., XXX, Milano, 1980, p. 
678 et seq., and XXXIV, Milano, 1983, p. 32 et seq., and F.P. Luiso, La giustizia sportiva, Milano, 1975, particularly p. 
363 et seq. 
38 M.S. Giannini, Gli elementi degli ordinamenti giuridici, in Riv. trim. dir. pubbl., 1958, p. 219 ss., now in Id., Scritti. 
Volume IV. 1955-1962, Milano, 2004, p. 337 et seq. 
39 Lastly, see G. Manfredi, Pluralità degli ordinamenti e tutela giurisdizionale. I rapporti tra giustizia statale e giustizia 
sportiva, Torino, 2007, F. Goisis, La giustizia sportiva tra funzione amministrativa ed arbitrato, Milano, 2007, and R. 
Morzenti Pellegrini, L’evoluzione dei rapporti tra fenomeno sportivo e ordinamento statale, Milano, 2007. A different 
perspective is adopted by L. Ferrara, ‘L'ordinamento sportivo: meno e più della libertà privata’ (2007) Diritto Pubblico 
1. 
40 See, for instance, Cassazione 2 aprile 1963, n. 811, in Foro it., 1963, I, c. 894 et seq., but, above all, article 117 of Italian 
Constitution, as amended in 2001, which mentions the “ordinamento sportivo”, and Italian Law no. 280/2003, art. 1. 
Towards global administrative systems? The case of sport 
77 
today, due to the need, instead, to involve supranational and national public powers in the pursuit of 
common goals (for example, in the field of anti-doping).41 
The transformations that took place in the last thirty years, especially the development of the 
international sports legal order and of its connections to national sport legal orders, made it almost 
impossible to clearly distinguish between separate legal orders at world and national levels. This led to 
the conceptualization of the existence of a single global sports legal order. 42 This legal order – which 
would be of a “transnational” nature, due to its private law – and voluntary – roots, would not be 
represented by one legal order alone: given the rule-making power enjoyed by IFs, it may be possible 
to identify as many legal orders as there are sports.43  
Although this approach may, on one hand, allow for both international and national profiles to be 
examined, on the other, it does not seem capable of fully encompassing sports law’s current 
developments. Describing the phenomenon of world sport in terms of legal order alone focuses 
excessively on the autonomy of sport in relation to the “sovereign” legal order, whether this be of an 
international, or single-State, nature:44 there is a risk of neglecting important international-level legal 
aspects, especially those in which public authorities constitute an integral part of the sport system.45 
This is why a perspective based exclusively on legal order theory may not be the most appropriate for 
explaining global sports law exhaustively.46 The sport system can therefore be appropriately analyzed 
by integrating such perspective with other approaches taken from international and administrative law. 
One may question, however, why public law tools should be more suitable for investigating a 
phenomenon that originates from – and is traditionally linked to – private autonomy. In other words, 
we should explain why we would need to adopt an administrative law perspective to deal with issues 
that could be explored with a private law lens.  
The answer is that sports law is now far from being understood from a private law perspective 
alone, because it presents, rather, a mixed nature, in which a regulatory framework based on private 
autonomy constantly interacts with public law norms. This phenomenon can be seen at national level 
especially, where dialogue between public and private law has always been intense. Furthermore, the 
Olympic regime, itself of private law derivation, has been flanked by other regimes in which States 
participate actively. On a national level, the domestic terminals of international sports regimes are 
often regulated by public law. From this point of view, the case of doping control measures offers a 
prime example, because the establishment of WADA and the adoption of the World Anti-Doping 
Code led to the creation of a uniform regulatory system, and, at the same time, of a dense network of 
                                                     
41 The theory of plurality of legal orders was adopted essentially to shed light on the relationships between sports and the 
national legal system, such as conflicts of norms or the relations between sports justice and national justice. These 
studies, while recognizing the relevance of the links between national and international spheres, were nevertheless mostly 
focused on domestic contexts and on the relationships between sport and the national legal orders. This happened also in 
French legal scholarship: see G. Simon, Puissance sportive et ordre juridique étatique. Contribution a l’étude des 
relations entre la puissance publique et les institutions privées, Paris, 1990. 
42 See the work by F. Latty, La lex sportiva. Recherche sur le droit transnational. 
43 F. Latty, La lex sportiva. Recherche sur le droit transnational, p. 32 et seq.  
44 M.S. Giannini, Prime osservazioni sugli Ordinamenti Giuridici Sportivi, ibid., p. 101. 
45 And, paradoxically, the very presence of all the elements typical of a legal order – plurality of actors/addressees; 
organization; norms – confers uniqueness and originality to the sports phenomenon, which in itself is not amenable to 
straightforward comparison with other experiences. As a matter of fact, terms for comparison used in describing the 
global sports legal order have been found in the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church, or, to highlight the 
transactional element, the lex mercatoria. On these issues, see A. Röthel, ‘Lex mercatoria, lex sportiva, lex technica – 
Private Rechtsetzung jenseits des Nationalstaats?’, in JZ, 62, 2007, p. 755 et seq. 
46 In Europe, for instance, the European Court of Justice’s interventions aimed at censoring the sport norms that conflict 
with European law has raised several issues regarding the true nature of the sports legal order and the relationship 
between the sports legal order and other supranational legal orders, thereby casting doubt on the comprehensiveness of a 
theoretical approach based on the application of the notion of “legal order” to sport. 
Lorenzo Casini 
78 
national bodies, mainly of a public nature: see, for example, the French anti-doping agency (Agence 
française de lutte contre le dopage), «autorité publique indépendante dotée de la personnalité 
morale», which is entrusted with defining and implementing actions to fight doping in France, and 
which must cooperate with WADA and the IFs.47  
In broader terms, the law of international sports orders no longer appears to fall within the sphere 
of private law alone. Also, the ways in which private autonomy and the public sphere interact are very 
often anchored to paradigms and institutions typical of administrative law. This is mostly due to the 
growing socio-economic relevance of sports, which is capable of having profound impact on several 
public interests such as, for example, the protection of health, the protection of human rights and other 
fundamental rights of athletes. 
Therefore, administrative law – the branch of law in which the dialectic between public and private 
is clearest –48 plays a crucial role in framing global sports law.49 First, it enables better comprehension 
of the relations between legal orders. “The majority of legal orders (from the most ancient, pertaining 
to territorial groups, to the most recent, such as the sports legal system and sectoral legal orders) 
operate in the context of administrative law” and the latter, therefore, “must address them”.50 Second, 
the dynamics linked to the dialogue between private autonomy and public powers give rise to an ever-
increasing degree of direct involvement of governments and domestic authorities in this field; this 
indicates that the significance of public administration and their law is constantly growing within sport 
legal orders.51 Third, the administrative law perspective allows better investigation of sporting 
institutions, in terms of the organizational and procedural aspects and review mechanisms. Fourth, as 
mentioned above, sporting institutions themselves refer, increasingly often, to administrative law tools 
(as shown by the CAS awards).52  
4. The Development of Global Administrative Systems 
The idea of conceptualizing global sports law as a global administrative system is a work in progress, 
which must necessarily consider that the phenomenon under examination is still on-going. The 
concept of “system” employed here, therefore, must be understood in both its meanings – that of 
“external” system (that is, in a “subjective” sense) and of “internal” system (in an “objective” sense).53 
On one hand, the “chaotic” state of the multiple relations – both regulatory and procedural – between 
the various sports legal orders requires huge effort of the interpreter, who must systematize this 
articulated mass of rules, bodies and procedures; on the other, the proliferation of sport regimes and 
the development of their respective apparatuses have followed a design that may have been 
                                                     
47 Code du Sport, Art. L232-5. 
48 M. Ruffert (ed.), The Public-Private Law Divide: Potential for Transformation?, London, 2009, and G. Napolitano, 
Pubblico e privato nel diritto amministrativo, Milano, 2003. 
49 A first attempt was made in in A. Van Varenbergh, Regulatory features and administrative law dimensions of the 
Olympic movement’s anti-doping regime, IILJ Working Paper 2005/11 (Global Administrative Law Series); see also L. 
Casini, Il diritto globale dello sport, above. However, many sports legal issues can be approached from different 
perspectives. In several cases, the same problem can be explained either through the application of administrative law 
tools or through private law. In case of dispute resolution through arbitration, for example, one may investigate sports 
justice with sole regard to private law, civil procedure and private international law, without any need to turn to public 
law: on these issues, see L. Ferrara, L'ordinamento sportivo: meno e più della libertà privata, above, p. 20 et seq. 
50 M.S. Giannini, Diritto amministrativo3, Milano, 1993, I, p. 97 (translation by the Author). 
51 A. Wax, Internationales Sportrecht. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Sportvölkerrechts, above, p. 83 et seq. 
52 On these issues, L. Casini, ‘The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sport’, above. 
53 See M.G. Losano, Sistema e struttura nel diritto, ibid., I, p. 42 et seq.; formerly, F.C. de Savigny, System des heutigen 
Römischen Rechts (1840), Italian translation by Vittorio Scialoja, Turin, 1886, p. 21.  
Towards global administrative systems? The case of sport 
79 
spontaneous, but also consistent, to the extent that structures of a global sports legal system are 
emerging, with a sufficiently well-defined shape.54  
In particular, the global character of such a system derives from the fact that it exists on a global 
scale and, at the same time, is not limited to the international or supranational level, but also involves 
the national sphere and is directly relevant to private entities and individuals.  
Thus, sports law illustrates the emergence of “global administrative systems”, which display the 
three main features above examined: the rise of an institutional network; the growth of administrative 
tasks and procedural mechanisms; the key role of (quasi-)judicial bodies. The administrative nature of 
these systems derives from three factors in particular. First, these systems present a high degree of 
interpenetration (in regulatory, institutional and procedural terms) between private autonomy and the 
public sphere. Second, States and national public administrations are actors operating within the 
system, and act in accordance with mechanisms for both consensus and authority. Third, the 
institutional models, procedures adopted and review mechanisms all follow models that are typical of 
– if not directly subject to – administrative law. It can be further stated that global administrative 
systems provide for the direct application, to private entities or individuals, of norms and decisions 
made by ultra-state bodies, usually without any intermediation on part of States.  
An administrative law perspective can facilitate comprehension of most sport-related phenomena: 
from the forms of cooperation between public and private actors to powers of oversight. Also, 
administrative law mechanisms have by now deeply penetrated into sports legal orders. This is evident 
from an examination of both the activities of sports institutions, and of the ways in which the latter 
interact with supranational and national public powers.  
Such an analysis allows the analogies and differences between global sports law and other global 
administrative systems to be highlighted. The development of a network-type organization composed 
of several regimes, the “proceduralization” of the system, the differentiation of functions and the 
definition of a (quasi-)judicial activity are features that tend to be present, albeit in varying forms, in 
cases other than sport, and also in other international regimes. The global sport system, which clearly 
presents these elements, is a significant example of the development of administrative law 
mechanisms beyond the State.  
                                                     
54 The term “system” is used by J.-L. Chappelet e B. Kübler-Mabbott, The International Olympic Committee and the 
Olympic System: The governance of sport, above, and is adopted in other international contexts: see B. Buzan and R. 
Little, International Systems in World History. Remaking the Study of International Relations, Oxford, 2000, and P.F. 
Diehl and C. Ku, The Dynamics of International Law, Cambridge, 2010. 
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GAL and EU administrative law. A research agenda 
Edoardo Chiti* 
1. Purpose 
This paper aims at identifying a specific field of research, that of the relations between global and EU 
administrative law, at outlining the main research questions that should be tackled by legal science, 
and at assessing the state of advancement of legal reflection on the subject. 
2. The Manifold Relations between Global and EU Administrative Law 
Far from being two separate bodies of law, global administrative law and European Union (EU) 
administrative law come to contact and establish many types of relationships in an ever increasing 
number of policy areas. These relationships take a great variety of forms, are characterized by 
variations and differences, raise uneasy legal issues. 
Two examples may give a taste of the variety, complexity and problematic character of the 
interplay between global and EU administrative law. The first refers to the relations between global 
and EU environmental management systems, the second to the EU Atalanta military operation 
implementing the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions concerning piracy on the high 
seas off the coast of Somalia. 
As for environmental management systems, the EU has developed in the Nineties an Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS). EMAS is a voluntary management tool for organisations 
aiming at improving their environmental and financial performance and at communicating their 
environmental achievements to stakeholders and society in general1. It is part of the EU strategy 
towards a sustainable growth based on a more resource-efficient, greener and more competitive 
economy. It reflects the attempt of the EU institutions to reach such objectives through instruments 
based on collaboration and partnership with enterprises rather than on legislative requirements, as well 
as a general tendency to establish environmental management systems in the global legal space2.  
EMAS interacts with other environmental management systems developed by non-EU actors. 
Environmental management systems are rapidly spreading in the global legal space. One remarkable 
example is provided by EN ISO 14001:2004, a certifiable standard adopted by the International 
Standards Organisation (ISO). It provides the most important requirements for an environmental 
management system and it is used worldwide by public and private organisations.  
Interestingly enough, the relationship between EMAS and EN ISO 14001:2004 is not an easy one. 
EMAS and ISO/EN ISO 14001 share the same objective, i.e. to provide good environmental 
management. Yet, EU institutions consider EMAS more advanced than ISO/EN ISO 14001 and 
                                                     
* Professor of Administrative Law, Tuscia University of Viterbo. 
1 Regulation (EC) No 1221/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the voluntary 
participation by organisations in a Community eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS), repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 761/2001 and Commission Decisions 2001/681/EC and 2006/193/EC, OJEU 2009 L 342. See also Regulation (EC) 
No 1893/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 establishing the statistical 
classification of economic activities NACE Revision 2 and amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3037/90 as well as 
certain EC Regulations on specific statistical domains, in OJEU 2006 L 393. 
2 An account of the EMAS is provided by J. Clausen (with M. Keil and M. Jungwirth), The State of EMAS in the EU. Eco-
Management as a Tool for Sustainable Development, 2002 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/pdf/general/literature_study_020506_en.pdf); and M.S. Wenk, The European 
Union's Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London, New York, Springer, 2005. 
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encourage EU and non-EU organisations that are already ISO/EN ISO 14001 certified to “step-up” to 
EMAS. EMAS is considered more rigorous because the environmental performance of the 
organisation is continuously improved, legal compliance is required and checked throughout the whole 
process before and after registration, a strict internal environmental auditing is carried out. As for the 
move from ISO/EN ISO 14001 to EMAS, the Commission has issued a number of guidances to 
facilitate organisations in taking all the necessary additional steps. 
Are EMAS and EN ISO 14001:2004 two functionally complementary schemes, serving the same 
purposes through equivalent regulatory frameworks? Can one consider EMAS as a scheme 
implementing and further developing on a regional level a regulatory tool increasingly used in the 
global legal space? Or do EMAS and EN ISO 14001:2004 coexist in a less peaceful way, competing 
one with the other? If their relation is a competitive one, what is the rationale for competition?  
A very different interplay between global administrative law and EU administrative law is 
illustrated by a second example, that of the Atalanta military operation of the EU.  
The Atalanta military operation was launched by the EU Council in the late 2008 with the view of 
contributing to the implementation of several Security Council Resolutions concerning piracy and 
robbery against vessels on the high seas off the coast of Somalia3. Several actors were involved in the 
operation: the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations; the EU institutions 
and bodies competent in the field of ESDP (such as the Council, the Political and Security Committee 
and the Military Committee), together with the EU bodies set up in connection with the Atalanta 
operation, such as the Operation Commander; governments and military administrations of the EU 
Member States as well as those of the third countries participating in the operation; and, lastly, the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. 
The implementation of the Atalanta operation does not only require that EU administrative 
regulation and national administrative law combine in a single regulatory framework. It also implies 
that EU administrative regulation comes to contact with the UN regulation. Differently from the case 
of environmental management systems, what is at stake here is not a direct interaction between an 
instrument of EU administrative law and an instrument of global administrative law, but an interaction 
between EU administrative law and a body of regulation belonging to traditional public international 
law. What is interesting, however, is that EU administrative regulation and UN regulation seem to 
combine one with the other in a quite coherent way and to establish a unitary regime: while the UN 
regulation provides the general framework of the administrative implementation of the operation, the 
EU regulation sets forth the details of the operation Atalanta, governing operational and tactical 
command and control, and national law regulates the service relationship between military staff and 
national administrations, such as, for example, the exercise of disciplinary powers.  
What is the nature of such emerging unitary regime? Does it respond to the traditional features of 
public international law? Or would it not be preferable to analyze this regime instead as a branch of 
global administrative law, taking into consideration the essentially unitary character of that regime; its 
reliance on sources other than exclusively conventional ones; and its main function of regulating, by 
means of administrative tools, the combined action of a plurality of different public powers, both 
national and non-national, in a specific sector of the global legal space? If so, what is the contribution 
specifically provided by EU administrative law to the emergence of such global administrative law by 
sector? 
                                                     
3 On the Atalanta operation, see S.J. Hansen, Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden.Myths, Misconception and Remedies, 
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research Report 2009:29 
(http://www.nibr.no/uploads/publications/26b0226ad4177819779c2805e91c670d.pdf). See also G. Grevi, D. Helly, D. 
Keohane (Eds.), European Security and Defense Policy. The First Ten Years (1999-2009), EU Institute for Security 
Studies, 2009 (http://ddata.over-blog.com/xxxyyy/2/48/17/48/Fichiers-pdf/Europe/ESDP_10-web.pdf). 
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3. The Research Questions 
The cases of the environmental management systems and of the Atalanta operation are only two of the 
many examples that may illustrate the great variety and complexity of the interplay between EU 
administrative law and global administrative law. Other examples might be taken from sectors ranging 
from competition to economic regulation (e.g. public procurements, accounting and auditing, and 
banking supervision) and social regulation (e.g. environmental protection and consumer protection). 
These further examples would confirm that the interactions between EU and global administrative law 
determine the emergence of a legal and institutional space rich of variations and tensions. 
Notwithstanding its institutional and legal richness, though, the interplay between EU and global 
administrative law has not yet been identified as an autonomous and relevant field of research.  
This lack of recognition has no clear explanation. One might suggest, however, that it reflects a 
specific understanding of the nature of the EU. Admittedly, the study of global administrative law has 
requested scholars to engage in the investigation of the relationships between different sets of 
administrative law, in two main directions: first, the “vertical” relationships between global 
administrative law and national administrative law; second, the “horizontal” relationships among 
different global administrative regimes, that is among the global administrative laws governing 
specific sectoral global regulatory systems4. It may be that the relationships between global 
administrative law and EU administrative law have been considered to fall in one of these two boxes, 
and not to deserve autonomous consideration. EU administrative law, in other terms, might be 
considered as the administrative law either of a State-like body or of a regulatory system beyond the 
State, with the consequence that the relationships between global and EU administrative law do not 
deserve to be explored and analyzed as such. Such relationships may be investigated either as 
“vertical” relationships between global administrative law and a specific type of national 
administrative law or as “horizontal” relationships among the administrative laws governing specific 
regulatory systems beyond the State. 
Should this be the implicit reason behind the tendency to over-look the interplay between global 
and EU administrative law, yet, it would be an unconvincing one. Neither representation of the EU is 
indeed correct. The EU is not a regulatory system beyond the State homogeneous to the global 
regulatory systems as identified by the global administrative law studies: for example, it is not a 
sectoral system, but it has a quasi-general jurisdiction; and it relies on a constitutional architecture that 
is simply absent in the global regulatory systems. Nor is the EU a federal State, as it ambiguously 
combines federal, intergovernmental and governance elements in a post-national polity. Whatever our 
precise understanding of the European polity is, the peculiarities of the EU suggest that the 
relationships between global and EU administrative law might take forms and be carried out through 
processes different from those that are typical both of the vertical relationships between global and 
national administrative law and of the horizontal relationships among different global administrative 
regimes. The interplay between EU and global administrative law represents an autonomous field of 
research, deserving specific attention. 
Within this field of research, many research questions may and should be raised. Two sets of 
questions, though, are prominent. 
The first set of questions is oriented to an analytical understanding of the interactions between 
global and EU administrative law. Which game of forces characterizes, in the sectors where such 
relationships take place, the interactions between EU administrative law and global administrative 
law? To which extent and through which legal techniques are EU administrations subject not only to 
EU law but also to global administrative law? And to which extent and through which legal techniques 
                                                     
4 The point is developed in the framework paper by S. Cassese, What is Global Administrative Law and Why Study it?, in 
this working paper, passim.  
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are global regulatory systems subject to the influence of EU administrative law? Is there opposition or 
communication among the two legal systems? And what principles or rules govern the co-existence 
and the interplay between EU and global administrative law?  
The second set of questions aims at reconstructing the result of such game of forces. Does the 
interplay produce an extension of EU administrative law beyond the EU formal boundaries? Does it 
produce an extension of global administrative law? Doest it give place to a specific body of 
administrative law, different both from EU and global administrative law? If so, what are its 
distinguishing features? And what is the specific contribution provided to the new body of 
administrative law respectively by EU administrative law and by global administrative law? Provided 
that EU and global administrative laws are two bodies of law having rather different features (for 
example, in terms of formalization, mechanisms of compliance, public-private distinction, 
administrative powers), how do they exactly combine in a coherent overall framework? 
4. An Unexplored Field of Research 
Admittedly, these are, at the time of writing, questions without an answer. Legal science has devoted 
some attention to certain aspects of the interplay between global and EU administrative law. This is 
the case, for example, of the studies on the EU participation to international organizations, which 
provide very useful insights on certain fundamental channels of interpenetration between the EU and 
global regulatory systems5. It is also the case of the literature exploring the forms and rationales of the 
dialogue between the European Court of Justice and the courts of some regulatory systems beyond the 
State, such as the system established by the European Convention of Human Rights6. Moreover, the 
interaction between EU and global administrative law seems to be at the centre of an increasing 
number of essays dedicated to single policy-fields7. With the exception of some remarkable works on 
judicial dialogue8, however, these studies are rarely carried out by making recourse to the analytical 
tools of administrative law, they reflect very different understandings of the global legal space, and 
they never tackle the overall questions lying at the heart of the interplay between global and EU 
administrative law. 
Against this background, a possible way forward is indicated by a volume on the relationships and 
comparison between global administrative law and EU administrative law published in 20119. This 
book represents only a very preliminary attempt to explore a dense area of new legal issues, which 
                                                     
5 See, e.g., the essays collected in Julia Lieb/Nicolai von Ondarza/ Daniela Schwarzer (Eds.), The European Union in 
International Fora, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011; see also the articles collected in the special issue of the Journal of 
European Integration dedicated to “The Performance of the EU in International Institutions”, Vol. 33, No. 6, November 
2011 (the various papers are introduced by the framework paper by K.E. Jørgensen, S. Oberthür and J. Shahin, 
Introduction: Assessing the EU’s Performance in International Institutions – Conceptual Framework and Core Findings; 
among the various articles, see the horizontal analysis carried out by R.A. Wessel, The Legal Framework for the 
Participation of the European Union in International Institutions). 
6 See, e.g., S. Douglas-Scott, A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights 
Acquis, in Common Market Law Review, 2006, p. 629 ff. 
7 See, e.g., C. Secchi and A. Villafranca (Eds.), Global Governance and the role of the EU, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 
2011, dedicated to economic growth. 
8 We are here referring to Sabino Cassese’s reflections on judicial dialogue within the global legal space, including the 
specific case of the relations between the Luxembourg Court and the Strasbourg Court: see, in particular, S. Cassese, I 
tribunali di Babele. I giudici alla ricerca di un nuovo ordine globale, Roma, Donzelli, 2009, p. 71 ff. and p. 80 ff See 
also E. D’Alterio, La funzione di regolazione delle corti nello spazio amministrativo globale, Milano, Giuffrè, 2010, at p. 
87 ff. 
9 I am taking the liberty to refer to my own work, and in particular to the following volume: E. Chiti and B.G. Mattarella 
(Eds.), Global Administrative Law and EU Administrative Law. Relationships, Legal Issues and Comparison, Heidelberg, 
Dordrecht, London, New York, Springer, 2011. 
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further research should develop and systematize. Yet, it may be regarded as a useful first step, for two 
reasons.  
First, it proposes a method to analyze the new legal field of research. This method is based on two 
different strands: one is comparison, the other is exploration of the linkages and connections between 
EU administrative law and global administrative law from a variety of viewpoints (organizational, 
procedural, functional, and so on). This double approach is promising as it tries at the same time to 
consider the distinguishing features of each of the two bodies of administrative law and to catch the 
ongoing processes of their convergence and conflict. It might also lead to enrich and refine the 
analytical tools of EU and global administrative law, as it is not interested in applying to a number of 
sectors a predefined set of EU and global administrative law categories, but it asks whether it is 
possible to develop further analytical tools. 
Second, the volume proposes some preliminary conclusions, which might be tested and verified by 
further research.  
As for the comparative dimension of the inquiry, the analysis carried out in the book indicates that 
differences between the EU and the global legal systems can be easily depicted for administrative 
organization, ways of action and instruments of review. EU law is well settled in its principles, bodies 
and procedures, while the global one is so diverse, as to make it often impossible to draw general 
conclusions. The former has very efficient and secure ways to affect national law, while the latter is 
unsteady and adaptable. More generally, the former relies strongly on national public authorities, 
while the latter looks more freely for partners, even in the private sector, and often is itself the product 
of private bodies. Moreover, the EU has a large scope of action and performs several different 
functions, while the global legal systems tend to focus on specific yet important policies and to act 
mainly as regulatory regimes. 
However, there are similarities and exceptions to these tendencies. EU and global regulations are 
often similar, at times converge and reinforce each other. Global law uses organizational models and 
manners of action typical of the EU law, which in turn adjusts to many global regulations, making its 
own law similar to the global one. Convergence is particularly strong for some aspects, such as the 
principles regulating administrative procedures, and in some sectors, like the environmental 
protection. Also global law often relies on national governments, while EU law does not neglect 
private enforcement. They both are largely western systems of law. 
As for the interactions between global and EU administrative law, the volume shows that the 
interplay between these two bodies of administrative law does not respond to a single overall rule.  
EU and global regulations are sometimes similar, and they converge and reinforce each other for 
certain aspects (e.g., the principles regulating administrative procedures). In certain sectors, they seem 
to coexist easily, as their harmonization or coordination efforts are directed towards common or 
connected purposes and the instruments used are sometimes the same. In other policy-fields, EU and 
global administrative law not only coexist peacefully, but even pursue common goals and tend to 
reinforce each other through cross implementations and integrated organizations. 
At the same time, however, the two bodies of administrative law maintain important differences, 
for example as for the values they encapsulate, the way in which they deal with compliance, the way 
in which they manage authority and power, the way in which they develop a constitutional anchorage. 
Moreover, they may also conflict one with other, directly or indirectly, for example because the EU 
administrative instruments may be conceived as alternatives to functionally equivalent global 
administrative law instruments. If “cooperation, division of labor and dialogue are common among 
global regimes and their constituent institutions”10, the interplay between EU and global 
administrative law may be an exception in so far as it may give rise to competition, non-cooperation, 
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reciprocal impermeability and even clash between the two sets of administrative laws. And this is not 
without implication, as it implies that the interplay between EU and global administrative law does not 
always facilitate the emergence of a general body of law at the global level. 
5. The Possible Implications of the Study of the Relations between Global and EU 
Administrative Law  
This paper has pointed to a specific field of research, that of the relations between global and EU 
administrative law; it has outlined the main research questions that should be tackled by legal science; 
and it has assessed the state of advancement of legal reflection on the subject. The main conclusion is 
that the relations between global and EU administrative law represent a promising field of research, 
but such field has been so far largely ignored by legal science, and its features, tensions and issues 
have just started to be explored. 
While waiting for further research, capable to provide a more accurate and convincing account of 
the matter, it should be observed that the study of the various forms of the interplay between EU and 
global administrative law is an important exercise, with possible broad implications.  
Three main implications should be mentioned here, by way of conclusion. 
To begin with, tackling the research questions previously identified could shed light on the 
distinguishing features respectively of EU administrative law and global administrative law. The 
inquiry of the forms, modalities and effects of the interactions between global and EU administrative 
law is first of all a fruitful way to deepen our understanding of each body of administrative law beyond 
the State, to recognize its distinguishing features and specificities, to refine the analytical tools for its 
study.  
Second, the inquiry of the relations between global and EU administrative law could usefully 
contribute to the reflection on the overall features of administrative law. In particular, it might allow us 
to reflect on the functional adaptability of administrative law. Processes of hybridation, cross-
fertilization, transplants and the like are well known to administrative lawyers interested in 
comparison. Yet, they have been studied mainly with reference to national administrative laws. The 
study of the interplay between EU and global administrative law provides a case-study to reflect on the 
administrative law resulting from the interaction between two administrative laws developed outside 
the nation-State, which might make a difference.  
Finally, the research questions are relevant in so far as they could permit to advance in the 
reconstruction of the features and dynamics of the global legal space. They could shed light, in 
particular, on a number of underlying and inherent tensions of the global legal space: this is the case of 
the tensions between unity and fragmentation, between politics and administration, and between local 
and universal, which represent some fundamental fault lines of the global legal space. And they could 
provide legal science with helpful insights to engage in the reconstruction of the overall features of the 
legal space, an effort which is crucial for the advancement both of global administrative law and EU 
law studies. 
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The Transgovernmental Power in the EU and Beyond: A Dangerous Branch? 
Mario Savino* 
1. Introduction 
For some scholars, the transgovernmental phenomenon1 amounts to a technocratic nightmare2 and 
constitutes an opaque source of intergovernmentalism.3 Such bodies – so the criticism runs – are 
composed of like-minded faceless bureaucrats, all using the same kind of ties and after-shave, who 
meet in Brussels or in Geneva behind closed doors and take decisions that affect the lives of millions 
of citizens without being accountable to anybody. 
Other scholars, by contrast, associate transgovernmentalism with a non-hierarchical system of 
governance, dependent upon persuasion, argument and discursive processes, rather then on command, 
control and/or strategic action. Within such bodies high-level national officials and (more rarely) 
scientists discuss problems that are common to various states and address them by arguing rather than 
bargaining. Due to their deliberative style, a «shift from “power to reason”» occurs and a new kind of 
democratic experiment – «deliberative supranationalism»4 – gradually emerges. 
Who is right? This paper argues that none of them is. The association between 
transgovernmentalism and democracy (whatever the latter may mean) is often misleading. Many 
scholars misunderstand the transgovernmental phenomenon because they overlook its inherently 
administrative dimension. I will try to qualify my claim by addressing three questions: a) How 
widespread is the transgovernmental phenomenon? b) Why is it so widespread? c) Is it democratic or 
not?  
2. The rise of transgovernmentalism 
Transgovernmental networks are everywhere. Within the EU institutional setting, there are around 
1500 such bodies, usually referred to simply as committees.  
About thousand committees of government experts are established (most of them by the 
Commission itself) to assist the Commission’s directorate generals in drafting legislative proposals. 
                                                     
* Associate Professor of Administrative Law, Tuscia University of Viterbo. 
1 Though often used interchangeably, the terms “transgovernmentalism” and “transnationalism”, in their strict meaning, 
point to two different concepts: “Transnational interactions necessarily involve nongovernmental actors,” while 
transgovernmental relations are “interactions between governmental subunits across state boundaries”: J.S. Nye and R.O. 
Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion, 25 International Organization (1971) 733; see also 
R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 World Politics (1974) 43. 
In this paper I refer to transgovernmentalism stricto sensu. 
2 M. Shapiro,“Deliberative,” “Independent” Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe Echo the E.U.?, 68 Law 
& Contemp. Probl. (2005) 314. 
3 J.H.H. Weiler, The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism, 1 Yearbook of European Law (1982), 
267 ff. See also Id., Epilogue: “Comitology” as Revolution – Infranationalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy, in C. 
Joerges and E. Vos (eds.), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Oxford, 1999) 343-346. 
4 C. Joerges e J. Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalization 
of Comitology, 3 European Law Journal (1997), 273. See also, among the numerous responses to criticisms, C. Joerges, 
“Deliberative Supranationalism” – Two Defences, 8 European Law Journal (2002), 146, e Id., “Good Governance” in 
the European Internal Market – Two Competing Legal Conceptualisations of European Integration and their Synthesis, 
in A. von Bogdandy, P.C. Mavroidis e Y. Mény (eds.), European Integration and International Coordination (Kluwer, 
2002) 219. 
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These colleges are usually chaired by the Commission (less frequently, by the Council) and are 
composed of experts sent to Brussels by the relevant national administrative units.5  
In the legislative phase, a second group of transgovernmental bodies intervenes, namely Council 
working groups or groupes de travail. Their number approximates two hundred.6 Under the 
coordination of the Committee of permanent representatives (COREPER), these auxiliary bodies 
prepare Council decisions. The agreements achieved at committee level are double-checked by the 
Coreper and merely rubber-stamped by the ministers in their Council meetings. 
Moreover, more two hundred-fifty comitology committees make sure that Member States’ 
administrative apparatuses are involved in the executive or implementing stage of the EU decision-
making7. National delegations composed of administrative officials take part in the meetings, under 
the chair of the Commission. A specific piece of EU legislation – Regulation n. 182/2011 – 
analytically defines the procedures according to which such transgovernmental bodies issue (binding 
and non-binding) opinions on the implementing acts that the Commission wants to adopt.8  
The transgovernmental paradigm has, thus, reached a high level of specialization and refinement in 
the European system, probably higher than in any other international organization9. 
Nonetheless, transgovernmental networks also spread across the global order. They can be found in 
every sort of international organization, from those having a general competence to highly specialized 
ones, from universal or open organizations to non-universal or closed ones. Here again, such bodies 
are composed of national delegations of administrative officials and are typically chaired by a 
supranational institution (a secretariat).  
From a structural viewpoint, those bodies can be divided into two broad categories.  
Within the first one fit “horizontal” transgovernmental bodies, whose main features are three. To 
begin with, these committees are autonomous or “headless”, not being incorporated into an 
international organization. In addition, there are not disciplined by treaties, but rather by informal 
agreements between independent or quasi-independent national agencies. Finally, they do not adopt 
formal decisions, binding to States, and are set up for different reasons – to coordinate or facilitate 
information-sharing among national regulators, to draft guidelines and spread best practices, to set 
(legally non-binding) international standards. The most well-known examples are the International 
Organization of Securities Commission (Iosco), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(Iais), the G-10 committees, such as the Committee on the Global Financial System, the Committee on 
                                                     
5 In this heterogeneous category, fit also “high-level” government expert committees, whose specific job is policy 
formation, and other committees (the European Regulatory Groups) that bring together the heads of national independent 
regulatory agencies.  
6 In Council of the European Union, List of Council preparatory bodies (doc. n. 5269/12, 11 January 2012), 189 active 
working groups are mentioned (the total rises if one considers the different forms in which many Council committees 
actually meet). 
7 According to the last official assessment, EU comitology committees are 266: see European Commission, Report from 
the Commission on the working of committees in 2009, 2 July 2010, COM(2010)354 final, at 4, tab. I.  
8 Article 291 TFEU and Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 
2011, laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the 
Commission’s exercise of implementing powers.  
9 J. Trondal, An Institutionalist Perspective on EU Committee Decision Making, Ces, WP n. 6, 2003, p. 21 
(www.hia.no/oksam/ces/), also in B. Reinalda and B. Verbeek (eds.), Decision Making within International 
Organizations (London, 2004) 154 (asserting that «few international organizations have institutionalized a committee 
system that integrates external expertise and national civil servants to the same extent as the EU. Accordingly, there is 
greater interaction between community institutions and domestic administrations in the EU than in traditional 
intergovernmental organizations»), and A. M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, 2004) 350 (stating that “the EU 
has many features that make its distinctive form of government by network exportable to other regions and to the world 
at large”).  
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Payment and Settlement Systems and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (or Basel 
Committee).  
The other category includes “vertical” transgovernmental bodies. These are auxiliary or secondary 
bodies that operate within an international organization and typically set harmonization or 
standardization rules or monitor the correct domestic implementation of international decisions. Also 
these bodies are composed of national (middle or high-level) officials and supranational official, i.e. 
civil servants working within international secretariats. Thus, these fora open national systems both 
“laterally”, to promote dialogue between domestic administrations, and “vertically”, to foster 
cooperation among supranational apparatuses and national implementing terminals. Within this group 
of “mixed” or “vertical” transgovernmental networks fit , just to mention a few, WTO secondary 
bodies administering multilateral or plurilateral agreements, the UN “functional committees”, 
exercising consultative and initiative tasks, and the so-called Codex Committees, assisting the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission in the drafting of food-safety standards.10 
The omnipresence of transgovernmental networks in the EU and global institutional settings shows 
the limits of the multi-level metaphor: far from being separated by a void, the national and the 
European/international levels are linked by a densely populated area of inter-administrative colleges. 
Beside intergovernmental and supranational institution, the transgovernmental dimension represents a 
third kind of executive power beyond the State.  
3. The virtues of transgovernmentalism 
Having ascertained that transgovernmental networks stretch everywhere in the global and European 
arenas, the next question concerns the reasons for this success. I will mention three of them. 
First, this institutional model provides a viable tool for national executives to cope with the 
Europeanization and globalization of regulatory decision-making. The rules concerning meta-national 
phenomena, from global warming to international terrorism, increasingly de-nationalize, being 
adopted by supranational and international institutions. Transgovernmental bodies offer a way to re-
nationalize decisions that are taken beyond the State, insofar as they enable member States to make 
their “voices” heard in all the phases of the ultra-national decision-making process (even when 
intergovernmental bodies are not directly involved). Government officials that sit on such committees 
pursue the interest defined by their domestic administration and make sure that this interest is 
adequately considered and protected by the European or global decision. The consensus rule prevails 
and the joint-decision making, in turn, erodes the margins for agreements that frustrate national 
interests, thus reinforcing one of the distinguishing features of the global polity: transactionalism.11  
A second reason is the “lateral” opening they allow between national administrations. Through 
such colleges, in fact, domestic bureaucracies jointly investigate and discuss common problems, share 
information and exchange best practices. Therefore, they set in motion a mechanism of inter-
administrative coordination and gradual approximation of administrative “styles” at both the European 
and global levels12. Moreover, some bodies also consult with independent experts (e.g. scientists, 
                                                     
10 On auxiliary or secondary bodies in international organizations, still important is P. Reuter, Les organes subsidiaires des 
organisations internationales, in Hommage d’une génération de juristes au président Basdevant (Paris, 1960) 415. See 
also J. Makarczyk, La création des organes subsidiaires et les statuts des organisations internationales, 6 Polish 
Yearbook of International Law (1972-1973) 183, and M. Savino, The Role of Transnational Committees in the European 
and Global Orders, 6 Global Jurist (2006), at http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol6/iss3/art5/. 
11 On “transactionalism” or governance by agreement, S. Cassese, The Global Polity (Sevilla, 2012) 32. 
12 See S. Cassese, Divided Powers: European Administration and National Bureaucracies, in S. Cassese (ed.), The 
European Administration, Bruxelles, 1987. 
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academic professors) and private stakeholders, thus enhancing the “quality” (in terms of technical 
consistency) and the participatory nature of the decision-making.  
Thirdly, the transgovernmental dimension helps to bridge the gap, endemic to legal systems based 
upon indirect rule, between legislation and execution. In both the European and global legal systems, 
national administrations usually have the task of applying ultra-state norms. The implementation of 
these norms is thus facilitated by the participation of state administrators in the formation of European 
and global norms. Moreover, it also requires that conflicts between the supranational law (ius 
commune) and domestic laws (iura particularia) be avoided. This need exists in the European Union, 
where the model of indirect administration is still prevalent, being the execution of supranational 
legislation typically entrusted with domestic authorities. The same need is even more pressing in the 
global system, where international organizations have no autonomous executive power and where 
there is no general principle of supremacy and direct effect of the ultra-state law in the domestic 
systems.  
In short, transgovernmentalism is an essential tool for legitimizing the action of European and 
global institutions, for reconciling national and supranational interests and for connecting the activity 
of ultra-state legislative bodies with the activity of state executing administrations13.  
4. Is transgovernmentalism undemocratic? 
One way to address this question is to look at the recent developments of EU comitology. Before the 
Lisbon Treaty, Article 202 of the EC Treaty simply provided for the conferral on the Commission of 
powers for implementing legislative acts. The Commission exerted that power with the assistance of 
comitology committees, which issued opinions on all the executive measures: in case of negative 
opinion, the Council might have the opportunity to intervene and settle the issue14.  
A major reform occurred in 2006, when a specific comitology procedure – the so-called 
“regulatory procedure with scrutiny” – has enabled the Parliament (and the Council) to veto executive 
measures of general scope that are designed to amend legislative texts and are, thus, considered as 
quasi-legislative acts15. This reform was introduced to meet the parliamentary quest for institutional 
parity vis-à-vis the Council. Comitology, after all, is a creation of the Council. National officials 
participating in comitology meetings are accountable to the Council, via their national ministers. Put 
simply, the Parliament – once achieved a full legislative status with the co-decision – could not accept 
the quasi-legislative power be delegated to the Commission-comitology pair, unless it could control 
them directly.16 
Since the Lisbon Treaty entered in force, things have radically changed. The main innovation is the 
sharp exclusion of comitology from the quasi-legislative sphere. According to Article 290 TFUE, 
delegated acts are adopted by the Commission under the direct and exclusive control of the legislative 
                                                     
13 See, amplius, M. Savino, I comitati dell’Unione europea (Milano, 2005) and Id., The Role of Committees in the EU 
Institutional Balance: Deliberative or Procedural Supranationalism?, in Thomas Christiansen, Johanna Oettel and 
Beatrice Vaccari (eds.), 21st Century Comitology: The Role of Implementation Committees in the Wider European 
Union (Maastricht, 2009) 19-47.  
14 Articles 4 (management procedure) and 5 (regulatory procedure) of Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999, 
laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. 
15 Council decision 2006/512/EC of 17 July 2006, amending Decision 1999/468/EC. 
16 For an historical appraisal of comitology, C.F. Bergström, Comitology - Delegation of Powers in the European Union and 
the Committee System (Oxford, 2005). On the 2006 reform, K.S.C. Bradley, Halfway House: The 2006 Comitology 
Reforms and the European Parliament, 31 West European Politics (2008) 837 ff.  
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authorities. What was the purpose of the segregation of comitology in the lower executive sphere?17 
Behind this important change in the European institutional balance, there is – beside Parliament’s 
hostility for comitology – a democracy-enhancing purpose, that is, the intention to strengthen EU 
democracy by reducing the relevance of its technocratic components. 
Has this purpose been achieved? Has transgovernmentalism been really excluded from the quasi-
legislative area? Surprisingly enough, the answer is negative. Article 290 TFEU entrusts the 
Parliament and the Council with a veto power over Commission’s measures and the power to revoke 
the delegation altogether. Both these powers presuppose the ability of the legislative authorities to 
perform a proper scrutiny over the each delegated act. However, as the post-2006 experience with the 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny has shown, both the Parliament and the Council are ill-suited to 
control the heavy flow of quasi-legislative decisions stemming from the Commission18.  
This is why, two days after the Lisbon Treaty had entered in force, the Council stressed «the 
importance of a strong commitment from the Commission to ensure that the experience and the 
concerns of experts of the Member States are heard and taken into account to create confidence in the 
new procedure» and, while acknowledging that «no reintroduction of comitology is possible, since it 
would be incompatible with the Treaty», asked the Commission to reflect on the opportunity to make 
the consultation of national experts «systematic»19.  
If the Council misses transgovernmentalism, the nostalgia of the Commission is not weaker. 
Despite the usual image of comitology as a hostile watchdog on the Commission, consultation with 
national official is important for the Commission too: throughout committees, the supranational 
institution borrows technical solution from national administrative best practices, builds a pre-political 
consensus which facilitates the approval of its proposals in the Council, and establishes cooperative 
relations with domestic administrative authorities, which are in charge for the implementation of EU 
law. Here again, the virtues of transgovernmentalism reappear and help to explain why, seven days 
later, the Commission accepted the Council offer: it confirmed that it «intends systematically to 
consult experts from the national authorities of all the Member States, which will be responsible for 
implementing the delegated acts once they have been adopted»20.  
After a long negotiation, also the Parliament surrendered and signed, in April 2011, a Common 
Understanding on EU delegated acts, whose anodyne wording states that «The Commission, when 
preparing and drawing up delegated acts, will (…) carry out appropriate and transparent consultations 
well in advance, including at expert level».21 This implies that the Commission will elaborate EU 
delegated acts in close cooperation with national administrations, as represented (not anymore in 
comitology, but) in the already mentioned committees of government experts22.  
                                                     
17 Comitology is now confined in the lower executive sphere, concerning the adoption of implementing acts (Article 291 
TFEU). 
18 M. Keading and A. Hardacre, Delegated & Implementing Acts: The New Comitology, Eipa paper, 2 March 2011; Id., The 
execution of delegated powers after Lisbon: a timely analysis of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny and its lessons for 
delegated acts, EUI working paper, RSCAS 2010/85; V. Georgiev, Commission on the Loose? Delegated Lawmaking 
and Comitology after Lisbon, EUSA paper, 3-5 March 2011. 
19 Report of the Council of the European Union to the Coreper, Implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon - Delegated acts 
(16998/09, 2 December 2009) 3. 
20 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Implementation of Article 290 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union COM(2009) 673 final (9 December 2009) 6. 
21 Common Understanding on EU delegated acts, para. 4, unpublished, yet available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st08/st08640.en11.pdf. 
22 See above, § 2. 
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Moreover, the Council itself has clarified that its veto power over delegated acts, provided for in 
Article 290, will be exercised by means of its groups de travail23. Just like legislative proposals, quasi-
legislative proposals put forward by the Commission will fall under the scrutiny of Council working 
groups, which are – as observed – just another variant of European transgovernmentalism. 
The overall outcome of this silent institutional adjustment is that, in the quasi legislative sphere 
(Article 290 TFEU), the transgovernmental oversight over the Commission is not exercised anymore 
by comitology, but by other two types of EU transgovernmental colleges. Both the governmental 
expert committees and the Council working groups are much less formalized and, hence, much less 
transparent than comitology. Not surprisingly, EU lobbyists complain that they will not even know 
when and where to lobby, being it difficult also for Brussels’ insiders to understand which committee 
will help the Commission defining the proposal, when it will meet and who will sit at that table24.  
Assessed in a “democratic” perspective, this institutional parabola seems to be quite paradoxical. A 
reform aimed at marginalising comitology, understood as a source of undemocratic decision-making, 
ends up with a shift of quasi-legislative decisions from a more transparent and accountable 
transgovernmental realm (comitology, now operating under Regulation 182 of 2011) to much less 
transparent, formalized and accountable ones (Council working groups and committees of government 
experts). 
From this European tale a good lesson for global transgovernmentalism can be drawn. Questioning 
the democratic pedigree of this administrative reality represents a false start. Technocracy and 
democracy might well be at odds with each other. Yet, technocracy is an unavoidable piece of the 
democratic game, just like transgovernmentalism is an irredeemable face of the executive power 
beyond the State – as the EU case patently shows. This relatively new phenomenon poses an old 
question: how to check administrative regulatory power? If approached from this perspective, 
transgovernmentalism becomes a tractable issue. The administrative law toolbox might, then, be 
helpful in the search for the right answer, provided that we put the right question. 
 
                                                     
23 On this silent development, see European Scrutiny Committee, Common Understanding on EU delegated acts, 13 luglio 
2011, par. 10.15-10.17, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-
xxxiii/42812.htm. 
24 For a telling lobbyist perspective, D. Guéguen, Comitology: Hijacking European Power? (Brussels, 2011). 
  
 
